Ámbito de competencia de los funcionarios gubernamentales

He was a major historic figure, a born revo­

lutionary, an amazing mixture of soldier and politician, realist and romantic . . . . He was the greatest son the Sumadija has produced for the last century . . . .

D. llic to the Yugoslav Parliament in

194

7 There were other Serbian army colonels with greater military knowledge and ex­

pertise . . . Apis failed to perform his as­

signed duties as chief of Serbian intelligence and aimed to become a dictator and lord it over the army.

Colonel Peter Opacic to the author, June

1986

Apis has been glorified extravagantly by admirers, relatives, and col­

leagues and vilified unduly by enemies and opponents. He remains one of the most controversial figures in modern Yugoslav history. Admirers, viewing him as a martyr to the Serbian national cause, considered Apis a dedicated national revolutionary, a spiritual architect of modern Yugo­

slavia. Critics accused Apis of being a ruthless terrorist and traitor, a re­

actionary praetorian who repeatedly sought power and aimed to turn

3 1 0

Verdict of History

3 1 1

Serbia into a military dictatorship. On the personal level, worshipers cited his alleged unselfishness, modesty, dedication, and praised him as an ex­

emplary patriot and family man. Comrades lauded .him ·as an intelligent, courageous, hardworking officer who followed orders and deferred to superiors. Detractors denounced him as inordinately ambitious, ruthless, and unscrupulous. There is likewise a total divergence of views as to his significance. Partisans credited him with inspiring and directing the May coup, reforming the army and preparing it for wars of national liberation, and masterminding national-revolutionary activities abroad. Critics con­

fmn that no low ranking officer could exert predominant influence in the army and allege that Apis did more to divide than to unite Serbs and Yugoslavs.

Uninvolved in bitter controversies in Serbia and Yugoslavia which con­

tributed to such divergent assessments of Apis' character and significance, the author will construct here a balance sheet based on evidence collected for tltis volume. Presented first will be a summary of the views of admirers

and critics of Apis among Yugoslav writers and scholars. Then at least tentative answers will be supplied to questions posed at the beginning of this volume. Finally, this neutral observer will seek to assess Apis as man and leader.

Previous admiring biographers, Milan Zivanovic and Milos Bogicevic, depicted Colonel Apis as Serbia's dominant military figure between

1903

and

1917,

involved positively in

all

key events occurring there, and per­

sonally as an exemplary, saintly , and heroic character. "Apis died like a hero in the knowledge he had always acted honorably and well," wrote his nephew. Admitting he had sometimes selected the wrong road, Apis affirmed-and Milan Zivanovic agreed-that he had always acted in good faith, convinced he was doing whatever Serbian and Yugoslav interests required. Thus Apis, he asserted, should be placed among Yugoslavia's leading creators. Apis died "without fear, hesitation, or suffering," believ­

ing his mission in life had been completed. Quoted by Apis' nephew was a statement by the respected English scholar, R. W. Seton-Watson: "Dim­

itrijeviC' s enthusiasm for the achievement of the Yugoslav idea caused him to be remembered in every home in Serbia."1

Writings of Apis' brother-in-law and of a "Black Hand" colleague ex­

emplify laudatory views of him as a man and leader. According to Zivan Zivanovic, Apis' helpfulness and human concern won him nearly universal

3 1 2

APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

devotion and respect which persisted long after his untimely death. Exert­

ing a "magnetic force" over his comrades, he acquired a broad circle of friends and admirers among officers and politicians in Serbia and abroad.

His outgoing, winning personality and the May Coup's outstanding success began to transform Serbia's political, military, and economic situation and accounted for his great personal influence. He had led that coup out of deep love and concern for Serbia. The cooperation Apis received from

military and political leaders, stressed Zivanovic, came volunt�rily, not from fear or pressure. Exerting vast influence in the anny and over govern­

ment leaders from

1903

until

1916

as Serbia's "grey eminence," Apis nonetheless subordinated himself properly to his army superiors and to political leaders. "The strength of his influence stemmed from his forceful arguments in support of a proposal or desire."2 Former "Black Hand"

leader, Captain Pavle Pankovic, who knew Apis for almost twenty years, recalled he had agreed unhesitatingly to participate in the May Coup

"because I was firmly convinced that everything Apis does or intends to do is solely for the good of the country." On another occasion Pankovic stated: "In all his undertakings Apis was outstanding. He was the hinge around which all events turned." Apis' devoted efforts contributed greatly to "Black Hand" goals of liberating and unifying all Serbs.

