The answer was filed on June 2, 1954 and on motion of plaintiff dated March 15, 1955, the defendants were declared in default. A motion to set aside the default was denied, and a judgment by default was entered by the court on April 26, 1955. It ordered defendants to restore possession of the land to plaintiff. Having failed to obtain a reconsideration of the above decision, defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.
While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, a writ for the execution of the judgment of the lower court was issued. Said writ of execution was furnished to the defendants on October 7, 1955. The evidence shows that in spite of the receipt by the defendants of the notice of the writ of execution of October 3, 1955, which writ of execution commanded defendants "to forthwith remove from said premises and that plaintiff have restitution of the same," defendants-appellants nevertheless entered the land to gather palay which was then pending harvest.
ISSUE: Whether the defendants’ act of entering the contested land to gather
palay which was then pending harvest was lawful despite receipt of order of execution commanding them to vacate said premises.
RULING:
YES. The Court gathered further from the record that the rice found on the disputed land at the time of the service of the order of execution had been planted by defendants-appellants, who appear to have been in possession of the land from 1951. While the court order of October 3, 1955 ordered the defendant-appellant to move out from the premises, it did not prohibit them from gathering the crop then existing thereon. Under the law a person who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products thereon are pending harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545 of the Civil Code.
ART. 545. If at the time the good faith ceases, there should be any natural or industrial fruits, the possessor shall have a right to a part of the expenses of cultivation, and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time of the possession.
As the order of execution did not expressly prohibit the defendants-appellants from gathering the pending fruits, which fruits were the result of their possession and cultivation of the land, it cannot be said that the defendants- appellants committed an act which is clear violation of the courts' order. Besides, the defendants-appellants had presented, after receipt of the order of execution, a motion to set aside the said order of execution, and this motion to stay execution was granted. Defendants furthermore presented a bond in accordance with the order of the court and had it approved by the Court of First Instance. It was perhaps in expectation of this resolution of the court setting aside the order of execution that defendants-appellants may have felt justified in entering the land and harvesting the fruits existing thereon.
Again the order of the court setting aside its order to stay execution was issued in the belief that the defendants-appellants had not presented before
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and which said court actually approved). Under the circumstances above stated, the Court is not ready to conclude that the defendants-appellants can be held to have committed a clear defiance of the order of the court. Their act in harvesting the pending fruits was not only justified by law but was not expressly prohibited by the court's order, and was even ratified when the court ordered the suspension of the execution. There was, therefore, no open, clear and contumacious refusal to obey a definite order of the court such as would constitute contempt. Furthermore, a person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is ordinarily not prohibited from taking with him his own effects and possession, unless there is an express prohibition to this effect. No such, prohibition was contained in the order for the defendants to leave the land. There may have been a technical violation of an order not to enter the premises, but not of one prohibiting them from removing anything therefrom. Such technical violation of the order cannot be considered as one amounting to a defiance of the court's authority, punishable as contempt.
FELIPA CORDERO (Deceased) MAURO OCAMPO, CASIMIRO OCAMPO and ELISEA OCAMPO v. VICTORIA P. CABRAL, ALEJANDRO BERBOSO, DALMACIO MONTAOS and HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-36789, 25 July 1983 [FERNANDEZ]
FACTS:
Mr. Gregorio Z. Ocampo, husband of Felipa Cordero and father of the other petitiones, died on May 17, 1958, and left several properties. Petitioners took possession of the properties left by him, among others is a riceland. However, they found out that a portion of the same was possessed by Victoria P. Cabral, Alejandro Berboso and Dalmacio Montaos.
Petitioners filed a civil case alleging that Victoria P. Cabral continued claiming to be the owner of the land while her co-defendants continued recognizing her as the owner thereof instead of the plaintiffs despite demands to vacate the property. They also claim that due to respondents' occupancy of the aforementioned portion of land, petitioners failed to realize a yearly harvest of at least ten (10) cavanes of palay at the rate of P10.00 per cavan, from the harvest-time of 1958 up to the present. RTC dismissed the complaint.
On appeal, even though the CA found that the disputed piece of land is registered in the name of the petitioners but because of the supposed oral sale of the same to the predecessors of the defendants mentioned by the petitioners on appeal, it affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the complaint for the recovery of the land.
ISSUES:
1. Are the heirs of the registered owner entitled to the land?
RULING:
1. YES. The Court of Appeals found as a fact that the disputed portion of the land is admittedly part of the land originally registered in the name of petitioners’ predecessor in interest. There should be no question that that title had become imprescriptible and the original registrant as well as his successors had the right to vindicate their ownership against anybody else. 2. YES. The respondents, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence that they were possessors in bad faith. However, their good faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the complaint. As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they "shall reimburse the fruits received and those which the legitimate possessor could have received”.
MARTIN MENDOZA and NATALIO ENRIQUEZ v. MANUEL DE GUZMAN G.R. No. L-28721, 5 October 1928
[J. FERNANDO] FACTS:
In a cadastral proceeding, a piece of land was adjudicated in favor of Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez in equal parts pro indiviso subject to the right of retention on the part of Manuel de Guzman until he shall have been indemnified for the improvements existing on the land.
Being unable to come to an agreement as to the amount which should be allowed for the improvements made on the land, Martin Mendoza and Natalio Enriquez began an action requesting the court to fix the value of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by Manuel de Guzman in introducing the improvements. The trial court resolved the questions presented by holding that in accordance with the provisions of articles 435 and 454 in relation with article 361 of the Civil Code, the value of the "indemnization" to be paid to the defendant should be fixed according to the necessary and useful expenses incurred by him in introducing "las plantaciones en cuestion."
ISSUE: Is the term “indemnizacion” pertains to the amount of expenditures
such as necessary and useful expenses?
RULING:
YES. The amount of the "indemnizacion" is the amount of the expenditures mentioned in articles 453 and 454 of the Civil Code, which in the present case is the amount of the necessary and useful expenditures incurred by the defendant. Necessary expenses have been variously described by the Spanish commentators as those made for the preservation of the thing; as those without which the thing would deteriorate or be lost; as those that augment the income of the things upon which they are expanded. Among the necessary expenditures are those incurred for cultivation, production, upkeep,