The final objection that I wish to consider from Chapter 2 is that Rawls’s theory may allow people to treat political decision-making as a bargaining process, and use whatever means they can to advance their own self-interest. As we have seen, a central aim in theories of justice is to find fair terms of cooperation in order to resolve political controversies. But then, approaching discussions with the primary goal of advancing one’s own self-interest seems necessarily inconsistent with justice so conceived.
The Rawlsian structure of political justification I have outlined provides a way of understanding why, and in what way, including considerations of self- interest in citizens’ evaluations of political decisions should be permissible. As Rawls’s theory holds, justification for political decisions rests on reasonable citizens’ satisfaction with the institutions making the decisions. I submit that reasonable people are likely to share the view that one’s evaluations of deci- sions should, in part, be based on their implications for one’s own interests. Moreover, they are also likely to share the view that one’s satisfaction with institutions making the decisions should be based on how one’s own interests are thwarted or advanced over time.
Although constraints should be placed on the role of self-interest in judge- ments about political issues, those constraints must be determined by public reason. So, the extent to which political officials allow people’s self-interested claims to affect the outcomes must be conducive to the satisfaction of those
in the reasonable overlapping consensus with the institutions. Furthermore, it seems that the criterion of reasonableness as it applies to persons excludes those who would judge decisions based solely on the consequences for them- selves from counting towards the justification of a decision.
The ability for institutions to be flexible in how they accommodate self- interested reasons is, I think, a virtue when one considers that the aim of political institutions is to fulfil the principle of equality over time. Examining decisions and evaluating the fairness of institutions by looking at how they af- fect the interests of particular citizens allows institutions to consider whether their decisions are systematically disadvantaging certain citizens, i.e., whether decisions are systematically thwarting their interests. If the citizens whose interests are being systematically thwarted are reasonable ones who hold rea- sonable comprehensive doctrines, then my account suggests that the mere fact that they are being systematically disadvantaged warrants attention on the part of political officials. And it allows for citizens to make an appeal couched in the language of public reason, on their own behalf.
Political officials ought to take the systematic thwarting of citizens’ in- terests into account because the objective of political officials is to promote the satisfaction of citizens with the institutions. And insofar as citizens regard each other as equals, if institutions systematically thwart the interests of some, then it seems that all reasonable citizens should agree that this is cause to be concerned about the goodness of the institutions or those making decisions within them. They may disagree about what should be done as a result, and they may disagree about the precise sources of unfairness. But they should agree that it is a problem worth examining and addressing. For, systematic
thwarting of some interests suggests that there may be something unfair about the current structure of institutions.
4.13
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have defended Rawls’s political theory against the criticisms raised in Chapter 2, and laid the groundwork for the main objections that I see arising for Gutmann and Thompson, which I will raise in the final chapter. One difference between the two theories that emerges is what sort of evidence each believes should be privileged in political decisions. Rawls holds that political officials should base their decisions on information that tells them about what would be likely to meet the standard of public reason. Gutmann and Thompson argue instead that political decisions should be grounded in public discourse that fulfils their standards to a significant degree.
As a result of Gutmann and Thompson’s commitment to the view that decisions should be determined by actual public discourse, it is helpful to examine their theory at work, which I will do in the next chapter. There, I will use the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly (OCA) to illustrate the moves they make to address the limitations they identified in Rawls’s theory. This also makes it possible to see the differences between how each theory guides the approaches and decision-making processes in practice. In the final chapter, on the basis of the Rawlsian framework I have developed here, I will argue that the OCA could have been strengthened by grounding decisions about it in political liberalism. However, I will also argue that there is a role for Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, so long as it is situated within the framework built on
Chapter 5
Deliberative Democracy in
Action
5.1
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I defended a Rawlsian framework of political justifi- cation. There, I argued that the justification of a political decision depends on whether it is conducive to the satisfaction of reasonable people in the soci- ety, with the institutions as defined by the constitutional essentials. In other words, the justification of a political decision depends on whether it meets the standard of public reason.
In this chapter, I will return to Gutmann and Thompson’s theory, which holds that political decisions are justified insofar as they are made in a process in which citizens exchange reasons that are respectful and moral, and that a
binding decisionmust be made at some point, although it should be possible to
revisit any decision after a period of time. I will outline Thompson’s argument that a citizens’ assembly, designed according to the principles of Gutmann’s and his theory of deliberative democracy, should be used to review and make
decisions about reforming electoral systems.
Thompson draws out his arguments using the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly (BCCA), which was held to review the electoral system, and poten- tially recommend a new one to the people to vote on in a referendum. However, I will argue that the Ontario Citizens’ Assembly (OCA) fulfilled Thompson’s principles at least as well as did the BCCA. Thus, in the last chapter, I will use the OCA to draw out my critique of Gutmann and Thompson’s theory and the practical implications of it.