The most convincing argument of the concepts presented above is that water sharing in a rational manner means to realize benefits for the actors involved. Water as an indispensable resource and driver of socio-economic development carries a multitude of potential benefits. The aim of rational actors in the water sector, accordingly, is to realize such benefits – be it in the form of greater shares, more convenient delivery timings, for example, or in the form of any other substantial benefit in return for water. Cooperation will be seen as a successful strategy if such benefits outweigh the prize that has to be paid by the individual actor, either in the form of water or other commodities or assets given to other actors, or potential gains foregone. If cooperation does not pay, it will most likely not be considered.
For actors to engage in an effort to share water those expected benefits need to be identified. Since cooperation, even if the benefits seem so obvious, does not come automatically, there must be other aspects behind political decisions worth analyzing. Stated interests help identify an actor’s expected water-related benefits and thus provide a guideline by which to measure when and how one actor might take to cooperate rather than seek confrontation. A central problem attached to political interests is the decision-making. The arcane sphere of executive decision-making inhibits the analysis of rationality and it conflicts with the desire of other actors seeking cooperation to identify and understand interests and positions. Besides the stated interests and political agendas, a number of psychological, societal, cultural and other factors determine decision-making which are highly dynamic and not transparent yet important for the understanding of government action.
To employ RCT effectively would mean to be able to evaluate these factors, at least as far as they can be identified, before actually entering the actor into an RCT model. Game Theory describes a clearly defined idea of rational action that – in theory – allows predicting patterns of action. As such, it exposes the methodical limitations of a strictly mathematical approach to understanding behaviour while at the same time exhibiting the importance of qualitative analysis.348
346 Levi: Modeling …., op. cit., p. 121. This challenge has been faced by other social science
disciplines, for example the sociological discussion of war as an integral part of theories on conflict and peace; cf. Hans Joas and Wolfgang Knöbl: Kriegsverdrängung. Ein Problem in der Geschichte der Sozialtheorie (Avoiding war. A problem in the history of social theory; in German); Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2008.
347 Brian M. Downing: Economic analysis in historical perspective: Analytic Narratives, by Robert H.
Bates et al.; review article; History and Theory , vol. 39, no. 1, 2000, p. 90 - 91.
348 Cf. Randy Simmons & Peregrine Schwartz-Shea: Method, metaphor …, supra, p. 6; the authors
point at the limits of game theoretic approaches regarding group identities which tend to be mistaken analytically for collective interests.
Political decision-making in past crises reminds us of the difficulty to adequately assess and weigh the factors behind executive decisions. Some rational decisions may, on an individual level, even contradictory perceptions of ground realities, reflecting very different rationalities concerning the same subject.349 A well studied case of conflicting rationalities is the Vietnam War management of diverse U.S. administrations. In this case, the government institutions involved in decision-making functioned as intended, yet several different rationalities emerged out of a complex set of personal and group interests, some individuals and groups arguing against, others arguing in favour of escalating the war. Both sides, while advocating diametrically opposed measures, regularly referred to the overall national security interest as a guiding parameter of their respective rationalities. In the end, many measures taken proved counter-productive or even irrational (Halberstam), yet the widespread belief in the righteousness of the decision-makers remained by and large intact.350
Cases like this serve to underline that a general concept of rationality does not exist. In other words, rationality is to be understood as dynamic and reflecting psychological, institutional and other aspects of decision-making, even public opinion. Today’s rationality of a given actor might lead to cooperation with another actor, while tomorrow confrontation might serve that actor’s interests better, just as perceptions of likely gains or costs might change due to factors not necessarily visible to people outside the decision-making body. This observation strongly supports a context-oriented narrative approach, rather than an approach that relies entirely on a general theoretical framework.
The role of incentives as a trigger of cooperation remains important. The above cited example, however, has marked the limits of an entirely incentive-based approach to rational action – not simply because it may be hard to identify likely incentives and their effect on the actor, but also because they do not necessarily constitute the main driver of rational decisions. Much of the decision-making in the Vietnam case is due to the unchecked belief of decision-makers and advisers that the policy enacted by the previous government was in essence successful and in line with stated interests. Moreover, the government itself had already limited its own options to a point where there were few potential benefits from a cooperative move, if any. When defeat on the battlefield had become inescapable, there weren’t any possible incentives left. Consequently, confrontation, rather than cooperation – besides a half-hearted agreement on the withdrawal of foreign forces – continued until the end.
349 The American war against Vietnam illustrates the clashing rationalities expressed by leading
political and military figures in a most dramatic fashion. Though regarded as a hopeless case by many senior advisers, presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon have steadily escalated this conflict up to a level where it became increasingly unmanageable. Stated geopolitical interests were regularly given priority over more tangible arguments fielded by advisers, such as prohibitive costs, adverse economic and social consequences, and lacking prospects of any measurable military success. For a comparative analysis of the internal divisions within the respective U.S. governments see David L. Anderson, ed.: Shadow on the White House. Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945 – 1975; Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1993; Robert Buzzanco: Masters of war. Military dissent and politics in the Vietnam era; Cambridge: CUP, 1996, especially ch. 8.
350 David Halberstam: The best and the brightest; New York: Random House, 1969. See also Walter
Isaacson: The wise men; New York: Simon & Schuster, 1986. Halberstam, citing policy-making with respect to Asia and China, remarks that it was the irony of the Kennedy administration that John Kennedy, rationalist, pledged above all to rationality, should continue the most irrational of all major American foreign policies.
