ANÁLISIS DE ENTORNOS

Andrew Beedle (1996) thinks, as I do, that GMR has serious implications for human agency. He uses a fork argument in an attempt to demonstrate that either GMR commits us to modal fatalism (that is, there is no agency; this is explained below), or GMR implies that our desires about this world being a good one are simultaneously desires that other worlds are worse off. The first prong of the fork is meant to show that GMR implies that there is no agency. This section focuses on the first argument.

The prong of the fork Beedle favors against GMR is modal fatalism. By ‘modal fatalism,’ Beedle (1996) means that the character of each and every world is fixed and necessary because the whole of the plurality is fixed and necessary (pp. 491-492). Beedle (1996) sums up the reason for this: "If the character of all the worlds is given, then the character of each world is given" (p. 492).

This seems to make sense; if the plurality could not have been otherwise, how could the worlds have been otherwise? Beedle thinks this has implications for agency; specifically, that there could be no such thing. The reason is that, since each world is completely necessary, then a being that thinks she’s an agent is wrong; she does exactly what she must do according to the world. If Beedle is right, this means that my choices are ultimately not part of the causal fabric of this world (or, of course, any world).50 Or, if my choices are part of the causal fabric of my world, they are not chosen by me, but by the world or system of worlds (whatever that means).

An example is in order, and I adapt it from Beedle (1996, pp. 492-493). I am typing

50 _{Beedle is attempting to recast the argument from indifference against GMR originally posited by Robert} Adams (1974).

this section of my dissertation on a Thursday morning at the library. It seems possible (and actually likely) that someone is going to interrupt and distract me. Orthodoxy says that I have several possibilities at that point from which I can freely choose. I might choose to kill the person, to shake his hand, give him a stick of gum, ask him to leave me alone, etc. But what I do is up to me. However, according to Beedle, if GMR is right, then this orthodox stance is wrong because if I choose anything freely, I am thereby

determining both the kind of possibility I am and the kind of world at which I live. But if the character of the plurality, and therefore all worlds, is fixed and non-contingent from their beginnings to ends, then I would not choose from these options when I am

interrupted; I would simply discover what kind of possibility I am, whether I be one that kills or gives out gum. Beedle (1996): "The idea that I choose is illusory, because it is not as if I am choosing to be a member of a certain world in making any ethical decision. Instead, my decision just shows me which is the world that already has me as a part" (p. 493). Seemingly, a this-worldly analogue of this point is the kind of determinism that states that all events, even so-called human choices are ultimately explained by the laws of nature.

But this is only a ‘seeming.’ For then Beedle (1996) distinguishes his sense of modal fatalism from both determinism and classical fatalism (pp. 493-494). According to determinism, everything proceeds from the past, and, given the initial conditions, things would go exactly the same way. In other words, the world is ordered in a rational way. But, GMR does not require any world to be rational or follow a rational causal order. There could be a world at which a man could be walking down a street and, in a flash, for no rational reason, turn into a pterodactyl. Beedle (1996) points out that GMR “does not

claim that each successive state of a world depends causally on the previous state” (p. 494). I think he means just what has been said; some worlds do follow a rational order; others do not. Causal connections are contingent.

Beedle also juxtaposes his theory against a classical form of fatalism, the tragic Greek myth, in which Τυχη (Fate, or Fortune) oversees the big details, but the little details are left up to the person. For example, the hero is often told that he will suffer great evil or die at a particular time. He then does everything to avoid this, only to find that he cannot. Beedle (1996): “This sort of fatalism gives one the freedom to make little choices (like setting sail on a particular ship or avoiding certain foods) but claims that the larger elements of one’s life are rigidly fixed. In essence, any set of conditions will lead to the same outcome” (pp. 493-494). He rejects this as well, since it allows for a

modicum of freedom; he argues that if GMR holds, all parts of all worlds are fixed. In summary, classical fatalism allows some, smaller choices on our part to be part of the causal order. “Classical” determinism posits that each moment is causally

dependent on the previous. But GMR requires neither. According to Beedle, GMR requires that each moment and part of any world be rigidly fixed. So modal fatalism is not like the Greek tragic myth because everything is rigidly fixed; and modal fatalism is not deterministic because it does not require a rational, causally dependent chain of events at every world.

If Beedle were right about modal fatalism, this would indeed provide a powerful reason to think that Lewis’ abductive argument for GMR is not on better footing than his rivals.But I think there is a good Lewisian response that shows why Beedle’s argument is far too quick. Specifically, Beedle does not account for the qualitative/de re distinction.