He revisado un conjunto exce- lente de artículos, que en su ma- yoría aparecieron publicados en algunas de las más prestigiosas revistas académicas, y que de- muestran que el deporte como economía puede ser considerado como un campo de la ciencia económica por derecho propio.
El progreso en este campo se ha acelerado en las dos últi- mas décadas y hemos visto cómo los deportes brindan un entorno singular con abundantes datos equiparable al entorno de labo- ratorio que puede informar al estudio económico en un amplio abanico de cuestiones importan- tes. En muchos aspectos, dicho entorno puede revelarse como in- cluso mejor que el típico entorno de laboratorio, debido a la gran cantidad de datos disponibles, a que los objetivos de los partici- pantes que compiten suelen ser obvios, los resultados están extre- madamente claros, lo que está en juego suele ser importante y los participantes son profesionales con experiencia.
Sauers (2017) señala, acer- tadamente, cómo Robert Tolli- son puso los cimientos para el abordaje de los deportes con
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