The acute requirements of the newly independent state of Pakistan led its leaders to rely on structural elements of the British colonial rule such as the bi-cameral parliamentary system (Senate and National Assembly), the bureaucracy, the federal division of authorities and the constitution. In essence, however, the nascent political system started as a highly centralized mechanism dominated by a strong central government and bureaucracy.372 The early years of independent Pakistan were formative in the sense that the existing bureaucratic elite soon replaced the major party, the PML, as a centre of power. Firmly rooted in the colonial tradition, the
367 Alan Whaites: The state and civil society in Pakistan; Contemporary South Asia, vol. 4, no. 3, 1995,
p. 232-233.
368 Syed Akbar Zaidi: Issues in Pakistan’s economy; Karachi: OUP, 2005, p. 27 – 29. 369 Whaites, supra, p. 233.
370 For a detailed analysis see Stephen Lyon: Power and patronage in Pakistan; dissertation,
University of Kent, 2002; www.eprints.dur.ac.uk/archive/00000020/01/Lyon_thesis.pdf (August 2008).
371 According to Taylor, the original idea of nation state for all of the Indian subcontinent’s Muslims,
important as it still is in ideological terms, has not been able to replace loyalties based on region, group and language; David Taylor: Parties, elections, and democracy in Pakistan; Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, vol. 30, no. 1, March 1992, p. 97. The influence of landlords would remain strong in the decades to come, with a severe impact on the development of political parties, as Taylor notes, citing the example of the PPP, p. 105.
372 Aitzaz Ahsan: Why Pakistan is not a democracy; in: Meghnad Desai & Aitzaz Ahsan: Divided by
democracy; New Delhi: Roli, 2005, p. 99 – 100. On the colonial roots of the bureaucracy, the Indian Civil Service, see Ali Cheema & Asad Sayeed: Bureaucracy and pro-poor change; PIDE Working Papers (ed. By Pakistan Institute of Development Economics), no. 3, 2006, p. 6 – 8; www.pide.org.pk (Dec. 2010); the authors point out that India and Pakistan inherited one of the most developed civil service systems in the world (p. 7). Its virtually complete insularity allowed it to become a strong tool of the new government, and as a result, it did not face any political compulsions for accommodation of the public interest (…); ibidem.
The disputed territory of Kashmir consists of a Pakistan-controlled area – Azad Kashmir (free Kashmir) neighbouring the Northern Areas – the Indian controlled Jammu and Kashmir (central and southern parts) and Chinese-controlled northern sections (Aksai Chin and Trans-Karakoram Tract). Neither side acknowledges the authority of the others. A referendum on the legal-political status and territorial boundaries, as mandated by the UN Security Council, has not yet materialized; the actual borders are subject to a final resolution of the dispute. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Northern Areas hold a special status of semi-autonomy.
bureaucracy has been an organized institutional apparatus, similar only to the army which itself emerged largely unchanged from the transformation of 1947.373 In the
face of external crises and a lack of internal cohesion the belief that only a strong central government headed by a strong leader could provide the required stability to hold the nation together became a guiding principle of governance after 1947. For that purpose the bureaucracy proved essential.
The need to balance the authority of the provinces and that of the central government was not felt as a challenge in the early years. The federalist system of Pakistan that had been developed from the colonial system recognized in principle the autonomy of the provincial governments in certain areas, yet without allotting resources to exercise the power to act accordingly. The areas of provincial autonomy were very limited and would only slowly be extended. The Government of India Act (GIA, 1919) which itself marked a transition from a centralized to a more decentralized administrative system continued to be the de facto constitution of Pakistan until 1956. It had been amended in 1935, leading to greater provincial autonomy, especially in the water sector.374
Pakistan’s first Constitution, of March 1956, reversed the existing system in that it established the “one unit”, effectively abolishing provincial autonomy.375 The first constitution also established the office of the President as the head of state.376 The strong position of the president would become a cornerstone of the centralist system. The power of the head of state is manifested in the capacity to dissolve the federal and provincial governments and the legislative organs; even the judicature is subject to the president’s decision as it is the president which selects the members of the Supreme Court. Provincial governors were not representatives of the provinces but of the President.
