Throughout 1948 the political atmosphere of the Republic was one of tension, as the crisis which had begun in the first months of
1946 approached its climax. In the early months of the year, a series
of events took place which put the Republic in a dangerous situation owing to tensions between the Sayap Kiri (Left Wing) and the Sayap Kanan
(Right W ing), the core of which was Masyumi and its affiliated organizations
such as the Hizbullah and the STII. In a broad sense, Masyumi also
enjoyed the support of the PNI and other minority parties, such as Catholic and Protestant parties, against uhe leftists.
On 17 January 1948 the Renville Agreement was signed by the government of Amir Sjarifuddin, although without the full support of many cabinet members, notably the representatives of Masyumi and PNI. A few daiys later an anti-Amir demonstration, under the leadership of Masyumi and PNI, took place in the Republican capital, Jogjakarta. Amir's followers responded in turn with a show of force in the form of
a big parade.’* When Masyumi and PNI then withdrew their members from
his cabinet, Amir resigned on 23 January. President Sukarno immediately
appointed Hatta to form a coalition cabinet, During negotiations for
its formation, Amir insisted that Hatta provide ten seats in the new
cabinet for Amir's men. Hatta rejected this demand, allotting only one
seat for Amir's socialists? Amir felt he could not accept this offer.12
When the Hatta cabinet was formed on 29 January, therefore, Amir's men had no ministerial seats, so that the left was unrepresented
in Hatta's cabinet. In fact the Hatta cabinet consisted mostly of
1 Mohammad Hatta, Memoir, pp.523-24.
prominent leaders from Masyumi and the P N 1 , along with a few influential Catholic and Protestant leaders. On the same day Amir's Sayap Kiri .launched a protest against Hatte'.-3 government in various residencies
and regencies, including Madiun and its surrounding areas.^ A few
1 l&ter t.he Surakarta Sayap Kiri followed the example of the Madiun ^11 1 ; an : staged a demonstration. The demonstration consisted most y of PESTNDO, Amir's supporters in Brigade XXIV, and Sarbupri
(Sarekat Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia - Union of Plantation 5
W< -rkers of the Indonesian Republic).
Tho resignation of Amir vvus of course one of the major turning points of the revolution, as the leadership passed from the left to the right for the first time. It appears to have led Amir to concentrate on his own political forces in the Sayap Kiri. On 11 February the Socialist Party, which had previously consisted of Communists and Socialists, split, with Sjahrir's followers setting up a new party, the Partai Sosialis Indonesia or PSI,34*6 and Amir retaining the leadership of the old Socialist Party. On 26 February .Amir's group set up a new organization, the so-called Front Demokrasi Rakyat
(People s Democratic Front) or FDR, which gained strong support from Amir's Socialist Party, the Labour Party and the P K I . Two other organizations, PESINDO and Sobsi (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh
Indonesia - All-Indonesia Secretariat of Labour Organization) also joined it. Thus all the Sayap Kiri groups, except Sjahrir's PSI and Tan M a l a k a 's former Persatuan Perjuangan, joined together in the FDR which constituted a major political force in opposition to the Hatta cabinet.
3 H a t t a 's cabinet is listed in ibid., p.524. 4 Bekerd j a , 30 January 1948.
6 Interview with Sardjono, 4 August 1979; Bodronojo, 26 September
1979.
6 Justus van der Kroef, The Communist Party of Indonesia, p.32. See also Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-
In early March, shortly after the formation of the FDR, Amir launched his campaign for national unity and new democracy, touring East Java in an attempt to arouse mass support for opposition
7
to the Hatta cabinet. Meanwhile the FDR held a series of meetings throughout Eiist and Central Java. In June the FDR campaign reached a peak in Surakarta with various meetings in the regencies and in the city. The FDR launched programs which concentrated on the abolition of bengkok
(village land a]located in lieu of salary to village officials) and of various taxes, and on reformation of the agrarian system.* On a
different tack, the FDR and Hatta's cabinet had come into serious disagreement on a key policy. Hatta, feeling that the army was not functioning properly, initiated a program called Rera (reorganization and rationalization) which would reduce the size of the aimed forces and make them more sensitive to Republican government control."* The FDR, seeing that the implementation of Rera would demobilize many soldiers, particularly in the badan perjuangan where support for the Sayap Kiri was strong, opposed Hatta's plan and attempted to resist Rer a .
The return of Musso in August 1948 acted to intensify the political tensions between the left and the Sukarno-Hatta government. Musso on his return passed himself off as one Suparto, the secretary of Suripno, a PKI member who had represented the Republic in eastern Europe, and began to correct what he saw as the fault of Amir's policy, compromise with the Dutch through agreements. Musso introduced instead
7 Bekerdja, 3 March 1948.
8 Suara Ibu Kota, 22 June 1948.
his 'Jalan Baru' (New Road) for the R e p u b l i c . ^ Ideologically, Musso's
policy was one of total confrontation of imperialists. Tactically,
it involved an uncompromising fighc against the Dutch and against those Indonesian politicians who were inclined to the diplomasi policy.
The PKI accepted Mu s s o ’s policy and when a new PKI Politburo was announced on 1 September, Musso became one of the principal members of the
General Secretariat."^ Musso's 'Jalan Baru' seemed to create a new political role for the PKI, and in response the Partai Sosialis, PBI and PKI merged in August into one enlarged PKI, with Amir Sjari.fuddin declaring himself to be a communist.
The Musso leadership sparked an increase in the mass support
for the new PKI and its policy. PKI leaders, including Musso, made
speeches concerning the 'Jalan Baru' at mass meetings in many cities of East and Central Java, such as Madiun, K e diri, Bojonegoro, Jogjakarta
and Surakarta. After the arrival of Musso, political tension in society
increased dramatically, with both sides indulging in kidnappings,
killings and gang rivalries. The climax of this was the Madiun rebellion
on 18 September 1948, when Musso's challenge was militarily crushed
by forces loyal to the Sukarno-Hatta government. The collapse of the
PKI meant that the revolutionary leadership of the Republic had fallen securely into the hands of th§ rightist group.
10 For details of Musso's 'Jalan Baru' see van der Kroef, o p ,c i t . ,
p .33; Reid, o p .c i t . , p.137. Musso was born in 1897 in Pegu,
a village in the residency of Kediri, East Java. He was a close
friend of Alimin since their high school days in Batavia and in
Tjokroaminoto's boarding house in Surabaya he met Sukarno, He
had been involved in political activities with Insulinde, Sarekat Rakyat and ISDV, and he attended the Lenin School for several years after he went to Russia following his key role in the
planning of the 1926-27 PKI uprisings. See Ruth T. McVey,
The Rise of Indonesian Communism, pp.169, 202; Harry A. Poeze,
Tan Mala k a : Levensloop van 1897 tot 1945 ('s-Gravenhage, Martinus
Nijhoff, 1976), p.254.
11 For the members of the new PKI Politburo, see Pinardi, Peristiwa