Administración 2006-2012

This case was a remedy to the Milliken v. Bradley (1974) case. The case needed to be remedied because the Detroit school system did not have an approved desegregation plan. Evidence showed that the school district needed to follow an interdistrict plan in order to maintain the pupil racial composition. The Supreme Court recognized this plan would involve inflicting change on uninvolved school districts because of the interdistrict scheme. Two plans were proposed, one by Bradley and one by the school district.

Bradley's plan ensured the pupil racial composition of the school district would be maintained. On the other hand, the district's plan ensured that the elementary students would experience desegregated schooling, but the high school students would attend neighborhood schools. This was seen as an effort to decrease transportation. In addition, the district

introduced several remedial instructional plans to implement in the system to aid the desegregation efforts. The state board realized the planned programs were needed if the desegregation programs were going to be effective, but also recognized the plans were not necessarily going to repair the Constitutional violation. In the end, the Detroit Board’s plan was chosen by the district court.

The Supreme Court addressed the decision of the district court because there was a dispute in determining what jurisdiction should bear the costs of the desegregation plan. As the justices gave credit to the district court for approving a remedial desegregation plan, they faced two questions. One, could the district court order desegregation decrees? Two, which jurisdiction(s) should pay for the cost of the desegregation plan? The justices determined the state of Michigan and Detroit board should pay the cost because they were responsible for the occurrences in Milliken I. Significantly, this case aided in understanding the role district

courts could have in implementing desegregation decrees. If violations were significant and substantial to warrant their presence, courts could enforce remedial desegregation plans.

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (1977)

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (1977) was another school desegregation case that occurred in the North. The Dayton School Board was segregating its city schools. However, this case was not over segregation, but over the extent to desegregate, as ordered by a court. The district court found evidence proving the segregation in the Dayton school system was

intentional and the school district exhibited no efforts to alleviate those segregative actions. The district court created a plan aimed to remedy the three discovered segregative acts. However, when the case arrived at the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals the plan was changed to a system wide desegregation plan. The Supreme Court found the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' plan too "sweeping" in its proposed remedy and believed the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals surpassed its authority by implementing a system wide remedy for three instances of segregative action (433 U.S. 406, 1977, at 413).

The decision of this case arose on the basis that the Dayton City Schools were still experiencing segregation. The Supreme Court found because no constitutional violations were claimed, the justices could not make a decision on the plans. They ruled the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision be vacated. The case was remanded for later proceedings that would be consistent with their opinions.

Four major changes occurred in the 1970s involving school desegregation. These changes continued into the 1980s. One, there were significant changes in legal interpretation between the Warren and Burger Courts involving school desegregation cases. Two, the evolving practice of transporting students (busing) impacted court cases. Three, the

movement of school desegregation outside of the South debuted in the Supreme Court. Now court cases from the North were present. Four, the emergence of the Mexican American struggle in the school desegregation cases were apparent. The Burger Court sustained the rulings of the landmark desegregation cases of the Warren Court up to a point, but later became divided on remedies. Due to heavy resistance and public opinion, the Supreme Court began to change.

The Burger Court began contradicting previous rulings. Burger's comment in the previous decision stated "one-race, or virtually one race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices segregation by law" (402 U.S. 1, 1977, at 25-26). This spawned major controversy and opposition about the ruling because it

allowed school systems an avenue to prolong the journey to desegregate. It also changes the intensity of scrutiny on the principles of de facto segregation and de jure segregation. By 1971, the Burger Court began breaking its record of unanimity. Busing was ruled an acceptable tool to thwart "intentional and historically proven" segregation based on race in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education (1971).

Desegregation problems moved North and West. Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver (1973) became the first desegregation case considered by the Supreme Court outside of the South. A growing phenomenon took place with the northern and western school desegregation cases. The distinction between de jure and de facto segregation became a main component of the decisions. Determining a case's outcome increasingly hinged on whether segregation concerned the practice of segregation or the principles of the law concerning desegregation.

Cases involving Mexican Americans and their struggle for desegregated schooling appeared on the docket as well. However, their cases were based around housing and

economic placement and immigration inequalities. These cases were not viewed as directly related to segregated schooling due to the background context of economic and social position.

The 1980s: The Continuation of School Desegregation