3

Prvoslav Vasiljevic, Apis' defender at the Retrial, reflects the moderate defense of Apis' role and views which emerged after World War Il. Com­

paring "Black Hand" to nineteenth century European nationalist organi­

zations in its romantic struggle for national liberation, Vasiljevic afflrmed that Apis' national views were broader and more progressive than those of the organization. Concluding that true unification involved more than Greater Serbia, Apis aproached ever closer to the Yugoslav idea, working closely with Croatian and other South Slav leaders. Thus Apis' national views had diverged markedly from the Serbia-first, hegemonistic, exploita­

tive approach of King Alexander and Pasic. Morally purer than theirs, Apis' view was "devoid of calculation, of proflt, and of plans to enslave other Yugoslav peoples." As the strongest leader of "Black Hand," Apis

"in his work was so independent that he did many things without the knowledge of the CEC . . . . " Thus, whereas "Black Hand" was not "pro­

gressive" as an organization, Apis, while belonging by virtue of his politi­

cal views to the bourgeoisie, "was a progressive individual insofar as his actions and those of his organization contributed to destruction of the

Verdict of History

313

enslaving powers of Austria-Hungary and Turkey and the liberation and uniflcation of the Yugoslav peoples.""

However, soon after the Retrial two leading Yugoslav scholars asserted that neither "Black Hand" nor Apis had held progressive views or played a progressive role. While praising the Retrial's verdict as correct, they char­

acterized the "Black Hand" as a reactionary, chauvinistic, and militarist organization and described

Piedmont,

its official organ, as reflecting Apis' views. 5 Similarly ,

Borba,

official paper of the Yugoslav Communist Party , noted that whereas King Alexander had adopted barbarous means against Apis and friends in the Salonika Trial, tl1at did not signify that Apis or

"Black Hand" were true national revolutionaries. "Black Hand's" program of August

1 9 1 1

in

Piedmont

had opposed democratic freedoms and espoused praetorianism. A Zagreb newspaper compared

Piedmont's

mili­

tarist ideology to that of the Pan-German League. "Black Hand's" Con­

stitution had been attacked justifiably by Croatian leaders like Hinko Hinkovic for espousing Greater Serbian hegemony by designating Croatia and Slovenia as "Serbian lands. "6

Some Yugoslav officers have criticized Colonel Apis severely for mili­

tary shortcomings and for involving himself and the anny deeply in poli­

tics. Other Serbian colonels displayed greater military expertise, argued Dr. Peter Opacic, especially since Apis focused so greatly on political activity. A pis' role in anny reorganization and refonn after

1904,

dramati­

zed by "Black Hand" colleagues, was actually minimal since he held low rank. Instead these refonns should be ascribed to earlier efforts by King Milan and General Putnik. As chief "Black Hand" leader, Apis headed a subversive military faction which undennined army unity. His elevation as chief of military intelligence may have resulted partly from "Black Hand" pressure. Nor did military intelligence flourish under his direction:

he failed to perfonn all assigned tasks or to gather full infonnation about Austrian military plans in

1913-14.

Hig11ly ambitious, Apis and his friends were promoted rapidly with little regard for length of service. Apis' aim after

1906,

affumed Opacic, was to dominate the army and seize power.

His political role was strictly illegal. Since his behavior was inexcusable and divisive, the Serbian regime had adequate grounds to act against hin1 and the "Black Hand."7

Let us now attempt to supply answers to questions raised at the begin­

ning of this study. Colonel A pis and the ·'Black Hand," at least in their

3 1 4 APIS: The Congenial Conspirator

own perception, were undoubtedly patriotic, working mainly outside of Serbia to liquidate remnants of Turkish rule and destroy Austria-Hungary.

