Two points of the Hatta cabinet programs created military conflict in the Republic - the implementation of the Renville Agreement,
and the rationalization of the array. Almost the first step Hatta's
cabinet took was the withdrawal of most of the Republic's crack troops
from West Java. This was a result of the government's recognition of
the so-called van Mook line, between the Dutch and Republican territories, which required most of the Siliwangi Division to withdraw in February 1948 from pockets (kantong) in West Java to Republican territory in
13
Central Java. This retreat, popularly known as the hijrah was
a very bitter experience for the Siliwangi Division, whose members were assembled in the city of Cirebon and transferred to Central Java
by cargo ships and trains, guarded by the Dutch military. Their arms
had to be surrendered until their arrival at their destination in the
^ , 14
towns of Central Java.
On 22 February 1948 about 29,000 men of the Siliwangi Division 15
left West Java for Central Java. One of the daily newspapers in
Surakarta reported in early February that 13,000 men of the Siliwangi 16
Division had already entered Central Java. The total figure for
12 The van Mook 1ine arose from the Linggajati Agreement of 1947 as a policy of the Governor-General of the Netherlands East-
Indi.es, II.J. van Mook. This line separated the Dutch-occupied
territories and the Republican territories. As a result the
Republic was driven back to the most densely populated and
poorest areas of Sumatra and Java. This action coincided with an
economic blockade. See Kahin, o p .c i t . , pp.220-21; T.B. Simatupang,
Report from Banaran; Experiences During the People's War
(Ithaca, Cornell University Modern Indonesia Project, 1972), p p.115-17.
13 The term hijrah here refers to the imitation of the Prophet
Mohammad's flight to Medina before his return to Mecca. The
Siliwangi Division, in using this term for its evacuation from
West Java to Central Java, thus prophesied its own triumphant
return to West Java. See Simatupang, Report, p.35, n.18.
14 For details see Siliwangi dari masa ke m a s a , pp.129-44.
15 Siliwangi dari m a s a , p.129. Anthony Reid, op.cit., p.134, has
given the different figure of some 22,000 men.
the hijrah was about 35,000 men, not including army families who followed the hijrah to Central Java. Thereafter the army of the Siliwangi Division was popularly called the Tentara Hijrah or the Tentara Kantong (the Kijrah Army or the Pocket Army) by the people of
, 18
Central Java.
In Surakarta there were, by March 1948, four battalions of the Siliwangi Division which had been withdrawn from the 'pockets’
in West Java. These were the Rukman Battalion, the Sentot Iskandardinata 19
Battalion, the Umar Battalion and the Sambas Battalion. Like other Siliwangi battalions, they had been relatively well disciplined during the first Dutch aggression. Other Siliwangi units were stationed in areas near Surakarta, such as Madiun (4,000 men), Bojonegoro (3,000
20 21
men), Pati (4,000 men), and Jogjakarta (four battalions).
The Siliwangi division in Surakarta, as in other parts of Central Java, faced many difficulties. These were classified by the hijrah committee of Surakarta into five main categories: security,
22
transportation, funds, health and housing. Funds from the local
community were collected to support their daily needs. Apparently, though, the committee could not provide adequate transportation and health facilities. The chief reason for this was that Surakarta, like other parts of Java, had been suffering from the Dutch economic blockade.
17 Lukisan Revolusi Rakjat Indonesia 1945-1949 (Jogjakarta, Kementerian
Penerangan Republik Indonesia, 1949) , p.200. See also A .H . Nasucion, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, vol.2, p.123.
18 The Siliwangi did not like the term Tentara Kantong, because it was associated with a setback for the Republican army, caused by the Renville Agreement. Interview with Sastrolawu, 13 October 1979. 19 Siliwangi dari m a s a , pp.125, 140, 141. Interview with Sastrolawu,
13 October .1979.
20 Merdeka, 3 February 1948.
21 Siliwangi dari m a s a , p.125.
22 Merdeka, no.416, 9 March 1948. For the hijrah committee of Surakarta see also Was!to, n o .7 , 6 February 1948; no.13, 20 March 1948.
Various imported goods, including medicines and motor vehicles, were very difficult to find.
The arrival of the Siliwangi Division in Central Java became
a major political issue for the FDR. Within the P K I , the Siliwangi
Division was viewed as loyal to the Ilatta government, since it had obeyed H a t t a 1s orders to evacuate West Java and to move into Republican
territory. The FDR accordingly feared that the Siliwangi Division,
vvhich was well disciplined and sympathetic to Tslam, might outweigh the TNI Masyarakat and the Sayap Kiri's other supporters in the Senopati
Division. A consequence of the arrival of the Siliwangi Division in
Central Java was, therefore, that the schism in the army leadership became more obvious.
Another factor which sharpened the hostility within the military in Surakarta was the implementation of the rationalization
program of the Hatta cabinet. This reorganization, or Rera, would
demobilize some of the regular TNI as well as the lasykar units which
had nominally been included within TNI since June 1947. Nasution
reckoned there were 350,000 men in the regular army and 470,000 men 23
in lasykar units in Java alone.
One reason for the rationalization was that the Republic was incapable of financing a large standing army, since the Linggajati
Agreement, the first Dutch aggression, and the Renville Agreement had
placed it in a very difficult economic position. In addition, the
rationalization was aimed at developing a well-armed and well-trained regular army, which would be prepared to operate at battalion strength
in a mobile, hard-hitting guerrilla war against the Dutch. The
rationalization, which was implemented in February and March 1948,
was partially successful. There were, however, only four divisions
(Divisions II, III, V, and VII) which completed the rationalization. In March General Sudirman himself, in view of the danger of Dutch attacks, ordered the commanders of divisions to delay temporarily the
24