Compras de gobierno (Título III)

In February 1988, a week long report of the first five years of the desegregation program was published in the St. Louis Post Dispatch. This report was a culmination of a three month survey on the overall effects of the transfer program. This section presents some of its findings. By the 1986-1987 school year, there were 9,302 students transferring from the city to the county schools and 549 students transferring from the county to the city magnet schools (Campbell & Uchitelle, 1987, 46-48). In June 1987, before the federal court underwent its assessment, there were only seven of the sixteen county schools that achieved their plan ratio set in the settlement agreement (Brentwood, Clayton, Hancock Place,

Pattonville, Ritenour, Valley Park, and Webster Groves). However, the city public schools remained in disarray for the most part. City students’ test scores continued to lag, city school building repairs were incomplete, and teaching materials were obsolete (St. Louis Post Dispatch, 1988, 5). Most parents of city students found the desegregation program depleted the “best minds and athletes” from the city (St. Louis Post Dispatch, 1988, 5).

During this time, city students in all-black schools who did not transfer into the county schools were not ignored, as obliged by the court. They received supplementary academic aids and instructional tools to better the quality of education and achievement. For example, computers and specialized teachers were implemented to aid with academic

advancement. With the decrease in the student-teacher ratio, the students were given the opportunity to increase their achievement scores as well.

Several successes were found. Black transfer students were able to increase their academic achievement by attending the county schools; however, their presence and

enrollment created more stress for the county teachers than anticipated. The county teachers began to experience more discipline problems than ever before. For instance, 1,164 students were suspended from schools, which amounted to 10.8% of the total transfer students

participating in the program (Campbell & Uchitelle, 1987, 116).

The success of producing a multicultural atmosphere became questionable as black and white students did not show signs of positive coexistence and mixing. In one survey supervised by E. Terrence Jones, a professor at the University of Missouri-St. Louis, students, parents, and county teachers were asked do they strongly agree, partially agree, or strongly disagree with the statement that “transfer students have a lot of school spirit and pride in their county schools” (St. Louis Post Dispatch, 1988, 8). From the results, blacks seemed to strongly agree to having had school spirit to the same extent that whites seemed to disagree. Forty-six percent of black high school transfer students and 67 percent of parents of black transfer students strongly agreed with the statement. On the other hand 40 percent of white high school resident students, 40 percent of parents of white resident students, and 33 percent of county teachers (ninety-eight percent white) disagreed. Jones found this result a reflection of the whites’ skepticism of blacks identifying themselves as part of the county schools (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1988, 8).

The initial rush to become a participant in the program dwindled at the five year mark. Even more, students, black and white, began to drop out of the program. Dropouts were constantly tied to the costs of the program on the city and county school districts involved and the cost of busing the students. There were several students awake before the

St. Louis metropolitan area began its daily routine due to being bused from the city to the county, or vice versa. Some students rode for up to ninety minutes to get to school every day. However, the majority of the students involved in the transfer program (approximately 72 percent) had rides sixty minutes or less (Campbell & Uchitelle, 1987, 56). In an alternate perspective, whites were concerned with the prospects that the cost of busing raised their taxes. However, most suburban school districts welcomed black students due to the monetary incentives provided by the state to participate and integrate.

By the fifth year of desegregating St. Louis Public Schools, the cumulative cost of the program surmounted $500 million (St. Louis Post Dispatch, 1988, 6). The state paid over $170 million to fund the program and provide incentives. While these costs at a

comprehensive glance seemed confounding, opposing views existed among parents, school districts, and even legislators. State Senator Roger Wilson was quoted for his views on the morale around the state legislature. In discussing the negativity of the governor and

legislature, Wilson found these acts “creates a furor in the state and a negative attitude” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1988, 6). Contrarily, Governor John Ashcroft opposed the costs of the desegregation plan and found the money would be better allocated to “programs that [we know] could bring excellence to [our] classrooms—like paying teachers more” (St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 1988, 6). More importantly, the costs of the St. Louis desegregation plan was not the only desegregated schooling case receiving state funds. The Kansas City school systems were under a court-ordered plan as well, enforcing more demand on the purse of the state.

County and city dwellers had mixed opinions about the positive aspects of the program. There were both county and city residents who felt the desegregation plan was an

asset to the metropolitan area, just as well as there were county and city residents who found the plan a detriment. County and city school officials began to recognize the flow of athletic competition and academic achievement to the county schools. County schools were gaining top-notch athletes and their new black students achieved better in their schools (St. Louis Post Dispatch, 1988, 32). However, the city schools recognized the weakening of their athletic teams and a lowering of their already poor academic achievement with the onset of the plan (34). The magnet schools were highly used by the city residents, but not by the county residents (22). Skepticism remains about how beneficial the program really was or could have been for the future.

Blacks and whites held strong views against the city school system. Most white city residents enrolled their children in parochial or private schools in the city, whereas black city residents continued to educate their children through the city’s public school system. Some argue this was a reflection of white city resident’s decline in faith of the ability of the city school system to educate effectively and black city resident’s hope in a one-day prosperous outcome (Willie and Grady, 1985, 103). Arguably, this could also have been a reflection of the options open to blacks and whites to pursue greater educational venues. Whether it was household income or mobility opportunities, whites still held the upper hand.