center of one of the most valuable residential sections of the city of Manila, and that for many years a house stood upon this land, and was occupied by some of the predecessors in interest of the applicants in these proceedings. There are strong reasons to believe that the land in question was originally well above the ebb and flow of the tide and that only in later years have the waters risen to such a height along the shores of the Bay of Manila at this point as to cover the land in question completely at high tide, though it does not definitely appear whether this is due to changes in the current and flow of the waters in the bay, or to the gradual sinking of the land along the coast. The Court of Land Registration adjudicated title over the land in favor of the applicants and ordering its registry in accordance with the provisions of "The Land Registration Act." The Government of the Philippine Islands , through its proper representatives, objected to the application for registry on the ground that, as it alleges, the land in question is a part of the public domain. As alleged by the opponent, the land in question, at the time when the trial was had in the court below, was so located that at high tide it was completely covered by the waters of the Bay of Manila, though the receding waters left it completely bare at low tide.
ISSUE: Did the owners lose their possession of the land in question as
provided under Article 555 of the New Civil Code?
RULING:
NO. If the Government is justified in disturbing the possession of the
applicants, it can only be on the ground that they have abandoned their property, or that it has been totally destroyed and has now become a part of the public domain by the erosive action of the sea. It is quite clear that applicants have never abandoned their possession under a claim of ownership of this land. There has been no such destructive or total loss of the property as would justify a holding that the owners have lost possession. Doubtless the property has been injured by the erosive action of the sea. Doubtless the owners in order to profitably enjoy the possession of this property will be compelled to make some relatively small expenditures by way of a "fill" or a retaining wall. If the applicants have not lost their right of possession, the Government's claim of ownership, on the ground that this is a part of the playa (shore) of Manila Bay, necessarily falls to the ground. It affirmatively appears that the owners of the land in question have never in fact nor in intent abandoned it, and that keeping in mind its location and actual condition it can not be said to have been totally destroyed for the purposes for which it was held by them, so as to have become a part of the playa (shore) of the Bay of Manila.
CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC OF THE MOUNTAIN PROVINCE v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. NO. 80294-95, 21 September 1988 [CABBUAG]
FACTS:
The whole controversy started when the herein petitioner filed an application for registration of lands 1, 2, 3 and 4 in La Trinidad, Benguet on September 5, 1962. The heirs of Juan Valdez and the heirs of Egmidio Octaviano filed an opposition on lots 2 and 3, respectively. On November 17, 1965, the land registration court confirmed the registrable title of the petitioner. On May 9, 1977, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and dismissed the Vicar’s application. The heirs filed a motion for reconsideration, praying that the lots be ordered registered under their names. The Court of Appeals denied the motion for lack of sufficient merit. Both parties then came before the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in a minute resolution, denied both petitions. The heirs filed the instant cases for the recovery and possession of the lots.
Respondents argue that the petitioner is barred from setting up the defense of ownership or long and continuous possession by the prior judgment of the Court of Appeals under the principle of res judicata. Petitioner contends that the principle is not applicable because the dispositive portion of the judgment merely dismissed the application for registration.
ISSUE: Did ownership of Lots 2 and 3 transfer to petitioner Vicar through
acquisitive prescription?
RULING:
NO. Private respondents were able to prove that their predecessors' house
was borrowed by petitioner Vicar after the church and the convent were destroyed. They never asked for the return of the house, but when they allowed its free use, they became bailors in commodatum and the petitioner the bailee. The bailees' failure to return the subject matter of commodatum to the bailor did not mean adverse possession on the part of the borrower. The bailee held in trust the property subject matter of commodatum. The adverse claim of petitioner came only in 1951 when it declared the lots for taxation purposes. The action of petitioner Vicar by such adverse claim could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription because of the absence of just title.
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING CORP v. SANTOS G.R. No. 80298, 26 April 1990
[CRON] FACTS:
Jose Cruz ordered 406 books from EDCA through telephone, payable on delivery. Cruz issued a personal check covering the purchase price for the books. Cruz sold 120 books to Santos who, upon verifying the seller’s ownership from the invoice he showed her, paid him the purchase price.
Upon investigation, EDCA confirmed that Cruz was an impostor and had no intention of paying the books ordered (the check issued bounced). Thus, with the assistance of police, EDCA forcibly seized the books from Santos and threatened her with prosecution for buying stolen property.
Santos sued for the recovery of the books after demand for their return was rejected by EDCA. EDCA argued that pursuant to Article 559 of the Civil Code, it has the right to recover the books since it was unlawfully deprived thereof.
ISSUE:Was EDCA unlawfully deprived of the books because the check issued by the impostor in payment therefor was dishonored?
RULING:
NO. There was no unlawful deprivation of property which would entitle the
petitioner to recover a property from the person possessing it in good faith. Actual delivery of the books having been made, Cruz acquired ownership over the books which he could then validly transfer to the private respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid for them to EDCA was a matter between him and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired by the private respondents to the books.
Non-payment only creates a right to demand payment or to rescind the contract, or to criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing checks. But absent the stipulation above noted, delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer it to another.
DE GARCIA v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. L-20264, 30 January 1971 [CAINDAY]
FACTS:
Guevarra was the owner of a lady’s diamond ring. It was stolen from her house. Later on, while she was talking to Garcia, an owner of a restaurant,