The BBC European Service was the main instrument of British propaganda and throughout the war its broadcasts presented the official line of the government.6 This meant that the BBC
Polish Service could not contradict the government’s foreign policy which, from June 1941, took a pro-Soviet position. The Soviet Union was recognised as a more important ally than Poland, therefore news which could undermine the USSR position was withheld from
broadcast. The BBC Polish Service, as other European Services, was sponsored by a Treasury grant and required to follow the Political Warfare Executive (PWE) directives, written in accordance with Foreign Office policy. Issued weekly, the PWE directives ‘steered’ the European Service ‘in the right direction’ and outlined how the broadcasts should be ‘tailored’.7
As Cruickshank points out:
‘Although open broadcasting was confined to the truth, on the ground that honesty is the best policy, it did not necessarily have to be the whole truth. While the white broadcasters were required to promote the current approved propaganda themes no less than were their black brethren, some truths would support them better than others, and some were best left untold’.8
The aim of BBC European Service was not only to provide reliable and up to date information but, more importantly, to support war effort. As outlined by Noel Newsome, the European News Editor and, from December 1941, the Director of the European Service, propaganda to Europe was based on psychological warfare, namely ‘strengthening or preserving the right frame of mind in our audience’ and ‘operational- – exploiting that frame of mind in a practical
6 Garnett, D. The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939-1945 (London: St.
Ermin's Press, 2002), p. 9.
7 Cruickshank, C., The Fourth Arm: Psychological Warfare: 1938-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1981).
direction’.9 As the Director of the European Service, Newsome defined the principles and
purpose of the European Service as follow:
‘We report nothing that we don’t believe in, we supress nothing of importance which we believe to be true. We give bad news promptly and prominently. We express no views which we do not believe to be justified by the facts. We decide upon our ‘line’ according to our own estimate of the facts and only to a very minor degree as a ‘counter’ to the enemy’s version. We seek to explain our views to the listener: we do not trim that view merely because of his susceptibilities (…) We always take an offensive line: we attack all the time. (Even when things looked blackest we were aggressive (…) we do not subject our broadcasts either to the enemy’s propaganda line or to the prejudices and tastes of our listeners, enemy, neutral or friends (although in methods of presentation we take account of the audience mentality (…) We use as our ammunition not mere words but ideas, expressed in words’.10
Yet, in recognising radio as a weapon of war, Newsome also believed that it was a broadcaster’s job to make listeners ‘swallow the maximum dosage of propaganda’ without ‘doctoring’ though only to the extent that the interest and desire to continue listening was not minimised.11 In order
to achieve this goal Newsome argued:
‘All output must bear the stamp of authenticity and authority and must not be in danger of being exposed as otherwise (whether in fact it is or is not authentic and authoritative. (…) In short, if we depart from accuracy and the truth we must do so not accidently and carelessly but deliberately and systematically either because we know we shall not be found out or because it is considered essential to risk being found out for very special reason’.12
Newsome’s approach to broadcasting was very influential and throughout the war his weekly directives had a significant impact on the content of foreign broadcasts. The Director of the European Service, however, often ignored the Ministry of Information (MoI) and PWE
directives and pursued his own policy, although he argued that there was no difference between his and the PWE directives.13 Yet, this claim is questionable as he himself argued in December
1943 that the success of the European Service ‘has been due not to the creation of the PWE but
9BBC WAC, E / , Pape Politi al Wa fare: Ingredients of Propaganda, N. Newsome, 23 September
1941.
10BBC WAC E / / , file , Eu opea Se i e, , The European Service. Principles and purposes,
problems and policy points, Noel Newsome, 1 January 1943.
11 BBC WAC, E2/135, Newsome: Political Warfare: Ingredients of Propaganda, N. Newsome, 23
September 1941.