373 Taylor: Parties, op. cit., p. 102 – 103. According to Shafqat, the influence of the bureaucracy (and
of the military) suffered a marked decline following the 1971 conflict that led to Bangladesh becoming independent, with the army and administrative elite widely blamed for the military and political debacle; Saeed Shafqat: Pakistani bureaucracy: Crisis of governance and prospects for reform; The Pakistan Development Review, vol. 38, no. 4, 1999, p. 1005. This loss of credibility helped Zulfikar Bhutto gain power from 1972 on, as Hamza Alavi notes: Authoritarianism and legitimation of state power in Pakistan; in: Subrata Mitra, ed.: The post-colonial state in Asia. Dialectics of politics and culture; Lahore: Sang-e-meel, 1998, p. 20.
A major factor in the bureaucracy’s strong influence in the post-independence years is the increasing politicization, underlined by the large scale postings and transfers after each change of government; Shafqat, ibidem, p. 1008 – 1009. Cf. also Syed Akbar Zaidi: Issues in Pakistan’s economy; Karachi: Oxford U.P., 2005, p. 500.
374 This aspect will be addressed in greater detail in section V of this study.
375 The administrative structure of Pakistan was changed to comprise of two provinces (East and West
Pakistan). In the course of the East Pakistan crisis (1970/71), the earlier system of four Provinces (Balochistan, Sindh, Punjab, NWFP) was reinstituted in the western part of the country; the eastern province would become the state of Bangladesh in 1971; see Hamid Khan: The division of functions amongst federal, provincial and local governments under the constitution; workshop paper; Federation, provinces and local governments: demarcation of roles, issues and possible solutions; workshop hosted by Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, Quetta, 16 – 17 July 2003; www.pildat.org/events/03-07-16/ (August 2008).
Conrad notes that a federation has been envisioned in the Objectives Resolution of 1949, the first partial draft of a Constitution for Pakistan: Dieter Conrad: Conflicting legitimacies, op. cit., p. 126.
376 The Queen of England had remained the formal head of state until 1956. The Constitution of 1956
led to the election of Iskander Mirza to the office of President. Conrad doubts the legality of the Constitution of 1956, established by decree: Dieter Conrad: Zwischen den Traditionen. Probleme des Verfassungsrechts und der Rechtskultur in Indien und Pakistan (Problems of constitutional law and legal culture in India and Pakistan; in German); Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1999, p. 210.
The first military government (Gen. Ayub Khan, 1958 – 1969) led to a further centralization of political power, manifested in the Constitution of 1962. One the one hand, though, the new constitution established the National Finance Commission (NFC). Made up of provincial finance ministers, it gave the provinces a say in budget planning – however not as partners of the federal government, but merely as advisers. Appointed by the President, the actual influence of these provincial representatives was limited. Similarly, the National Economic Council (NEC), also with provincial representation, was established to make sure that budgets allocated for the provinces would take into account the population of the respective areas. In sum, this constitution did more to assert the power of the central government (especially of the President) than it provided a forum for the provinces to articulate their concerns and become actively engaged in policy-making.377 In sum, the Ayub
period strengthened the bureaucratic hegemony (Waseem), i.e. the rule of the three pillars of Pakistan politics – the bureaucracy, the military and the landlords.378
Finally, the constitution of 1973 which is valid to date gave a slightly more pronounced status to the provinces.379 Reflecting the concerns over the civil war in the former eastern half of the country and its aftershocks in the western part, this constitution eased the relationship between central and provincial governments in the provinces’ favour, at least hypothetically, as it allowed the centre to shift powers to the provinces.380 More precisely, the Constitution distinguishes two areas of legislative authority, exclusively federal and potentially provincial. All policy areas, from foreign affairs to fisheries, are divided into two blocs, the Federal List and the Concurrent List, the former describing exclusive federal responsibility, the latter allowing provincial legislation. In practice, this means that provincial legislators can pass laws, but have to synchronize them with federal legislation. In case of conflict between provincial and federal legislation, the latter would prevail.381 The control over taxes, however, remained unaltered. The provinces would continue to rely mainly on land revenue and tax on agricultural production. Issues not mentioned in either list but fall within the provincial prerogative would be referred to the Provincial Assembly. Provincial participation was served more by a bi-cameral legislative body that was formalized through this Constitution. In the National Assembly (NA), the provinces are represented on the basis of demography which means a proportionally smaller participation of NWFP and Balochistan.382 In the Senate, all provinces have an equal
representation which offsets the demographic weight of the Punjab. In sum, the third Constitution includes provincial participation in the legislative process, yet under the control of the federal government and the President. More importantly, effective legislative action and participation in the policy-making process depend on the
377 Hamid Khan: Division of functions, op. cit.
378 Mohammad Waseem: Politics and the state in Pakistan; Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989, p.
156.
