Actividad del Comité de Seguimiento del Plan Estratégico de Innovación y

Virgines Calvo, owner of Transorient Container Terminal Services, Inc., a customs broker,        entered into a contract with San Miguel Corp. to transfer 114 reels of semi­chemical fluting paper        and 124 reels of kraft liner board from the Port Area in Manila to SMC’s warehouse in Ermita,        Manila. The cargo was insured by UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. On July 14, 1990, the        shipment, contained in 30 metal vans, arrived in Manila on board “M/V Hayakawa Maru” and, after        24 hours, were unloaded from the vessel to the custody of the arrastre operator. Transorient        withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator and delivered it to SMC’s warehouse. Upon        inspection, it was found that 15 reels of the semi­chemical fluting paper were “wet/stained/torn”        and 3 reels of kraft liner board were likewise torn. SMC collected payment from UCPB under the        insurance contract and in turn, UCPB, as subrogee, brought suit against Calvo for the value of        damage which was placed at P93,112. The RTC rendered judgment against Calvo. The CA        affirmed. 

Calvo contends that she is a private carrier because, as a customs broker and warehouseman,        she does not indiscriminately hold her services out to the public but only offers the same to        select parties with whom she may contract in the conduct of her business. 

She likewise claims that the drive from the Port Area to SMC’s warehouse in Ermita, Manila took        merely 30 minutes and as such, the damage could not have taken place while the goods were in        her custody    Issues & Held:  1. W/N Transorient is a common carrier?    YES. Transorient is a common carrier.   

Article 1732. Common carriers are persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the        business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air for        compensation, offering their services to the public. 

Article 1732 makes no distinction between a carrier:  

     a. whose principal business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both, and one          who does such 

carrying only as an ancillary activity;  

b. offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service

on an 

occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis;  

c. offering its services to the “general public,” i.e., the general community or population, and              one who offers services or solicits business only from a narrow segment of the general              population. 

[The Court thinks] that Article 1732 deliberately refrained from making such distinctions.   

To hold that petitioner is a private carrier would be to deprive those with whom she contracts the        protection which the law affords them notwithstanding the fact that the obligation to carry goods        for her customers is part and parcel of her business. 

2. W/N Transorient exercised extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods?   

NO. Extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods tendered for shipment requires the              common carrier to know and to follow the required precaution for avoiding damage to, or        destruction of, the goods entrusted to it for sale, carriage, and delivery. It requires common        carriers to render service with the greatest skill and foresightand “to use all reasonable means to        ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for shipment, and to exercise due care        in the handling and stowage, including such methods as their nature requires.” 

Contrary to Calvo’s assertion, the Survey Report indicates that when the shipper transferred the        cargo to the arrastre operator, they were covered by clean Equipment Interchange Reports              (EIRs) and, when Calvo’s employees withdrew the cargo from the arrastre operator, they did so        without exception or protest either with regard to the condition of the container vans or their              contents. 

Thus, the shipment was received in good order and condition but was delivered to the consignee        damaged. Whenever the thing is lost or damaged in the possession of the obligor, it shall be        presumed that the loss or damage was due to his fault, unless there is proof to the contrary. No        proof was proffered by Calvo to rebut this legal presumption. 

With regard to the contention that the cargo could not have been damaged while in petitioner’s        custody as she immediately delivered the containers to SMC’s compound, suffice it to say that to       

prove the exercise of extraordinary diligence, petitioner must do more than merely show the        possibility that some other party could be responsible for the damage. It must prove that it used        “all reasonable means to ascertain the nature and characteristic of goods tendered for transport        and that it exercised due care in the handling thereof.” Petitioner failed to do this. 

Nor is there basis to exempt Calvo from liability under Article 1734 (4). For this provision to apply,        the rule is that if the improper packing or, in this case, the defect/s in the container, is/are known        to the carrier or his employees or apparent upon ordinary observation, but he nevertheless        accepts the same without protest or exception notwithstanding such condition, he is not relieved        of liability for damage resulting therefrom. In this case, Calvo accepted the cargo without        exception despite the apparent defects in some of the container vans. 

Hence, for failure to prove that she exercised extraordinary diligence in the carriage of goods in        this case or that she is exempt from liability, the presumption of negligence as provided under        Art. 1735 holds.