Estado del arte

Lewis' analysis of actuality is up next. I start with an attempted objection to Lewis' program based on actuality. Lewisian GMR holds a plenitude of worlds,

spatiotemporally and causally isolated. Regardless of isolation, it is still the case that all

28 _{There is another question lurking here. Does Lewis, by claiming there are no impossible worlds, actually} “inhibit” possibilities? There are those who are argue that there are true contradictions. For example, Graham Priest (2006). Lewis (1986d) clearly thinks there can be no such thing when he follows his claim of there being no impossible by worlds by saying that you would speak “truly [of them] by contradicting yourself” (p. 1). The possibility of true contradictions is a fascinating one and worth pursuing in light of GMR. It is, however, beyond the scope of this dissertation.

29 _{One might ask about the ontological status of imaginings, or fictitious universes in novels, that are truly} impossible. It is an important and interesting philosophical issue. However, it is not a pressing problem for Lewis, anymore than anyone else. And it falls well outside the scope of my dissertation. I set it to one side. For Lewis on fiction generally, see Lewis (1983f) and Lewis (1983e).

these worlds exist, that they are part of actuality. Or as Lewis (1986d) frames this stage of the objection:

"...it is a trivial matter of meaning that whatever there is, is actual. The word 'actual' is a blanket term, like 'entity' or 'exists': it applies to everything. Not just everything hereabouts, or everything suitably related to us, as I would have it; but

everything without restriction" (p. 97).30

So even if there are other worlds, isolated from us, they are still part of actuality. But now we have a serious problem according to this objection.

Lewis (1986d):

"Since everything is actual, the other worlds, if such there be, actually exist. Then it is not merely possible that they exist. They are not unactualised

possibilities. In fact they have nothing to do with possibility. For possibility concerns not the far reaches of actuality--not even the reaches of actuality that are spatiotemporally isolated from us, if such there be--but rather it concerns

alternatives to actuality. Actuality--all of it, no matter how much of it there is-- might have been different, and that is what modality is all about" (pp. 97-98) (emphasis mine).

What is Lewis' response?

He simply does not use 'actual' as a blanket term. Rather, he interprets it as an indexical, on a par with words like, 'you,' or 'today,' etc. On Lewis analysis, ‘actual' turns out to mean 'this-worldly'. Thus, when I discuss 'actuality,' I can only be referring to the contents and inhabitants of a particular world. Nota bene that ‘actual' no longer is the same as 'existence' on this analysis.

If actuality is indexical, other worlds and their parts can rightfully be said to be

un-actualised possibilities. What is actual at a world, could have been otherwise in so many different ways. Lewis (1986d): "Possibilities are not parts of actuality, they are alternatives to it" (p. 99). To put it one final way, the preceding statements can say 'possibilities are not parts of this world (wherever 'this world' is used), they are alternatives to it.' So, not everything is actual on Lewis' analysis.

The last thing I say about actuality is that isolation is doing a lot of work for Lewis. That is, because of spatiotemporal and causal isolation, the worlds cannot be considered altogether as one big world. If the worlds were causally or spatiotemporally connected in any way, then everything would be actual. ‘Actual' can function as an indexical term because there is no interaction of any kind across worlds in Lewis’ GMR. Lewis (1986d) says:

"If I were convinced that I ought to call all the worlds actual--in which case also I might be reluctant to call them worlds--then it would become very

implausible to say that what might happen is what does happen at some or another world. If there were a place left for unactualised possibilities at all, they would be possibilities of a grander sort--not differences between the worlds, but other ways that the grand world, the totality that includes all my little worlds, might have been...All this would be a great defeat, given the theoretical benefits that modal realism brings" (pp. 100-101) (emphasis mine).

Thus, Lewis denies that everything is actual because ‘actual’ is an indexical term meaning ‘this-worldly.’ From the standpoint of any world, the rest of the plurality of worlds is unactualized.

I said earlier that Lewis’ analysis of actuality is underpinned by isolation. I would like to flag this point. If isolation could be shown not to hold, the point about the grand world returns, especially if some kind of causal connection across worlds is implied. With the return of the grand world comes the point about everything being actual. This is discussed more in chapter 5.