379 The 1973 Constitution, unlike its predecessors, was passed by parliament. Its legitimacy is
strengthened by the fact that it was passed unanimously by all parties.
380 Hamid Khan: Divisions, supra.
381 Syed Jaffar Ahmed: Overview of the Constitution of Pakistan. Briefing Paper for Pakistani
Parliamentarians; Karachi: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT), 2004, p. 16; www.pildat.org. Ahmed concludes that with regard to legislation, the Constitution of 1973 represents a step back in history, behind the earlier constitutions and even the GIA. See also Hamid Khan: Constitutional and political history of Pakistan; Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 494.
382 The demographic shares, according to the last population census (1998), are: Punjab, 55.62 %,
Sindh, 23 %, NWFP, 13.4 %, Balochistan, 4.96 % (FATA and Kashmir not included); www.statpak.gov.pk (Jan. 2011).
professional and institutional capacity of the Members of the Assembly to actively voice their positions, particularly in the form of qualified staff and a strong party base. At the start of the parliamentary period, 26 years into the independence of Pakistan, the elected members of the two Houses could not realistically be expected to start fulfilling their mandate perfectly armed to face a central government firmly built on the support of the country’s bureaucratic, military and economic elites.
On the institutional front, the most significant change was the establishment of the Council of Common Interests (CCI). Its ominous name notwithstanding, the purpose of the CCI, according to the Constitution, is to mediate between the provinces in cases of dispute, to seek a solution to conflicts, and, implicitly, to represent the provinces towards the central government. Water sharing is explicitly mentioned as a particular cause for the CCI. The CCI, according to Chapter 3 of the Constitution, is composed of top-level provincial and federal government representatives, signalling, in theory, a readiness on the part of the federal government to meet provincial governments on an equal footing.383 The CCI, which is answerable to the National Assembly, may be summoned in any case where the interests of a Province, the Federal Capital or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, or any of the inhabitants thereof, in water … have been or are likely to be affected (Art. 155, 1). Decisions of the Council would, in case of dispute, have to be referred to the National Assembly. The N.A.’s decision would be final.
Whether the CCI, which has so far met only rarely, will develop into a strong mechanism for dispute settlement will depend on how the parties adhere to its findings. In a dispute between the central and provincial governments over budget allocation within the NEC, the Prime Minister in 1989 refused to convene the CCI, as requested by the provinces, on the ground that tying the NEC to the CCI would not be in accordance with the Constitution.384 The CCI is powerful in theory but weak in
practice, as Waseem notes.385 Besides the CCI, the Supreme Court is mandated to have original jurisdiction in any dispute between any two or more governments (Art. 184,1). The position of the Supreme Court has in the past been ambivalent, as Ahsan notes, as it has often sided with the central government.386
Political parties as vehicles for the articulation and representation of interests and the recruitment of professional politicians have developed slowly. Their role in the political process effectively emerged after the authoritarian rule of General Zia ul-Haq (1977 – 1988), a period which saw the creation of several major parties that would compete in the parliamentary elections of 1988.387 The major parties that have
formed governments after the Zia period, the PML and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), represent organizations that are primarily based on the loyalty of supporters to the respective party leaders. The main parties are commonly distinguished not so
383 As described in articles 153 – 155, the federal government is represented by four cabinet
members, the provinces by their respective chief ministers – all of which are appointed by the President.
384 Ian Talbot: Pakistan: a modern history; London: Palgrave, 1999, p. 299; it wasn’t until Nawaz Sharif
assumed office (in late 1990) that the CCI convened again to solve the problem; p. 318.
385 Mohammad Waseem: Federalism in Pakistan; paper published by the Forum of Federations, 2010;
www.forumfed.org (Dec. 2010), p. 12.
386 Aitzaz Ahsan: Why Pakistan is not a democracy; op. cit., p. 118 - 119.
387 The election of 1985 was a non-party vote; cf. Ahsan, supra. The long military rule had a lasting
negative impact on the parties’ development into professional bodies of political articulation and representation of popular interests.
much by their individual programmes but by their leaders.388 In the case of the various factions of the Muslim League (PML), it is usually the Sharif family, and in the case of the Pakistan People’s Party’s (PPP) factions, it is the Bhutto family. The frequently observed readiness of prominent members and elected representatives (Members of the National Assembly or the Senate) to change sides and aid the more successful party not only demonstrates the volatility of governing coalitions in the light of their members’ opportunism, but also suggests a general lack of affinity with the party.389
The military in Pakistan rose to a strong political role as a result of early acute threats to the physical existence of the nation. A self-proclaimed saviour of national unity, the military has developed a strong belief in its political role, a mission that goes far beyond its constitutional responsibility for the physical integrity of the nation.390 Competition with civilian leaders and institutions over political control became an inevitable characteristic of the political system of Pakistan. Throughout the history of independent Pakistan, the military has retained firm control of politics – both while in power and also without formally assuming power, as Rizvi observes.391
388 For a concise overview of the political parties of Pakistan see party profiles in The Herald, Oct.
2002, p. 30 ff.