12 Ibid.
either to PWE’s restraint or its ineffectiveness’.14 In his view, however, the directives which he
prepared expressed HMG policy.15
Even prior to his nomination to the Director of the European Service post, Newsome produced his own Propaganda Background Notes, which were distributed to all European Service editors. Garnett, who worked for the PWE, maintains that those directives, written in ‘forcible
language’, deviated from the political and strategic guidelines and that Newsome continuously made ‘howlers’.16 The Propaganda Background Notes, however, were valued by his
subordinates, interested in their director’s views.17 In particular, Notes on Polish-Soviet affairs
had a big impact on how Stalin’s territorial demands were interpreted, since knowledge of pre- war Poland-Soviet relations was very limited in the BBC circles and many broadcasters relied on information and comments provided by the Director of the European Service. He did not hesitate to openly express his left wing political views and admiration for the Red Army:
‘Russians (were) not only a great fighting nation and a mighty ally in war but also people who have set us, and the world, an example in many respects of how to pursue an ideal with wholehearted sacrifice’.18
In fact, he went much further than supporting pro-Soviet foreign policy asserting that: ‘without accepting Communism, we must convince Europe that Russia has remained civilized, and that the Anglo-Russian alliance holds out a fine promise of progress for European civilisation towards a system combining the best futures of socialism and liberal democracy’.19
The issue of political warfare and the extent of governmental control over the BBC foreign broadcasts became a major point of disagreement between the BBC European Service and the PWE (see chapter 1). Both, however, acknowledged that broadcasting should ‘further the ends of HMG in political warfare’. 20 Ivone Kirkpatrick who, by autumn 1941, had held three
positions, namely Controller of European Broadcasts, PWE official and BBC liaison with the Foreign Office, complained that the BBC was not a ‘charitable organisation’ providing a free
14BBC WAC, E / / , Pape P opaga da , Newsome, 20 September 1943.
15 CAC, Neri 1/1, Memo by Newsome to all regional editors and sub-editors, 5 November 1941. 16 Garnett, op. cit., p. 98.
17 Ibid, p. 95.
18 BBC WAC, E2/138/2, Weekly General Directives/ Weekly Propaganda Weekly Notes, N. Newsome,
15-18 February 1942.
19 BBC WAC, E2/ 138/1, Weekly General Directives Weekly Propaganda Weekly Notes, N. Newsome,
1-8 September 1941.
news service to occupied Europe and its success should not be measured by its scope.21 He
questioned the principles of the European Service:
‘Is the BBC a powerful propaganda weapon? Is it a primary aim to keep morale high so that conquered peoples may be ready to strike at the enemy on the day? If this is
accepted then news becomes the handmaiden, not the mistress of broadcasting policy.’22
Although it was commonly understood that every means should be taken to support the war effort, it was not entirely clear what role the BBC European Service should play. This lack of clarity was especially evident in case of Polish Service and Kirkpatrick himself admitted that there was a lack of an overall plan for broadcasting to Poland.23 His view was shared by the
PWE Polish Regional Director of the PWE, Moray Maclaren complained as late as 1943 that this was the case.24
This situation left room for ‘broadcasting warriors’ such as Newsome to impose their political views, directly influencing the content of the bulletins. He was present at the weekly meetings where issues relating to broadcasts to Poland of both the Polish Service and Radio Polskie were discussed, and when Polish-Soviet affairs were on agenda, he openly attacked the Polish government for their unwillingness to compromise.25 In fact, until the Warsaw rising of 1944,
when it became evident that Stalin had attempted to manipulate international public opinion in order to establish communist rule in Poland, he supported Soviet territorial claims to eastern Poland and was openly challenging the position of the Polish Underground and the Polish authorities in London, fostering the belief that the main obstacle to friendly relationships between Poland the USSR rested in Poles’ anti-Soviet feelings (see chapter 7-8).
Newsome’s political views were, however, only circulated in the BBC and the Foreign Office and criticism of Polish government was never openly expressed in the Polish Service bulletins; it was essential that the Polish broadcasts followed the official British government line which maintained that Poland was a valued ally. It was equally important that Britain was not accused of taking sides and was seen rather as a mediator in the Polish-Soviet disputes. More
importantly, as Maclaren observed, those who disliked London Poles could not let their views be exposed because propaganda to Poland depended on good relations with the Polish
government, which had the unquestionable support of the Polish Underground, and it was the
21 Ibid. p. 91.
22 Ibid.
23 Unsigned note, 28 Jan 1942 in Briggs, op. cit., p. 424.
24 Stenton, Michael. Radio London and Resistance in Occupied Europe: British Political Warfare 1939–
1943 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 288-91.
latter which disseminated the BBC broadcasts.26 As he emphasised in his directives for the
Polish Service, ‘Polish listeners believed in anything said in line with the Polish government policy’.27 Yet, after the USSR joined the allies’ coalition, it was equally important that the BBC
used the announcements of TASS, the official news agency, in their broadcasts. This, however, became particularly problematic, since from 1943 onwards these broadcasts focused on
challenging the Polish government-in-exile and the Polish Underground’s position.