ANÁLISIS DEL MICRO ENTORNO

Events in former Yugoslavia cannot be said to threaten directly the security of the Russian Federation. Most commentators would agree that the expanse of the former Soviet Union, in three distinct areas - Eastern European, Transcaucasus, and Central Asia - is more significant for Russia than the Balkans are, but some analysts and politicians remain convinced that the Balkans as a whole are also important for Russian security.

Those who tend towards traditional realism may emphasise the strategic importance of the Straits (the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles). Historically, the Straits were believed to be the key to defending Russia’s ‘soft underbelly’; Russia’s vulnerability was demonstrated during the Crimean War and by the British incursion into the Black Sea during the civil war. Both the Soviet authorities and their Tsarist predecessors sought to gain control o f the Straits - or at least to secure a favourable

regime - in order to prevent access to the Black Sea by the navies of other great powers. After the Second World War, the Straits gained strategic importance as the warm water outlet for the Black Sea Fleet as the Soviet Union developed a navy capable o f global reach. On the other hand, the advent o f nuclear weapons and the growing importance of air power perhaps diminished the relative military significance of the Straits.

The Soviet authorities were clearer than their Tsarist predecessors in differentiating strategically between the Balkans and the Straits.^ The Tsarist preoccupation with the Straits had led it to seek influence in the Balkans, particularly through Bulgaria. However, Russian policy became trapped in a vicious circle. Geo-political considerations supposedly necessitated Balkan commitments in order to control the Straits. But the defence and expansion of those commitments in the Balkans created tensions with rival European powers and led to wars, one of which, the Crimean War, brought about the very invasion launched through the Straits that the Balkan policy was supposed to prevent. Defeat led to an increased pre-occupation with the importance of the Straits, which entailed more activity in the Balkans, eventually leading to Russian involvement in World War One and the subsequent collapse o f the Tsarist empire.

This indicates the flaw in the strategy o f attempting to gain control of the Straits through control of parts of the Balkans. But it also demonstrates the problem of getting trapped in a realist zero-sum struggle for strategic goals, particularly when the state is not sufficiently strong economically to pursue such commitments. Even before the First World War, the economic and human costs o f wars with Turkey that resulted from Russia’s Balkan commitments vastly outweighed the gains and hindered Russia’s development.^ Russia was too weak domestically to succeed in its Balkan operations, and those operations contributed to its domestic weakness because of the cost.

Despite these lessons, some realist commentators continue to think in such a way. For instance, Nadia Arbatova of the Institute o f World Economic and International Relations (IMEMO, RAN) suggests that, with the loss of Ukraine, and the disputes over the Black Sea Fleet, Russia is now even weaker on its Black Sea coastline; she argues that the Straits have, therefore, retained their strategic significance because of Russian vulnerability.^

The other supposed Russian strategic interest in the Balkans relates to the danger of a land invasion: the Balkans could be used as a base for an invasion o f Russia. This was ^ Arbatova (1996), j^. 404-5.

Lederer (1962a), p. 423. Jelavich (1991), conclus he Finance Ministers, opp ^ Arbatova (1996), p. 409.

^ Jelavich (1991), conclusion. Jelavich points out that those who supported reform at home, particularly the Finance Ministers, opposed an adventurous Balkan policy.

demonstrated in June 1941 when the southern army of the three-pronged German attack invaded the Soviet Union (Ukraine) from Romania. Elena Gus’kova uses this fact to argue that Russia still has strategic interests in the Balkans.^ Connected with this is the argument that the Belgrade revolt delayed the launch o f Operation Barbarossa, with crucial consequences for that campaign. According to Arbatova, ‘the old generation of Russians cannot forget ... that the uprising in Belgrade in 1941 delayed the Germans and they reached Moscow late in autumn,’^ thus getting caught by the Russian winter. Many historians, however, now question the significance of this delay. J. Grenville, for instance, suggests that, since it took less than two weeks to overcome Yugoslav resistance, ‘the military diversion was too slight to affect significantly the time it took to assemble the huge build-up of men, equipment and supplies for the Russian invasion’ . And James Gow refers to his own discussion with Aleksandr Korsik, First Secretary at the Russian Embassy in London, who also highlighted the Russian perception o f the significance o f the Belgrade revolt, but stressed that it was ‘an emotional response rather than one based on objective analysis’.

Given Russia’s new borders, and the independence o f Ukraine, the danger of invasion through the Balkans is now at still one more remove (see map 1). And any new attempts to gain control of the Straits would be doomed to fail. Hence, there are no clear-cut strategic interests for Russia in the Balkans that require an assertive, zero-sum approach. This does not mean, however, that neo-realist politicians and policy makers do not perceive there to be such interests.

* Interview with Gus’kova (4 June 1998). ^ Arbatova (1995), p. 51.

Grenville (1980), p. 489. " Gow (1997a), p. 188.

Map 1 Europe in the 19 9 0 s

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y

Russian Federation

Former Soviet republics

Former Y ugoslav republics

B ased on map on Oxford University Central and East European Society weh-site, httv .-//users, ox. ac. uk'~cees/