INICIO DEL PROCESO DE FAENA DEL CUY

Some Russian critics of the official foreign policy have been described as ‘Eurasianists’. However, Eurasianism is a misleading term because it refers to two distinct approaches. On the one hand, some commentators have used it to refer to the theory that - due to its geo-political position as part of both Europe and Asia - Russia has interests distinct fi'om those o f the Western powers; this could be called political Eurasianism. I have already suggested that there is nothing controversial about this claim, and that recognising it is essential for a successful Russian foreign policy. On the other hand, there is a cultural aspect of the term. It was originally used in the 1920s by a group of Russian émigrés, who claimed that because o f its unique culture, Russia has a specific role to play in world affairs. In this can be seen an echo of the idea o f Moscow as the ‘Third Rome’.

Cultural Eurasianism seeks a return to the Russian empire after the Soviet period (which is interpreted as an alien application o f Western European rationalism and materialism). The Russian empire is viewed as a unifier o f Orthodox and Islamic peoples. The political implication of these views is that policy makers should promote a re-integration o f the peoples of the Russian empire/Soviet Union, and that they should reject the Western model - democracy, market economy, and materialism - and re-build instead a society consistent with Eurasian culture: communal at the local level, paternalistic or authoritarian at the state level. ‘Neo-imperialists’ may also seek re­ integration of the former Soviet Union, but by force if necessary, and more on the basis o f Russian domination.

Pan-Slavists also see Russia as different fi'om the West. However, unlike Eurasianists, they emphasise the Slav nature o f much o f the Russian empire. They advocate a foreign policy orientated to the development of close relations with other Slav states (realists may also favour this sort o f approach as a basis for finding allies). Pan-Orthodox Slavists adopt the same approach, but directed towards the Orthodox Slav states. Some pan-Slavists may be more radical, advocating the creation of a Slav state - a Slavonic union - incorporating the Eastern Slav populations o f the former Soviet Union; pan-Orthodox Slavists might want a union incorporating the Orthodox Slav populations of Eurasia.

Pan-[Orthodox] Slavism can be viewed as an application o f Huntington’s ‘clash of civilisations’ theory. In Huntington’s formulation, the ‘Slavic-Orthodox’ is one o f the major civilisations. He contends that Russia occupies a pivotal position as the natural leader of Orthodox Christian civilisation:

Despite the fact that Russia remains a secular state and the majority of Russians, as with the majority in the West, hold secular views, Russia simultaneously remains a pivotal state of one of the basic world civilisations, historically identified with Orthodox Christianity... As a pivotal state Russia bears a fimdamental responsibility for the support of order and stability among Orthodox states and peoples.^®

Once again, there is no clear reason why any o f this should be the case.^^ It is obvious that a policy derived from this viewpoint will lead to accusations o f neo-imperialism, particularly since some Orthodox Slav states (such as Bulgaria) experienced this ‘responsibility’ after the Second World War.

A third radical programme with implications for the borders in the former Soviet space is ethnic nationalism. The liberal Westemisers were civic nationalists. They sought to create a multi-national, secular, non-imperial state on the basis of inclusive citizenship within the existing borders of the Russian Federation. In contrast, ethnic nationalists want to create an ethnic nation-state, in other words a Russia for ethnic Russians, or Russian-speakers. This is an exclusive notion of citizenship, based on the concept of a nation defined by its ethnicity, its language, and its religion. It differs from Eurasianism in that it wants to create an ethnic nation-state rather than a multi-cultural empire, and from pan-[Orthodox] Slavism in its focus on the narrower concepts of Russian ethnicity and language, rather than ‘Slavonic-ness’ and Orthodoxy. The policy implications are most apparent in relation to the ‘near abroad’. Ethnic nationalists would like to integrate those areas of the former Soviet Union with majority Russian populations into the Russian Federation to form a ‘Greater Russia’. Unlike Eurasianists, however, Russian ethnic nationalists may be more willing to allow non-Orthodox, non- Russian populated areas of the Russian Federation to secede; but they may also hope to remove the non-Russian population from the country.

There are clearly similarities between these issues and the issues facing post­ communist leaders in former Yugoslavia. In the following chapter, I shall discuss the links between the post-Soviet and the post-Yugoslav environments, and examine the

Huntington (1995), p. 135.

application to Russian policy towards the conflicts in former Yugoslavia of the various foreign policy approaches that I have outlined.

Chapter 3