389 The widespread factionalism and highly dynamic alliances, a phenomenon of the pre-election
phase, is analyzed by Syed Ali Dayan Hasan: Understanding the opposition; The Herald, Oct. 1999, p. 31.
390 Rizvi highlights the organizational strength and the significant presence in the polity and the society
as the basis of the military’s role in politics – regardless of the actual government: Hasan-Askari Rizvi: The military; in: Anita M. Weiss & Syed Zulfikar Gilani, eds.: Power and civil society in Pakistan; Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 186. Cohen, supporting Rizvi’s findings, concludes that the army was reluctant to take an active political role but saw it necessary for the survival of the nation: Stephen Cohen: The Pakistan Army; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 107. Tariq Ali stresses the foreign influence on the military system in Pakistan as a factor in promoting the army’s political role: Tariq Ali: Pakistan. Ein Staat zwischen Diktatur und Korruption (in German; original title: The duel. Pakistan on the flight path of American power; New York: Scribner, 2008); Bonn: Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung, 2008, p. 237ff. For an account of the army’s view of politics see interview with defence analyst Eqbal Ahmed, The Herald, May 1999, p. 36 – 39; Ahmed concludes that the military, having saved the country from external attacks and natural disasters alike, sees governing as a military job: It naturally becomes a function of defence activity. Gen. Jehangir Karamat, former Army Chief of Staff, asserts the civilian role of the military in indirect terms: Army chiefs can resist pressure only up to a point. Beyond that, their own position starts getting undermined because the army is after all a mirror image of the society from which it is drawn; interview in: The Herald, October 2002, p. 14.
391 Rizvi describes it as a power sharing arrangement between the military chiefs and the civilian
government: Hasan-Askari Rizvi: Civil-military relations in Pakistan; The Herald, May 1999, p. 39. Interestingly the first nation-wide direct elections were held under General Yahya Khan, in 1970. Ahsan terms this arrangement a form of controlled democracy that has become a constant thread of Pakistani politics – often with the tolerance and even support of the Supreme Court: Aitzaz Ahsan: Why Pakistan is not a democracy; op. cit., p. 104, 112. It is noteworthy in this context that the Kashmir dispute has developed into a factor of national identity above ethnic or clan affiliations; cf. Wolfgang- Peter Zingel: Stabilitätsanalyse Pakistan; in: Sigrid Faath, ed.: Stabilitätsprobleme zentraler Staaten: Ägypten, Algerien, Saudi-Arabien, Iran, Pakistan und die regionalen Auswirkungen; Mitteilungen no. 67; Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut, 2003, p. 2.
The latest sign of the military’s notorious refusal to subordinate itself to an elected government is manifested in its aggressive reaction to the sacking of defence minister General Kayani, threatening serious ramifications with potentially grievous consequences; see: Pakistan army warns PM Gilani over criticisms; BBC News (online), 11 January 2012; PM sacks secretary defence; COAS calls emergency meeting; Dawn, 11 January 2011.
Like in the case of the bureaucracy, the military benefited from a colonial legacy of well-organized institutional mechanisms. This institutional foundation provided a degree of political stability at a time when – due to external crises and internal frictions – Pakistan’s very existence was at risk. The military itself has been perceived as a pillar of stability thanks to its structural continuity. In this sense, the representation of the military in civilian institutions, like WAPDA, has contributed to the political and social status of the armed forces.392 On the other hand, the price for this outward stability came in the form of a slow development of civilian institutions (political parties, legislative organs, provincial representation).
The economic toll of the military’s enhanced role has grown into a heavy burden on a country that can hardly afford excessive military spending.393 Interestingly, military
governments which have ruled for 34 years – longer than all civilian governments combined – have overseen some important steps towards water sharing among the provinces and with neighbouring India.394 This seems to suggest that efforts towards
cooperation (between the provinces / between India and Pakistan) require an