E STADOS DE F Invercap S.A. LUJO DE E FECTIVO
3. C AMBIOS C ONTABLES
In China, the most important cultural factor is Sinocentricism: the claim that China is central to other countries. This has given China “cultural confidence (…) unity, strength, and resilience”177; it has given it, too, a “deep reservoir of cultural pride” and the feeling of superiority: “China’s historic conceit centers on its superiority as a civilized state.”178
In the traditional Sinocenctristic worldview, “the Chinese state was the ad- ministration of civilized society in toto” whereas the emperor was the “pater-
familias of all mankind.”179 The emperor has been given the “Mandate of Heaven”, thus becoming chosen from chosen, the bearer of the supernatural permit to rule the world.”180 Chinese elites of power had “an absolute claim of superiority over ‘barbarians’ – all the other nations.181 Chinese had considered their country “the only civilization.”182 The Chinese Empire was understood as “the only universalistic entity that covers all the world (…) beyond its borders other countries were, naturally, spotted, but were not considered as fully sov- ereign nor equal.”183 As Salvatore Babones writes, “to the extent that the po- litical system of which China was the central state had a name, or at least a label, it might be identified with the Chinese word tianxia (‘all under heaven’)”; tianxia was “an abstract notion embodying the idea of a superior
176 Yu Bin, Tales of Different ‘Pivots’, “Comparative Connections” 2012, vol. 14, no 3. 177 F.M. Mote, Imperial China, 900-1800, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, p.
948.
178 G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge…, p. 37 and 85.
179 M. Mancall, China at the Center: 300 Years of Foreign Policy, New York 1984, pp. 3 and 38.
180 W. Olszewski, Chiny. Zarys kultury [China. The Outline of Culture], Poznań 2003, p. 58. 181 D. Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Why Some are so Rich and Some so Poor,
New York 1998, p. 335.
182 N. Sivin, Science and Medicine, [in]: Heritage of China:Contemporary Perspectives on Chi-
nese Civilisation, ed. P. Ropp, Berkeley 1990, p. 166.
moral authority that guided behaviour in a civilized world.”184 The main insti- tutional mechanism through which the Chinese state managed their world-pol- ity, was the tributary system in East Asia.185 Foreign relations were regulated by the waifan doctrine (“the outer tributaries”) based on a fundamental as- sumption of inequality of sides; each country that maintained diplomatic rela- tions with China was automatically becoming its vassal (in Chinese eyes, cer- tainly not in these countries’ eyes). In this system, “the sovereigns of the other states (and quasi-states) of the East Asian world-polity regularly acknowledged the suzerainty of the Chinese emperor, who in exchange legitimized their rule over their various domains.”186 Tianxia’s system had put “primacy on harmony and order, not freedom” and was “premised on the notion that there is one all- inclusive order.”187 Although this Sinocentric world order “did not necessary involve any significant political control by China, it did require the lesser po- litical entities to recognize a hierarchical structure with China at the apex.”188 Although is questionable whether China did indeed maintain such control, whether East Asian neighbours considered it as the center of the universe and even whether this vision is not entirely false189; what matters here is that this is the narrative Chinese elites believe in and it serves them as the idealized model for international relations, at least in East Asia.
With this Sinocentric historical legacy, China entered the world of the 19th and the 20th century international politics and, especially after 1949, followed the Sinocentric patterns, counciously or not (see e.g., “three circles” concept, exporting Mao’s thought, or Deng’s “teaching Hanoi a lesson” in 1979). This tradition remains strongly present in China even now as it represents the ide- alized vision of IR – “the Tianxia system is the key to China’s ideal world order.”190 The emphasis, explicit or implicit, on hierarchy in the Chinese ap- proach to international relations, or relations in East Asia, with China at the top, is a clear indicator of this tradition.191
184 S.Babones, American Tianxia: Sovereignity in Millennial World-System; IROWS papers; see also: Idem, American Tianxia. Chinese Money, American Power and the End of History, Policy Press 2017, p. iv.
185 J.K.Fairbank, China: A New History, Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992. Enlarged Edition, with Merle Goldman, 1998; Second Enlarged Edition, 2006, pp. 112-113.
186 S.Babones, American Tianxia. Sovereignity… 187 G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge…, p. 167-168.
188 Maung Aung Myo, In the name of Pauk-Phaw. Myanmar’s China Policy Since 1948, Sin- gapore University Press 2011, p. 1.
189 On this discussion, see e.g. H. W. French, Everything Under the Heavens. How the Past
Helps Shape China’s Push for Global Power, Knopf 2017; I. Johnston, Xi Jinping: The Illusion of Greatness, NYRB, 17.03.2017; How Does China’s Imperial Past Shape Its For- eign Policy Today? A ChinaFile Conversation, 15.03.2017.
190 G. Rozman, The Sino-Russian Challenge…, p. 167. 191 James C. Hsiung, op. cit., p. 18.
The idealization of the tianxia period is even stronger given the fact how it has been destroyed: by Western colonialism. The “hundred years of national humiliation” (bai nian guo chi, 1842-1949), or the period of colonial depend- ence, is the central point in official Beijing’s nationalistic narrative that por- trays the road from past glory through defeat and failure to rejuvenation192; colonial defeat from the hands of Westerners came as a shock for the Chinese: “regarding their nation as chosen, close to heaven, and civilized beyond com- parison, the Chinese were traumatized as all elements of their national identity were disrupted” by foreign “barbarians”; communism then, as in Russia, “turned the tables” enabling the Chinese to feel respect again – and to restart rebuilding the Sinocentric world: “CPP’s revolution is steeped in heroic strug- gle against imperialism, layed foundation for Sinocentrism.”193 Legitimization of the ruling of the CPC has been so strong until now, because the communists were able to make the society believe that they gave China back the national pride, strained and humiliated by colonialism (“gave back the lost face”). Now, when they are “regaining the proper place” for China, they reach for the Sino- centristic patterns of relations with other countries. When admiral Yuan Yubai says that the South China Sea is the Chinese Sea “as the name indicates”194, he follows this tradition. As does Xi Jinping with his “Chinese dream” (see be- low). In Sino-Russian relations one can find examples of Sinocentric approach, too. The most obvious example is the “Shanghai spirit” from the Shanghai Co- operation Organization – a clear hint to China’s centrality; another one is the Chinese approach to the 2004 border agreement with Russia where Beijing, despite being stronger, finally compromised part of the disputed territory (ac- cording to international regulations it should have received all disputed islands, instead it agreed on a 50:50 share): “China proceeded from a position of strength as it recalled the Sinocentric tradition of benevolence.”195