Análisis acústico de la velarización en shipibo

Although the “emerging donors” have not joined the DAC (even though some of them belong to the OECD ), they publish data – in many cases detailed data – on their aid. China , in contrast, provides no statistical data. China’s lack of a culture of transparency does not wholly account for this attitude, and other explanations may be put forward. First, the government faces a real problem: to centralize its aid statistics, it must overcome the resistance of a highly compartmentalized public administration as aid is given by different ministries as well as by provinces and cities.12 _{Second, if such statistics were published, the government may fear}

that they would provoke a domestic backlash against aid. Why should the Chi- nese government provide aid to Mali instead of Anhui province?13 _{Not only are}

China’s western provinces poorer than the coastal provinces, but up to 2005 the central government made their situation worse by withdrawing from the social sectors and leaving the provinces to cover their own education and health spend- ing. In a country where civil society is playing a more active role, the government might thus be reluctant to publish data on aid. Lastly, the Chinese government may wish to avoid publishing statistics that indicate the breakdown by benefi- ciary country, as this would reveal inequality of treatment and raise questions from aid recipient countries.

In the absence of statistics, the only easily available information comes from the statements to the press that close official visits and summits. For example, at the third China -Africa summit in Beijing (October 2006), China promised that aid would double between 2006 and 2009, without specifying how much aid had been provided over the three previous years. These announcements are not accompanied by a disbursement schedule or any breakdown into grants, no- interest loans, soft loans and commercial loans. In some cases the announced “package” comprises both loans and investment intentions. Given the lack of official statistics, a number of authors have attempted to evaluate the amount of China ’s aid:

 Jean-R aphaël Chaponnière

– Bräutigam (1998) estimates that China provided 4.9 billion US$ in aid to Af- rica from 1957 to 1989. This amount is estimated to be equal to half of total Chinese aid over the period and a low percentage of OECD aid to Africa. According to Bräutigam (2007), bilateral project aid amounted to 1.6 billion US$ from 2000 to 2006, an amount that includes loans and grants as well as technical and medical assistance valued at one billion US$ (though worth much more in “volume” terms). Next in order of size are concessional loans (1.5 billion US$) and debt cancellation.

– Kurlantzick (2006), working from African data, estimates Chinese aid to Af- rica at 2.4 billion US$ in 2004 and considers that a substantial share of it was ODA as defined by the DAC.

– Working from central government budget data, Qi Guoqiang (2007), who is af- fi liated with the MOFCOM, fi nds that aid to Africa rose from 300 million US$ a year in 1998 to nearly one billion US$ in 2007. Th is estimate, which focuses on the “cost to the state” of grants and loans, takes account of neither the provinces’ aid activities nor the subsidies granted to Exim Bank for its soft loans. Accord- ing to one senior offi cial, quoted by Martin Davies (2008),it is estimated that approximately 4.5 billion US$ in aid had been disbursed in 2006.

Figure 3.4 Aid to Africa

Source: Jian Ye Wang (2007)

20 15 10 5 0 -5 Debt relief

Net ODA (less debt relief )

Multilateral Financial1

Institutions EU-15

 Chinese aid to Africa, origins, forms and issues

In an IMF working paper, Jian Ye Wang (2007) finds that Chinese aid to Africa is greater than in most previous estimates. This evaluation seems the most cred- ible (see below). Chinese aid could amount to 10 percent of total aid to Africa if debt relief, which accounts for half of European aid (Figure 3.4), is not taken into consideration.

Other estimates have attempted to determine the terms of Exim Bank loans, which are not published in either Chinese or English. By and large, Exim Bank finance export trade activities of Chinese firms in Africa.14 _{Hubbard (2007) iden-}

tifies 87 projects financed by Exim Bank from 2002 to 2007 on terms that are judged to be concessional; twenty of these projects, representing a total of 500 million US$ in loans, are in Africa. The maturity of such loans is ten to twenty years, the grace period three to seven years and the average interest rate 2.85 per- cent. Examining an Exim Bank loan, Reisen and Ndoye (2007) show that it met ODA standards and contained a grant element of 40 percent.

Th e geographical structure of aid

In contrast to the other “emerging donors”, China does not limit its aid to its neighbors. China has provided grant and interest-free loans as well as soft loans to North Korea, and South-east Asian countries (Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines), but the coverage of its aid is broader and Africa has always been one of its priorities.

