Divorced from any determinate situational reference point, the self involved in this third form of boredom cannot be recognised as maintaining the same determinate character: the “it” (the self that bores) is not “myself” 'of this particular standing and age, with this name and vocation and fate', but rather, myself as an 'undifferentiated no one'.86 The abstraction from a particular situation and the resulting lack of possible exemplification of this form of boredom, is reflected in the absence of any passing of the time. Rather, we respond by not permitting such activity, and thus allow our response to 'manifest the character of boredom itself', such that there is no counteraction of boredom, but a letting be of it. Heidegger characterises this as 'being compelled to listen' to what boredom has to say, whereas in the other forms of boredom we pass the time in order to avoid listening to, and experiencing, boredom as such. 84 Ibid.
85 FCM, §30 86 Ibid.
Given the factical absence of any passing the time in this third form of boredom and thus the indeterminate character of the situation, “being left empty” (the 1st structural moment) is neither constituted from a particular emptiness that arises in relation to the unfulfilling character of a situation (as in the first form), nor a self-forming emptiness that arises from a letting go of oneself to be fully given over to whatever presents itself in the situation. In this “it is boring for one”, Heidegger claims that we are 'relieved of our everyday personality'; 'elevated beyond the particular situation'; and also 'beyond the
specific beings surrounding us there'.87 In this moment of undifferentiatedness, there is an indifference in relation to the situation, both in terms of the things at hand, and ourselves. Heidegger puts this as follows:
Beings have – as we say – become indifferent as a whole, and we ourselves as these people are not expected. We no longer stand as subjects and suchlike opposite these beings and excluded from them, but find ourselves in the midst of beings as a whole, i.e., in the whole of this indifference.88
Upon initial investigation, this “indifference as a whole” does not seem to be graspable in terms of an emptiness, as 'being left empty is always possible only where there is some claim to be fulfilled, where the necessity of a fullness exists'.89 When divorced from the specific fullness or emptiness of a situation wherein various determinate possibilities for acting and doing are offered up, it must be the case that we are indeed
indifferent to whether or not we are satisfied or left empty at all. Rather than denying specific possibilities of acting and doing for the determinate everyday personality (the
87 FCM, §31, a). 88 Ibid.
“I” that is me with this specific history and name etc...), in profound boredom 'the beings that surround us offer us no further possibility of acting and no further possibility of doing anything'.90 In offering up no possibility of any practical engagement whatsoever, Heidegger takes the situation to be defined by a “telling
refusal” of beings as a whole.
What is being told?91 In this form of being left empty, Dasein is 'suspended among beings' in such a way that beings as a whole are pointed toward, but only in terms of their refusal. In so doing they do not refuse dealings (possible acting and doing) in a determinate way, i.e., obstruct a particular endeavour, or dissatisfy with regard to a specific expectation, but rather 'indicate indeterminately the possibilities of Dasein'.92 What is told in this telling refusal then, is that there are 'possibilities [of Dasein] left unexploited': there is an implicit reference to a fullness of possibilities that is in some manner interrupted in the refusal (qua breakdown) of beings as a whole. This is an indication that the first structural moment (“being left empty”) 'has in itself a structured relation to something else on account of the reference contained in such telling refusal.'93 This “something else” is of course “being held in limbo”(the 2nd structural moment). Here we find the most profound presentation of the relationship between world and solitude presented in FCM thus far.
The telling refusal of beings as a whole does not point to any arbitrary and determinate 90 Ibid.
91 It should be noted that Heidegger uses Versagen, the substantive form of the verb versagen, which connotes refusal in the sense of a breakdown, or a refusal to work, rather than, say, the refusal of an invitation. McNeill translates this as “telling refusal” because of the status of Versagen as a cognate of
sagen – to tell. It is only by recognising this connection to telling [sagen] that it makes sense for Heidegger to continue his interpretation by asking about what is being told in this telling refusal. 92 Ibid, §31, b).
possibilities of Dasein, but to the very ground of all possible determinations of Dasein.
Whatever is utmost and primary in making possible all possibilities of Dasein as possibilities, whatever it is that sustains Dasein's potentiality for being [Seinkönnen], its possibilities, is affected by this telling refusal of beings as a whole.94
In so being attuned there is nothing particular that emerges, there is no content as such to point to, but rather the singular character of Dasein is pointed toward. It is this being “impelled” in the direction of Dasein's potentiality for being, this contentless, indeterminate relation to the ground of all potential determinate relations, that constitutes “being held in limbo” in this third form of boredom.
“Being held in limbo” and “being left empty” cannot be understood as fully distinct in their specific determinations belonging to this third form of Boredom. Their structural interweaving is not merely external, but also contains internal references to the other. As such, Heidegger defines boredom in its most profound form as being an “expanse” into the “limit of beings as a whole” that intensifies 'the extremity of Dasein in the direction of what is originally singular in whatever makes Dasein itself possible'.95 In thus understanding boredom as ultimately attuning Dasein as an oscillation between beings as a whole and the singularity (solitude) of what makes Dasein itself possible, its metaphysical importance becomes clear. The fundamental concepts of metaphysics have now been presented with greater clarity through this interpretation of boredom:
World: enveloping limit of beings as a whole; Solitude: the singular extremity of whatever originarily makes Dasein possible; Finitude: being attuned.