Análisis de frecuencias según las dimensiones de la variable dependiente

former way, in this way too there would be something that now is not seen: some turning into white that was not from something not­

white. Again, our thinking either affirms or denies everything that it thinks about-and this is clear from its definition-whenever it thinks truly or falsely; whenever it puts together an assertion or denial this way, it is true, but that way, it is false. Further, there would have to be in-between things alongside all contradictories, if one is not just arguing for the sake of arguing, and therefore there will be something that is neither true nor not-true, and something besides being and not­

being, as that there would be a kind of change that is not becoming or passing away. Again, in all those cases of things in which the negation of something implies its contrary, there will be in-between things even among these, as among numbers, a number that is neither odd or not­

odd, which is impossible, as is obvious from the definition. Further, this will go on to infinity, and beings will not only be half again as many but more. For it will be possible in turn to negate both the affirmation and the denial of this in-between thing, and this will be something, for its thinghood will be something other than the previous one. And further, whenever one who is asked if a thing is white says that it is not, he has negated nothing other than its being so, while the not being so is the negation.

Now this opinion has come about for some people in the same way that other paradoxes have; for whenever one is not able to refute a debater's arguments, by giving in to the argument, he concedes the thing on which the reasoning was based to be true. Some people, then, say this for some such reason, but others because of seeking an argument for everything. But the starting point for all of these comes from definition. And the definition arises from the necessity that they mean something, since the articulation of which the word is a sign will be a definition. But while the Heracleitean account, saying that everything is and is not, seemed to make all things be true, that of Anaxagoras, that there is something between contradictories, seems to make all things false, for when things are mixed, the mixture is neither good nor not-good, so that there is nothing true to say.

Chapter

8

Now that these things have been distinguished, it is clear the statements that go only one way about all things cannot be accepted in the way some people say them, some of them saying that nothing is true (for they say that nothing prevents everything from being just like

Book IV (Book r) Chapter

⁸

"the diagonal is commensurable"24), while others say that everything is true. For these claims are just about the same as the Heracleitean one; for whoever says that all things are true

and

all things are false also makes each of these two claims separately, so that if they are both impossible, it too is impossible. Yet there are obviously contradictory things that cannot be true at the same time; nor indeed can all things be false, even though this might seem more possible from what has been said. But in the face of all such claims one must require what was said in the chapters above, not that something be or not be so but that it

mean

something, so that one must reason from a definition to grasp what would mean something false or something true. And if what is true to assert is what is false to deny, it is impossible for all things to be false, since one of the two parts of the contradiction must be true. Further, if it is necessary either to assert or deny everything, it is impossible that both be false, since

one

of the two parts of the contradiction is false.

And in fact all these claims are subject to the much repeated point that they annihilate themselves. For the one who says that everything is true also makes the statement contrary to his own be true, so that his own is not true (since the contrary one says that it is not true), while the one who says that everything is false also himself makes himself wrong. And if they make exceptions, the former that the contrary of his claim is the only one that is not true, or the latter that his own is the only one that is not false, nevertheless it turns out that they require infinitely many statements to be false or true, since the one that says that the true statement is true is also true, and this goes on to infinity.

It is also clear that neither those who say that all things are at rest or those who say they are all in motion speak the truth. For if all things are at rest, the same things would always be true and the same things false, but this obviously changes (for the one who says this himself at one time was not and again will not be); but if all things are

in

motion, nothing would be true and therefore everything would be false, but it has been demonstrated that this is impossible. What's more it must be what is that changes, since change is from something to something.

But it is surely not everything that is at rest sometimes and in motion

24 It seems perfectly obvious that some small fractional part of a square's diagonal must fit some exact number of times into its side, but precise reasoning shows that this is impossible. The sophist counts on undermining one's trust in whatever seems evident.

75

1 01 2b

1 01 2b 1 0

1 01 2b 20

1 01 2b 30

76

Book ^IV (Book I} Chapter

⁸

sometimes, while nothing is always at rest or in motion, for there is something that is always moving the things that move, and the first mover itself is motionless.

Book V (Book �)

In document Auditoría financiera y su relación con la toma de decisiones gerenciales de la empresa Científica Andina S.A.C., Lima, 2022. (página 65-80)