China provides aid to 53 African countries, among which are countries that have not adhered to the “one China” principle. Which countries receive the most aid from China? The available statistics do not allow us to answer this question directly. MOFCOM publishes statistics on what it calls “international coopera- tion”, which show a total of 21 billion US$ in 2004, of which ten billion US$ went to Asia, four billion US$ to Africa and 0.8 billion US$ to Latin America. Under the heading of international cooperation, MOFCOM aggregates all contracts – mostly construction and civil engineering contracts – obtained by Chinese firms in foreign countries, providing a breakdown into capital expenditure, wages paid to Chinese workers and consulting services. These statistics aggregate construc- tion projects that are financed from very different sources and that, for the most part, do not constitute aid. Private financing is used when the work is performed by a Chinese company on behalf of a non-Chinese company;15 _{multilateral or}

bilateral financing is employed when a Chinese firm carries out a project for the World Bank , the African Development Bank or a bilateral donor; and there is Chinese financing as well, in the form of either aid or loans from the Exim Bank. These statistics therefore cannot be used as such. Nevertheless, it is possible to

 Jean-R aphaël Chaponnière

get round this difficulty by working with the data published for each of the Afri- can countries by the international development banks. These data specify the na- tional origin of the companies carrying out the projects, which makes it possible to measure the value of projects conducted by Chinese enterprises using multilat- eral financing (Chaponnière, 2007) for individual African countries. The results show that 25 percent of the African Development Bank’s projects (in 2005/2006) and 15 percent of the World Bank’s projects in Africa were carried out by Chinese firms. When the value of projects financed by multilateral bodies is subtracted from total international cooperation as measured by MOFCOM, we obtain the amount representing projects financed by Chinese loans plus private projects.

Although we have no way of determining which projects are financed by pri- vate firms, we may assume that, in certain countries such as South Africa , Bot- swana, Mauritius and Nigeria, such projects play an important role, whereas in the poorest countries this is not the case. For the latter countries, the difference between “international cooperation” and the data provided by the multilateral or- ganizations gives a good proxy of Chinese aid.

Our method leads to an estimate of two billion US$ for total Chinese aid to Sub-Saharan Africa, a figure that is fairly close to those of Kurlantzick (2006) and the IMF . This estimate is corroborated by the results of a survey conducted by Goldstein (2007) on Chinese construction firms in Africa. The survey shows that 40 percent of the contracts executed by these enterprises are financed from Chinese funds. According to MOFCOM data, these contracts were worth a total of six billion US$ in 2005, which means that 2.4 billion US$-worth were funded by China .

This approach also gives an idea of the geographical distribution of Chinese aid to Africa. This is shown in Table 3.1 (column 4), which indicates the seventeen largest beneficiaries of “Chinese international cooperation” in 2005, i.e. the figure for international cooperation published by China less multilateral financing.

Have China ’s geographical priorities in Africa changed? The first two columns of Table 3.1 show Bräutigam’s (1998) data for the seventeen main beneficiaries of Chinese aid from 1959 to 1998: in Nigeria, Angola and Botswana, the figures for international cooperation probably include private financing, whereas those for other countries indicate cooperation financed by China.

Th is admittedly imperfect comparison shows that China ’s aid and international cooperation to Africa are becoming increasingly concentrated (the fi rst fi ve coun- tries received 38 percent of the total over the 1959-1989 period and 68 percent in 2005). Of the seventeen countries receiving the most aid in 2005, only seven were among the top seventeen in the earlier period (Tanzania, Congo , Sudan, Egypt , Mali, Ethiopia and Algeria). Th ere is thus considerable turnover in the ranking. Countries entering the top seventeen in 2005 include Angola ,16 _{Nigeria and Bot-}

 Chinese aid to Africa, origins, forms and issues

swana, indicating that countries which export oil or raw materials are among the priorities of Chinese cooperation. Due to the spectacular announcements made in 2007 and early 2008,17 _{the Democratic Republic of Congo (RDC) will probably}

rank among the fi rst benefi ciary of Chinese international cooperation.

Table 3.1 China ’s priorities in Africa

Aid per country “International cooperation” excl. external fi nancing in 2004/05; in millions of US$ 1959-1998 2004-2005 Tanzania Zambia Congo DR Mauritania Sudan Somalia Congo Egypt Guinea Ethiopia Mali Madagascar Burundi Cameroon Mozambique Senegal Algeria 534 372 303 239 230 220 205 193 161 155 148 144 125 124 116 108 100 Sudan Algeria Nigeria Angola Egypt Botswana Tanzania Mali Libya Zimbabwe South Africa Ethiopia Mauritius Eq. Guinea Ghana Congo Tunisia 1 342 1 065 787 305 276 265 181 169 132 89 82 77 76 75.6 69 68 65

Sources: Columns 1 and 2, Bräutigam (1998); columns 3 and 4, author’s estimates based on MOFCOM statistics and data from the World Bank and the African Development Bank Note: Countries where cooperation includes projects fi nanced by private fi rms are in italics.