Advocates for China’s African intervention contend that the relationship constitutes a force for African development and progress. Proponents of this view see Chinese aid, trade, and investments with African countries as catalysts for economic prosperity. The starting point for the advocates’ claim entails comparison with Western assistance. Joshua Ramo's (2004) study provide the pivot for pitting the West with the East. Ramo introduced into the literature on China-Africa relationship what he called the Beijing Consensus (BC). BC is characterized by a desire to have equitable and peaceful high-quality growth (Suzuki, 2009). The approach, however, does not believe in uniform solutions—such as economic and political liberalization often propagated by the West. Rather, it has a ruthless willingness to innovate, experiment, and a lively defense of national borders and interests7 (ibid). By comparing the Beijing Consensus to the
Washington Consensus, Ramo considers China’s African approach as distinct because it involves little conditionalities relative to Western assistance which insists on trade liberalization, rule of law, and democracy. The apparent lack of restrictions and conditionalities associated with China’s African interventions contribute to national sovereignty8. National sovereignty is necessary for self-determination. This new physics of power, according to Ramo (2004), challenges Western hegemony and provides
7An idea that emphasizes the Westphalian logic of state sovereignty: One that sanctifies the
integrity of the territorial nation-state and the principle that no nation can interfere in the affairs of another. This has become a defining principle in China’s so-called non-interference stance in Africa.
8 Although many scholars suggest that China’s engagement with African countries is devoid of
conditionalities, this is not entirely true. African countries need to conform to the One-China policy. This policy enjoins all countries with diplomatic ties with China to not engage Taiwan. In addition to this political requirement, countries are also to purchase certain quantities of Chinese goods and service.
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African countries the leeway for global reintegration. Further, the BC offers Africa the latitude to shape and chart a new course of development. As suggested by Ramo, these gains are based on the understanding that China’s African trade provides market for raw materials, while its aid and investment contribute to infrastructure and generate
employment, promote skills and technology transfer. Ramo’s work is key in shaping the foregoing debate, but it tends to accord a passive role to the African state as it did not indicate how self-determination and related benefits can be forged. Despite these shortcomings, Ramo’s view resonates with those of other advocates who focus on other aspects of the BC.
Focusing on aid, Deborah Brautigam (2009) claims that Chinese loans, grants, and technical assitance vary in form and in content from those of the West. Building on Joshua Ramo’s comparative framework, Brautigam argues that aid from China prioritizes improving Africa’s productive capacity because Chinese aid focuses on projects like roads, dams, railways, schools, hospitals, and telecommunication infrastructure, elements ignored by the West. These projects are tailored towards the needs of African countries. They are not based on one-size-fits-all principles which typify Western assistance. Chinese interventions also involve promoting mutual interests. Because of the nature of the interventions, Chinese assistance contributes significantly to African development, and form the basis of employment and economic growth.
The importance of Chinese aid to Africa is often illustrated by China’s symbiotic relationship with Angola in the early 2000s. Angola’s relationship with China is a classic demonstration of what is known of China’s African intervention. Angola emerged in
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2002 after decades of civil war amidst crumbling infrastructure. The country was economically weak with poor credit ratings, albeit being rich in oil and diamonds. Post- war reconstruction efforts based on sourcing financial support from the IMF and World Bank were thwarted by the insistence on credit improvement and macroeconomic stability. The Bretton Woods institutions raised concerns about Angola’s governance, transparency, and corruption. While Angola’s leadership indicated their awareness of the issues raised by the Bretton Woods institutions and their willingness to address them, the World Bank and IMF did not budge. The insistence of the IMF led to Angola’s turn to China for help (Corkin, 2013). Subsequently, China accepted Angola’s request and offered $10-billion credit-line to support the reconstruction process involving the
provision of infrastructure, such as road, utilities, schools, and power generation (Corkin, 2011).
Although Chinese assistance to Angola did not include much conditionalities9 peculiar to the West, the agreement entailed repayment using resources, such as oil. For the period of the loan—17 years—100,000 barrels of oil would be shipped daily to China to service and repay the loan. Meanwhile, 70% of the infrastructure to be provided was outsourced to Chinese contractors (Bräutigam & Gallagher, 2014). These provisions encapsulate the essence of the Angola Model, which entails an arrangement whereby Chinese loans are repaid using resources. The way in which Chinese aid are bundled with strategies to extract resources is a major worry for analysts who see the approach as
9The most significant defining conditionality for diplomatic cooperation with China is respect for
the One-China principle—the assertion that only China NOT Taiwan represents all Chinese people.
