The structural moments of boredom have been detailed and 'made [...] visible in their structural unity',96 but their precise relationship to time has not yet been established, thus the nature of this unity requires further elaboration. In order to bring this aspect into view, Heidegger points toward the temporal ramifications of the refusal of beings as a whole: 'everything – in every respect, retrospect and prospect, beings simultaneously withdraw'.97 These “perspectives”98 are clearly connected to the present, past and future, indeed, Heidegger states that they “distribute themselves” [verteilt sich] out as these temporal dimensions. However, their temporality is initially experienced as a perspective on, or aspect of, 'all doing and activity of Dasein', rather than as theoretical dimensions, or elements of perception.99 Heidegger defines these perspectives as a “simultaneous totality” 'in which Dasein constantly moves'100 – there is never a point at which one of these aspects, one of these ways of seeing,101 is isolated
96 Ibid, §32
97 Ibid, §32, a). Whilst there is a clear etymological chain connecting these terms in this English rendering, the temporal character of these terms (and the phenomena to which they relate) is somewhat lost.
Hinsicht (respect), Rücksicht (retrospect), and Absicht (prospect) are all cognates of sichten, which means “to sight” something, “to spot” something, and sometimes even “to classify”. Hin, rück, ab (there, back, from - as in abfahren, to leave from). The temporal characters of present, past, and future are clearer – for example, “respect” has seemingly no temporal or spatial character in English.
98 McNeill translates Sichten as “perspectives”. “Aspects” might have been more fitting with his rendering of Hinsicht etc. I point this out because “Perspektive” has separate connotations of its own – an important one being a seemingly inexorable connection with Horizont, which is a matter that will be investigated in the later stages of this thesis.
99 FCM, §32, a). Whilst Heidegger does not need to import his previous analysis of time and equipmental horizonality from Being and Time, it is worth noting that this thought is developed at length therein - in part as a development of and response to Husserls notion of time-consciousness. As such, Heidegger is concerned with the non-perceptual basis of time – to be phenomenological is not to start with perceptions but dealings etc.
100 Ibid.
101 In his own book Mcneill, M. The Time of Life (SUNY, New York: 2007), McNeill focuses heavily on the role of sight - conceptually, historically and etymologically – in FCM, yet he loses this aspect of seeing and sighting by using “perspective”. Perspective carries with it a particular relation to a viewpoint or a state, whereas Sichten has no point – it would just be “view”. Whilst I intermittently use “aspect” I recognise that the existence of both “ansicht” and indeed “aspekt” mean that it is by no means a perfect translation of this term, nor an improvement, but rather a way of drawing out a connotation that is more appropriate for this project.
from its counterparts; they are only ever maintained in varying configurations wherein one aspect may be dominant over the others. As such, 'these three perspectives are not lined up alongside one another, but originarily simply united in the horizon of time as such'.102 Heidegger takes this temporal elaboration to point toward the ground (in terms of that which makes it possible) of the refusal of beings as a whole. It is only on the basis of there being a “simultaneous totality” and “originarily simple unity” of the three aspects of Dasein's dealings, that a refusal as a whole (which is to say in every respect, retrospect and prospect) can occur. This is not to say that the three aspects are unified in a way that dissolves their identity.
With the refusal of beings as a whole, comes the withdrawal of beings as a whole. In this withdrawal the everyday dimensions of time lose their determinacy and their distinction, their non-theoretical, proximal determinations in the everyday dealings and activities of Dasein (respect, retrospect, prospect) withdraw along with beings as a whole. This is characterised as a being left empty, but, as Heidegger states, 'this telling refusal as a whole arises on the side of beings'.103 This means that there is no longer a specific situation, activity or context which determines the ground of this boredom, as Heidegger puts it: there is 'nothing, in the telling refusal of beings as a whole, which could “explain” this entrancement to it.104
Here, a certain distance becomes manifest between Dasein and beings as a whole, one which allows this emptiness of any determinate relationship to beings “a space in
102 FCM, §32, a). 103 Ibid.
which to play”.105 The temporal ramification of this space and emptiness is that Dasein is no longer anchored within time by reference to “determinate time-points” which occur within the dimensions of time as experienced with the activities of Dasein. Rather than being 'specifically articulated or delimited according to past and future', in this profound boredom the “time of Dasein” maintains itself in an “unarticulated unity”. The key aspect of this unarticulated unity is that, in boredom, the dimensions of the time of Dasein (not the dimensions of time itself) are not amalgamated or dissolved into a higher order unity, but held in 'the simplicity of this unity of their horizon all at once'. 106 Precisely how this is so, and precisely what this means are, at this stage, given over to the “enigmatic and concealed” power of the entrancement of the horizon of time.
