Análisis de las conductas procesales de las empresas operadoras respecto del

As discussed in Chapter Three, the decisions which are made now concerning the construction of major infrastructure projects will have an undoubted effect on future generations. However, commentators such as Bosher and Chtmutina (2017) and Coaffee and Fussey (2017) acknowledge this interconnection yet argue both agendas are

‘responsibilised’ (Garland, 1996) by different levels of actors. The threats of terrorism and events such as 7/7 have pushed the resilience agenda from a top level down, with the state being ‘a ‘facilitator’ instead of a ‘builder’ of resilience’ (Bosher and Chtmutina, 2017, p.

268). Local level stakeholders are ‘responsibilised’ (Garland, 1996) and ‘the security agenda [is] centralised’ (Bosher and Chtmutina, 2017). Coaffee and Fussey (2017, p.293) maintain the rhetoric of resilience and its enactment is through explicit security measures are now becoming narrower forms of ‘security-driven resilience’. Therefore, creating numerous consequences for governance, ‘scaling and coercive implications’ (Coaffee and Fussey, 2017, p. 293).

Moreover, Bosher et al. (2007, p.236) present an argument of a co-ordinated ‘and proactive multi-stakeholder approach’ to potentially reduce the vulnerability of CNI to both these and natural disaster threats. Designing new and the retrofitting of railway stations to increase resilience to security threats relies on the construction industry attaining ‘an in-depth understanding of the expertise and knowledge on avoiding and mitigating the effects of the

hazard’ (Bosher, 2008, p.3). This could be augmented practically by engaging and creating cross sector, public and private stakeholder relationships (Rogers, 2017 and Sircar et al., 2013) with the intention of enhancing ‘the quality and flow of communication…as well as the interoperability and resilience of best practice’ (Rogers, 2017, p.21-22). Thus, stakeholders in complex spaces like SPIRS could be made aware of the causes of disasters and fully participate in a ‘negotiated census’ (Bosher et al., 2007, p.245) of which losses are considered acceptable and those which are not. However, there are issues with this approach being undermined by conflicting resilience agendas arising between the complex stakeholders and the Government, with tensions being caused by threats being miscalculated, the burden of resilience implementation expenditure, and the burden of obligated regulations on the private sector (Schneider, 2002, p.14, cited in Bosher et al., 2007, p. 237).

The UK’s political stance on the resilience of the CNI of the UK is defined by the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Programme as ‘the ability of a system or organisation to withstand and recover from adversity’ (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.5). The Government states regardless of difficulties, resilience methods and plans in CNI and businesses should mean central aims and operations should be attainable and realisable (Cabinet Office, 2010). The Government proposes resilience should be a holistic concept, which incorporates a suitable amalgamation ‘of infrastructure networks, effective emergency response, business continuity planning, and recovery arrangements’ (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.5). Yet, it is must be questioned whether this form of bridging resilience as a form of ‘organising principle’

can constructively beneficially unite ‘whatever needs to be bridged’ (Randalls and Simon, 2017, p.40).

The Sector Resilience Plan for Critical Infrastructure 2010 concedes the high level of dependencies and interconnections between the UK’s CNI. However, resilience strategies within the UK are disconnected and are treated as two distinct political agendas, as resilience to natural hazards and to human malign security threats are dealt with by separate Governmental departments and policies and strategies (White and O’Hare, 2014).

This is evident in the 2010 Sector Resilience Plan for Critical Infrastructure, its core aims are to create resilience plans for each of the nine defined sectors and their respective sub-sectors by ‘setting out the current level of resilience of critical infrastructure and essential services to natural hazards’ (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.4). Moreover, Rogers (2017, p.17) contends the

concept of resilience in policies such as the Civil Contingences Act (CCA) (2004) which deal with disasters has not overlooked the division ‘between security threats and ecological or technological disasters’ it has more accurately been motivated ‘by comprehensive capability across all hazards’.

However, despite this cross sector and multi-hazard recognition and the recommendations of the 2007 Pitt Report concerning the floods of the same year, to date, there is not a coalesced or multi-hazard approach to reducing the vulnerability against these risks (White and O’Hare, 2014). The Sector Resilience Plan claims in subsequent plans ‘other types of hazard, will be included’ (Cabinet Office, 2010, p.4), yet it is proposed this statement is ambiguous as to whether human malign security threats will be incorporated into future resilience plans. Thus, the concept of the resilience in terms of the railway station is currently a two-tiered approach, which deals with natural and human malign security threats through separate policies.

A key policy that was triggered into action by natural occurring incidents is the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) (2004). The CCA 2004 is the emergency planning policy for England is divided into two parts, emergency powers, and civil protection at a local level.

Through this piece of legislation, the concept of resilience is presented through Governmentality through ‘empowering local responders, whilst also providing opportunities to attempt restructuring, imposing economies of scale on a number of key agencies’

(Rogers, 2011, cited in Rogers, 2017, p.18)

At this level, the Act states there are two forms of responders, category one and two, who are considered as frontline and which defines their responsibility and role in disasters to situations at a local level (Bosher 2014), see Table 4.3 below.

Category one Category two

Emergency services Private sector stakeholders, including voluntary agencies Primary local Government

authorities,

Network Rail and other transport operators

National Health Service (NHS)

National Grid

Strategic Government agencies

Utility companies

Table 4.3 Source Bosher (2014, p.245) Emergency planning in the UK

The political view of the concept of resilience in policies such as the CCA 2004 and Critical Infrastructure Resilience Programme advocate the position of ‘governmentality from a distance’ (Joseph, 2013, p.43), with the Government not taking ‘a direct role in the process’

(Joseph, 2013. P43).