Most "Black Hand" leaders were Greater Serbian nationalists, though a few such men as Bogdan Radenkovic and yuba Jovanovic-Cupa, two of its founders, were idealistic protagonists of an egalitarian Yugoslav federa­

tion. Apis himself, at first favoring a Greater Serbia, evolved later quite far in the direction of Yugoslavism and enjoyed excellent relations with Croat­

ian leaders.

Apis and his associates appear to have been innocent of most charges brought against them at Salonika but guilty of violating military regula­

tions and of impermissible political activities. Thus the Retrial's verdict will likely stand, although it was not reached by accepted judicial pro­

cedures. There is no convincing evidence Apis ever envisioned seizing total state power or creating a praetorian dictatorship in Serbia. But there are intimations in his messages to his friends in Skoplje in May 1914 that he

favored removing certain Radical civilian officials in Macedonia in the interests of the army and the public. Failing to obtain support from his comrades, he abandoned the scheme. Had he and the "Black Hand" been resolved to strike, there were opportunities to establish a military regime in 1903, May 1914, and December 1 9 1 5. On none of these occasions did Apis or the others draw up definite plans to act. On Corfu and at the Sal­

onika Trial he seems not to have even considered undertaking a military coup. In general Apis favored strong, effective civilian rule responsive to the popular will, not military rule. His political ideology was never clearly defmed, but he did not share the chauvinism and praet9rianism of ele­

ments which took over

Piedmont

after Jovanovic-Cupa's death.

All evidence suggests that no attempt against Prince Alexander's life occurred in August 1916. If any such plans existed , A pis surely had no­

thing to do with them. Lacking any discernible motive to murder his former benefactor, especially amidst a war of national survival, Apis was too competent a conspirator to plan anything as amateurish as the alleged attempt to kill the Prince. Similarly, A pis' strong patriotism and actions appear to exclude any betrayal of Serbia to the Central Powers or arrang­

ing a separate peace with Austria. The Salonika Trial, planned deliberately by Prince Alexander's entourage and Radical leaders, was revenge by the

"White Hand" and the fmal showdown in the civil-military conflict. Prince Alexander had concluded the Apis group had to be destroyed before he could control the army and rule Serbia.

Verdict of History 3 1 5

Apis' role in the Sarajevo assassination was secondary and far smaller than he himself claimed in his report to the Salonika court. The initiative for the Archduke's murder stemmed from revolutionary·"Young Bosnia"

which had committed similar acts previously . They and Malobabic per­

suaded and drew along Apis whose aim while participating in the as­

sassination plot was to prevent or delay war with Austria-Hungary. After discussing this issue in the "Black Hand's" CEC, Apis sought belatedly to recall the assassins and prevent the murder. In the entire Sarajevo affair Apis revealed uncharacteristic vacilation and indecisiveness.

As a man, family member, and ardent patriot Apis possessed many ad­

mirable and well-nigh unique qualities which made him a remarkable in­

dividual. His ability to win the loyalty, support, and love of others was virtually unequalled. He made the most difficult and dangerous under­

takings appear simple, and never did he ask others to undertake some­

thing he was not prepared to do himself. Apis' constant encouragement of others, his loyalty and devotion to family members, especially to his nephew, Milan, and grandniece, NenuSka, reveal him as a warm and moral human being in private life and as an admired military comrade . Nowhere was this revealed more graphically than in Salonika Prison where he won over both his officer jailors. Apis was able to infuse followers with an energy and courage which they otherwise lacked. Without his direction and driving energy, "Black Hand" soon lost its influence and dissolved.

However, Apis, as Slobodan Jovanovic noted, lacked true political ability or discernment, nor did he possess the flexibility to adapt to changing political circumstances.

8

This was shown especially during the Priority Dispute which dealt his influence a strong blow. Likewise, Apis was poor at realizing the consequences of his actions and the inappropriateness of means he often adopted in his incessant struggles. Once Prince Alexander became de facto ruler of Serbia in June 1914 and showed he could pro­

vide military and political leadership, A pis' star faded rapidly. No longer could he function as the irresponsible and dominant power in the army he had been under King Peter.

Colonel Apis revealed grave shortcomings as an officer and committed acts incompatible with his status. His perpetual involvement in politics and conspiracy, to which he seemed drawn irresistibly , was intolerable to any regime based on primacy of the civil over military authority . And those political activities absorbed so much of his time and energy that he

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