Análisis de costos y beneficios de la aplicación del procedimiento

Petro-business in Nigeria, especially the upstream or exploration/production sector, is dominated by the big Multinational oil companies (MNOCs) such as Shell, ExxonMobil, ChevronTexaco, Agip and Elf. These companies operate joint venture production arrangements with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) representing the Nigerian government, in which NNPC is always the majority equity shareholder (with between 55 and 60 percent of the equity). Hence, in a bid to protect its equity interests, the oil-dependent Nigerian State usually attempts to settle the conflict between the oil companies and their host communities in favour of petro-business, often adopting legislative as well as military means. More often than not, the State’s measures have aggravated the

conflict. The management strategy of the Nigerian government is contingent upon the following perceptions.

The Nigerian government sees the activities of protesting oil communities and the armed militias as acts of economic sabotage designed to endanger the main source of national revenues. Since Nigeria is an oil-dependent nation, with oil accounting for over 80 percent of Federal Government of Nigeria’s revenues and 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings, any act capable of resulting in the disruption of oil production is perceived a threat to the

survival and wellbeing of the country. The Nigerian government interprets the activities of

some of the armed groups as acts of criminality and insubordination, challenging the Government’s power in the Niger Delta and thus threatening national stability and security.

As a result of these perceptions, the Federal Government management style is characterised

by the following (Ibaba and Ikelebge 2009).

4.1.3.1 Military Tactics

The Federal Government management style has been that of repression and suppression, especially during the military regimes. Military rule commenced in Nigeria on January 15, 1966 when a military coup d’état, led by Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu, overthrew the government of Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. It continued through the short- lived regime of Major-General J. T. U. Aguiyi-lronsi (1966), the regime of Lt. Colonel (later General) Yakubu Gowon (1966 - 1975), which also witnessed the Nigerian Civil War (1966 - 1970), and the regimes of Brigadier (later General) Murtala Mohammed (1975 -1976) and Lt. General Olusegun Obasanjo (later General) (1976 - 1979).

The civilian administration that followed under President Shehu Shagari (1979 - 1983) was overthrown by a military coup on December 31, 1983. Thereafter, successive military regimes were headed by Major-General Mohammadu Buhari (1983 - 1985), Major-General (later General) lbrahim Badamasi Babangida (1985 - 1993), General Sani Abacha (1993 - 1998), and General Abdulsalami Abubakar (1998 - 1999). In between the Babangida and

Abacha regimes, there was a brief civilian Interim National Government (ING) installed by Babangida and headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan (August - November, 1993). Since May 29, 1999, when President Olusegun Obasanjo succeeded Abubakar, Nigeria has been ruled by a civilian regime, although Obasanjo was previously a General in the Army. Thus, by May 1999, the military had ruled Nigeria for approximately thirty years. Lands and backyards were being divided, partitioned and allocated to Lagos and Abuja in the name of oil blocks and wells without the knowledge and participation of Niger Delta peoples’ (United Nations Human Rights Council Geneva, February, 2009).

These management strategies from the government can be classified into two different

groups. The first involved a number of ad hoc measures, which included the use of force

through the Nigerian police, as well as the military to quell violent uprising in a bid to subdue the aggrieved people into quiescence (Dokubo 2004: 4). The standard response of the government involved the militarization of the area in order to crush community protests, so as to ensure the protection of oil facilities and the continued flow of crude oil. For instance, soldiers were on occasions sent into communities to raid, kill, maim and set villagers’ houses on fire. This was the popular management style, particularly during military rule. Military operations such as Operation Sweep, Operation Fire-For–Fire, Operation Hacurri No.1 and No. 2, Operation Restore Hope, and Operation Flush 1, 2, and 3 are just a few of the high profile security initiatives launched by the State against the Niger Delta region on the sight of any uprising (Douglas 2004).

Following human rights groups such as Amnesty International’s crusade against brutality and inhumane treatment of communities, the present democratic government has had to take steps to get avoid resorting to such brutal control measures to subdue such uprisings. Nigerian security forces, particularly the police, have been accused of serious human rights abuses and activists had suggested that the government was doing little to address issues of impunity and corruption within the Nigerian Police Force. In 2007, the U.N. Special

Rapporteur on Torture reported that “torture is an intrinsic part of how law enforcement services operate within the country” and called on the Nigerian government to criminalize the practice (United Nations 2007).

4.1.3.2 The Viability of Probes/Panels of Enquiry

Generally, probes /investigations are a core part of governance and public office management. They are tools used all over the world to get to the roots of an incident. The thrust of probes or investigations is to make sure the causes of a problem are known, and persons behind are made to be accountable. In Nigeria, the stream of probes with no definitive outcomes has eroded the citizens’ faith in the process. A typical example is the Oputa Panel.

In June 1999, just a month after the President Olusegun Obasanjo administration came on board, the Presidentset up the Human Rights Violations Investigation Panel popularly referred to as the Oputa Panel, to look into human rights abuse(s) in Nigeria. Prior to setting up the panel, the nation had been shaken to its roots by human rights abuses, especially during the successive dictatorial administrations of Generals Buhari, Babangida and Abacha. Nigerians saw the Oputa Panel as an opportunity to address the wrongs of the past. While the panel worked tirelessly and produced its findings as it was directed to, according to its mandate, in the end, nothing came of the report, as some powerful Nigerians, who felt threatened by the outcome used all means at their disposal, including court orders, to stop it. This was just one of a chain of probe panels whose reports were never published or implemented

Since the failure of the Oputa panel, the nation has witnessed at least 400 such unproductive probes (Probegate 2011). The Technical Committee Report (2008) set up to look into the plight of the Niger Delta issues and suggest a way forward in the Niger Delta made the following point: “It is clear that though governments, since 1958, have set up very high powered committees to look into the problems of the Niger Delta and the committees have

submitted far-reaching and comprehensive reports, they have suffered the same fate: non implementation”. While some recommendations have been considered, often they have been taken out of context and implemented piecemeal, or without the required enthusiasm, consistency and monitoring policies in place to ensure the desired result. Some of the reports were not even touched at all; no White Paper was issued, and no follow-up implementation and monitoring mechanisms (Probegate 2011). The current quagmire in which the people of the Niger Delta region find themselves, that has led them to resort to violence, kidnapping, oil theft, illegal bunkering and inter-and intra-community suspicion and conflicts, is a result of the non-implementation of the recommendations of various reports on the Niger Delta. Insensitivity, neglect and at times, marginalisation of already powerless and devastated communities have made it possible for political opportunists, bad leaders, corruption, waste, institutional decay and inefficiency to thrive in the Niger Delta (Technical Report 2008).

In addition to the observations of the technical report, there has been a lack of a conflict resolution model that is structured, viable, sustainable and culturally adaptable to the region. The practice of responding to conflict only when it occurs is not only non-viable, but it breeds “conflict entrepreneurship”. The fact that there is no process on the ground to manage any conflicts implies that once there is a conflict in any part of the country, a commission of enquiry is set up constituted by the same elders, rulers and politicians who have been accused of instigating such conflict to enrich themselves (Onosode 2003).

The second management strategy is based on the ‘paradigm shift’ to the new understanding that the essential part of the puzzle that will allow the IOCs to operate peacefully in the Niger Delta and make a more meaningful contribution to the Nigerian economy is community development projects. Such projects have covered areas such as the provision of social and economic infrastructure, compensation for polluted land (though it can be debated how successful compensation has been on occasions due to disagreements over the

rate of compensation which is decided by government and payment delays), youth skill acquisition programmes and scholarships for students of Niger Delta origin (Okoh 2002).