Alcance

East Timor only became a major issue the EU’s relations with ASEAN in 1991 though Indonesia’s invasion of this territory took place in 1975 and from then there were reports about widespread human rights violations by Indonesian army forces.58

In an attempt to boost its relations with Asia as a whole, the EU – and especially its four major powers, namely France, Germany, Italy and the UK – decided to put aside sensitive political issues and return to a pragmatic course of focusing on economics (Yeo 2005). That consensus decision was also the result of the EU’s general shift in policy towards Asia in the early 1990s. In fact, in July 1994 the European Commission issued Towards a New Strategy in Asia, which also emphasised the EU’s relations with ASEAN as the cornerstone of its engagement with Asia (European Commission 1994). This strategy, which also set the stage for the creation of ASEM, which will be examined in Chapter 7, was the EU’s response to the growing economic and political importance of Asia. Thanks to the optimism created by the Commission’s New Asia The Dili killing, which took place on 12 November 1991, when several hundred East Timorese pro-independence demonstrators in the Santa Cruz cemetery in the capital, Dili were shot by Indonesian troop (Defert 1992: 120; Amnesty International 1994: 50- 54; Singh 1999: 498), became a focal point of European criticism (Bridges 1999: 171). It brought East Timor in EU-ASEAN relations and compounded their already existing disagreements over the EU’s human rights clause. In fact, these divergences, coupled with Portugal’s veto in July 1992 were the reason behind their failure to negotiate a more advanced cooperation framework, even though they had desired and planed this in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. Chapter 6 will examine in-depth why, from a non- issue in the 1970s and 1980s, East Timor became a major – and indeed obstructive – factor in EU-ASEAN relations in the 1990s.

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According to a report of Amnesty International in 1994, about 200,000 people, one third of East Timor’s population, were killed or died of starvation or disease after Indonesia invaded in 1975 (Amnesty International 1994: 5). Others believe that the 1970s and 1980s between 100,000 to 250,000 East Timorese lost their lives out of a population of 650,000 (Smith 2001: 29).

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Strategy, the foreign ministers of both sides came to the 11th AEMM, held in Karlsruhe, Germany on 22-23 September 1994, with a determination to leave behind the disputes about human rights and find new ways to enhance their cooperation. More precisely, they adopted a pragmatic approach by sidestepping the issue on a new agreement that was blocked by Portugal. Given this, unlike the past few AEMMs, the Karlsruhe meeting was congenial. The East Timor issue was not raised and human rights were only briefly mentioned in this meeting. According Rüland (1996: 31), this revealed that ASEAN has gained the upper hand in determining the topics, style and procedure of the meeting. At this meeting, they agreed to establish an ad hoc Eminent Persons Group (EPG), also known as an ASEAN-EU Senior Officials Meeting (1995), with members drawn from both regions, whose task was to develop a comprehensive approach to EU- ASEAN political, security, economic and cultural relations towards the year 2000 and beyond (AEMM 1995; Villacorta 2009: 8). Nearly two years later, in June 1996, the EPG produced a report entitled A Strategy for a New Partnership, which called for an increase in mutual trust and a better understanding between the two regions. The strategy also suggested other measures to foster economic and political cooperation. The EPG’s proposals were complemented and supported by a communication of the European Commission, called Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations, which was aimed at revitalising the EU’s relations with ASEAN (European Commission 1996; Mierlo 1997). The Commission also proposed that this ‘new dynamic’ should be endorsed by the next AEMM, due to take place in Singapore in 1997.

However, this new and optimistic spirit or a new dynamism did not last long. In fact, the recommendations in both the EPG’s report the European Communication’s

Creating a New Dynamic in EU-ASEAN Relations did not produce any concrete results

and, consequently, failed to revive EU-ASEAN relations (Yeo 2008b: 87; 2009a: 45). While both sides thought they had found a new way to move their relationship forward after being held hostage by the human rights issue and the East Timor problem, they faced new and even bigger challenges. One of these was the 1997/1998 Asian financial crisis, which did not weakened many Asian economies but also negatively impacted upon ASEAN’s relations with the EU. Another significant – if not the defining – factor that hindered their interaction in the late 1990s was the Myanmar issue. While it had already a major point of disagreement between the two organisations in the early 1990s, Myanmar became an obstacle to the EU-ASEAN dialogue when it was allowed to join ASEAN in 1997 despite the EU’s objection. The disputes over Myanmar led the EU and

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ASEAN to postpone their AEMM and JCC for several years in the late 1990s. The Myanmar issue also overshadowed some summits and ministerial meetings of ASEM, which was established partly because of the desire of the EU and ASEAN to overcome the deadlock they faced in the 1990s. Chapter 7 will examine in-depth why the Myanmar jeopardised not only EU-ASEAN relations but also the ASEM process.