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neocolonial because of their restriction on choosing a contractor and how such
contractors are paid (Carmody & Kragelund, 2016). However, advocates insist that such claims are misguided because China’s approach tend to curb misappropriation of funds that characterizes projects financed by Western aid (Moyo, 2009).
One other important issue that has emerged concerning China’s aid program in Africa regards the view that they have mostly been geared toward rogue and illiberal regimes (Alden, 2007). This issue is fundamental to the ongoing debate and has been extensively discussed by advocates, such as Ngaire Woods (2008) and Suzuki Shogo (2009). For Ngaire Woods, the allegation that China supports rogue governments and inhibit African development is unjustified. According to her, China’s approach in Africa is based on political noninterference which does not discriminate or judge countries using Western standards of governance. China considers its African counterparts as peers and equals who need development (Chipaike & Bischoff, 2018). Because China does not claim a moral high ground and remains less sacrosanct, it does not meddle in internal politics. Instead, it tries to separate its business from local politics. As a result of this decoupling principle, China’s activities embrace polities of variant hues. This practice fuels concerns that China props up rogue regimes and inhibits efforts of good governance on the continent. Advocates, such as Woods and Suzuki claim that these critiques tend to dwarf China’s good intentions in Africa. For them, China is a member of multilateral institutions, such as the UN whose peacekeeping operations in countries such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan contributes to stability and peace. China also played a crucial role in forging truce in Darfur by appointing a special envoy to Sudan. China also turned
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around a ship of grain for Zimbabwe and offered to meet opposition figures instead (Woods, 2008). From these illustrations, advocates assert that China uses diplomacy instead of violence and sanctions in addressing conflicts in Africa10. Unfortunately, most of these interventions are ignored, and are therefore not registered in scholarly works. Further, Woods contends that there is incontrovertible evidence that countries receiving Chinese support have experienced considerable growth. A case in point is the 11% growth registered by Sudan in 200711. Based on this evidence, it remains unfounded that China only support illiberal acts in Africa and inhibit the continent’s growth and
development.
In addition to the foregoing, another area that has preoccupied advocates of China-Africa relations is trade and its opportunities for African development. Dambisa Moyo’s (2009) work delves into how China shapes African trade and the opportunity it portends for the continent’s development. Moyo is a staunch critic of Western aid;
therefore, her intervention in the discussion is less surprising. For her, Western countries’ and institutions’ interventions in Africa through aid have not worked because such ‘cash donations’ often end up in the private bank accounts of the political elites and ruling classes. Western aid is also intended to recycle reserves hence attracts astronomical interest rates, usually 2.5% plus. Given these issues, she proposes trade as a means to
10 China opposes sanctions as a solution to political problems. The Chinese view sanction as
hurtful for the poor, in lieu of sanction, they support diplomacy. Some experts on international relation and conflict resolution oppose sanction. Sanctions only work when the targets have economic links in the country that may be damaged when such steps are taken.
11The elements and drivers of this growth is contested as most critics argue that it was solely
induced by the extraction and export of raw materials and crude with limited distributional effects.
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ensure African economic growth. The first way that trade produces growth, according to Moyo, is by increasing the number of actual goods and services that a country sells abroad; second, trade drives up the productivity of workforce. She posits that Africa has been trading with the West for generations, but has gained little due to structural and political circumstances, such as subsidies. Western subsidies make African commodities globally less competitive. Moyo characterizes Africa’s role in the global economy as tragic. As such, she remains critical of globalization and suggests that although Africa has not been bypassed by globalization, Africans have not benefited as much from it as the Western world. Given her critical views on globalization, Moyo sees China’s rise as a counterweight to the deleterious impact of globalization on Africa. According to her, China’s willingness to trade with Africa provides new growth opportunities for the continent. In this regard, she stresses that China’s resource demands underpin recent economic growth in Africa. Moyo’s claim on the benefit of China’s trade with Africa coupled with other elements of China’s African interventions, such as aid, investment constitute some of the main gains that have been touted by advocates of China. These claims have been countered by critics who see China’s deepening stake on the continent as less developmental and neocolonial.