In the telling refusal of beings as a whole Dasein is given over to what is 'uncircumventable if [it], in keeping with its possibilities, is to be what it can be as it can be'.107 In telling of the uncircumventable, this refusal must also tell of the freedom of Dasein, such that it points to the ground of Dasein's possibilities for being, the very possibilities that are refused when beings as a whole refuse themselves. This dual orientation, in profound boredom, is shown to be maintained in some form of unity, as it is nothing other than “entrancing time” itself that 'essentially makes Dasein possible'. 108
Delving deeper into this notion of “that which properly makes possible”, Heidegger states that what time 'tells of' as being refused (i.e., what it 'gives to be known [...] as
105 Ibid. 106 Ibid
107 FCM, §32, b). 108 Ibid.
something possible' and, as such, 'gives to be free') is the 'freedom of Dasein as such'.109 In this profound boredom, the movement of the analysis “beyond the public individual subject” has been shown to be a movement beyond the level of self-cognition: the investigation is now asking after the selfhood that underlies all (situationally) determinate instances of “me”.
Mirroring the mechanics of anxiety's disclosive powers as laid out in BT, Heidegger forwards the idea that the freedom of Dasein as such is not given by an external entity, rather it is a mode of “self-liberation”[Sichbefreien], wherein Dasein frees itself from its factical and specifically situational determinateness by disclosing 'itself for itself as Da- sein'.110 The hyphenation of Dasein here emphasises the there character of Dasein, where Dasein is not simply 'present-at hand alongside other things', but in the midsts of beings. Being “amidst”, but not alongside, indicates that man maintains an essential difference from those beings that he finds himself amongst.111 This is the key point regarding the relationship of the fundamental concepts. This difference is what Heidegger will refer to as the “abyss of essential origins” in NIII. 'Part Two' will constitute an advanced elaboration of this point. In NIII Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche's extreme anthropomorphism arises from his ignoring this abyss. For Heidegger, in mistaking the world of Dasein for the world of life, Nietzsche universalises the unique ontological position of Dasein. In this regard the essential 109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 This difference is what Heidegger will refer to as the “abyss of essential origins” in NIII. 'Part Two' will constitute an advanced elaboration of this point. In NIII Heidegger will claim that Nietzsche's extreme anthropomorphism arises from his ignoring this abyss. For Heidegger, in mistaking the world of Dasein for the world of life, Nietzsche universalises the unique ontological position of Dasein. In this regard the essential otherness and discontinuity of life (the abyssal bodily kinship of man and animal), is erased in favour of a continuity. This forms the basis of Heidegger's rejection of “life” as a translation of “φύσις” in its most originary form. Life must remain other, else the finite tension that constitutes Dasein is released, in which case the terror of existence, and attack of being, are mitigated in favour of
otherness and discontinuity of life (the abyssal bodily kinship of man and animal), is erased in favour of a continuity. This forms the basis of Heidegger's rejection of “life” as a translation of “φύσις” in its most originary form. Where “life” names those other beings which we find ourselves amongst in the world, what essentially constitutes “life” must remain other, else the finite tension that constitutes Dasein is released, in which case the terror of existence, and attack of being, are mitigated in favour of comfort and assurance.
The self-disclosure of Dasein does not involve an opposition to beings as a whole, or a movement beyond them, but rather, occurs within the very ground of the manifestness of beings as whole: the horizon of time, in binding Dasein to itself, presents the uncircumventability of beings as a whole at the same time as allowing Dasein to disclose itself for itself as the ground of its own possibility for being. In profound boredom the entrancement of time presents an emptiness of all possible dealings, a suspension of all temporal dimensions of engagement, thus announcing the essential
jointure of Dasein to beings as a whole. But, at the same time, this emptiness speaks of unexploited possibilities, of the freedom of the possibility to be there, as maintaining a threefold perspective as a simple unity within the full horizon of time, rather than the threefold perspective as seemingly divided within concrete situations.
This is a clear repetition of the structure of Aristotle's notion of first philosophy, and indeed the structure of Nietzsche's meditation on Apollo and Dionysus. This identity is not trivial. The task of the self-becoming of Dasein has been shown to lie in a meditation upon the fundamental unity of the opposed orientations of what would classically be taken to be freedom and determinacy, self and other, man and nature, but
in Heidegger's thought comes to be world and individuation.