The debate over rational action, benefits and incentives for cooperation will also have to address issues of responsibility, accountability and common interests. From a public perspective, the relevance of incentives may be seen as irrelevant because the elected government is expected to act in a responsible manner, serving a common objective beneficial to most, if not all members of the society, at least in a democratic system. Rational choice, in the above context, is typically applied to governments seen as executive bodies acting in a sphere of exclusive authority with a more or less exclusive right to define national interests. From a public perspective, the benefits from cooperation over water might include ecological long-term aspects not taken into account by the executive.
As systematic economic utilization of rivers inadvertently involves ecological damages to the river basin in one form or another that, in the long run, might lead to a deterioration of water supplies (in terms of quantity and quality), the cost of restoring the basin is set to rise. Avoiding such a burden can be translated into economic benefits to all users. As Ostrom has pointed out, if transaction costs like these are included in the calculation of potential benefits, the rewards of cooperation would have to be reassessed. This helps explain why, if all relevant information is available to decision-makers, it may pay to cooperate even if there are no significant immediate gains but instead important long-term benefits. This finding is crucial to the problem of water sharing in a case like Pakistan because it would hypothetically enable all actors (provinces) to find a common ground, e.g. the rehabilitation of the irrigation and storage network towards ensuring adequate long-term water shares for all parties. In terms of methodology Ostrom’s extension of the classic NIE model widens the scope of rational choice instruments and narrows the gap between economic concepts and concepts primarily based on hydrological and ecological approaches, like IWRM, as well as the property rights approach.
Finally, the problem of asymmetry remains a major challenge in practical political as well as in methodical terms. Hydro-strategic advantages do not necessarily lead upstream sides to blackmail downstream sides – though, at least hypothetically, it is possible. Thus the perceived threat remains, as will be seen in the case of the Indus Basin shared by India and Pakistan. Whether water will be used as a means to exert power over the lower side is a matter of wider political considerations. Upstream positions do not always render an all-out advantage over downstream actors; turning the screws on a riparian neighbour involves potentially negative consequences for the upstream side, even if water blackmailing is feasible.351 It is again economic theory that provides a clue to understanding decision-making by translating such opportunity or transaction costs into operational factors of political action.
351 Halting the flow of a river requires upstream storage capacities; unless storage of significant
dimensions is available, the threat cannot easily be realized. This aspect will be discussed in the chapter on the early post-independence conflict between India and Pakistan.
Introduction:
III. The Indus River and the importance of pani
Large rivers have been focal points of human development ever since the beginning of organized settlements thousands of years ago. The prospects of constant water supply, high-yielding agriculture and revenues from water-borne regional trade have been accompanied by the manifold challenges of river management which were particularly felt in arid places. Not surprisingly, it was Asian societies that have over the centuries developed a unique mastery in managing large rivers and adjusting their economies to the highly dynamic Monsoon cycles.
The Indus River Basin, with its tributaries and canals, its groundwater reservoirs and surface storage facilities, and its climatic and geological features, determines the way water is used in the countries that share this basin.
The people of Pakistan have been harnessing the waters of the Indus River for irrigation since ancient times. Rising demand for water, or pani (in Urdu), has necessitated a more economic utilization of water and the sharing of this vital resource among its many users. To find out why water sharing remains a hotly contested issue in a country whose experience with organized water utilization goes back over 4,000 years, this section presents a comprehensive profile of Pakistan that includes the historical, political, economic and hydrological circumstances of water management.
This context-oriented approach aims to identify the social, economic and political fault lines that run through the Indus River basin and define the relationship between the water users. Understanding the circumstances and conditions of water management is a precondition of understanding the way water is shared or why sometimes confrontation reigns.
III.1 Water management: an institutional history
The history of water management in the Indus Basin is very much a history of Pakistan as a nation. As the development of the Indus into a network of rivers and canals is accompanied by an evolving institutional framework intended to support systematic irrigation, Pakistan’s transition from colonial entity to sovereign state is reflected by the development of administrative structures.
The hallmark of this dual process is the gradual expansion of the irrigation network begun during the colonial rule of the then Crown Colony of India. The desire to support increasing water consumption in the Indus region and beyond drove colonial water managers to regulate the use of the rivers and canals.
Institutions of various types have since emerged: acts and ordinances, committees and commissions, treaties and agreements. Their scope ranges from
- provincial (concerning only one particular province),
- inter-provincial (concerning relations between provinces) and - federal (concerning Pakistan as a whole) to
- international (concerning India and Pakistan).
As the following table shows, a number of institutions covering both provincial and inter-provincial concerns have survived from the colonial era to this day. After independence, when political attention focused on the conflict with India, many institutional provisions in the water sector remained operational without much change, if any. It was not before the conclusion of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), in 1960, when the main problem – sharing water between India and Pakistan – finally seemed to be solved, that the road was cleared for the necessary modernization of the irrigation system that would allow for effective economic and political sovereignty. Though the IWT’s consequence was not instantaneous institutional change, the Treaty can nevertheless be seen as a first step in this direction – all the more so because the former colonial patron, the United Kingdom, did not play much of a role in the IWT process, as will be seen in the chapter on the IWT process.
Further institutional steps that followed the IWT strengthened the role of the provinces. While federal structures took a long time to evolve into effective mechanisms of government, the problem of provincial water shares slowly appeared on the political agenda. When in 1991 a formula for the sharing of water within Pakistan was agreed, a basis for water distribution was established to last to this day.
The following chart presents a chronology of water management that is closely interwoven with the transition from colony to an independent nation. Institutions can be read as markings on the path towards sovereignty in water management as well as in governance.352
352 The following table is primarily based on information provided by Arthur Aloys Michel: The Indus
Rivers: A study of the effects of Partition; New Haven/London: Yale UP, 1967. Being the most comprehensive account of water management up to the implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960, Michel’s work remains a reference on the subject even five decades after its publication. For developments after 1965 the main source are newspaper quotations (particularly Dawn).
Political
system Year