Análisis inferencial

One of the major agencies involved in partisan organization during 1941 was the Communist Party itself. The Central Committee of the All-Union Party directed the formation of partisan units which were to parallel the existing territorial structure of the Party. Probably certain officials of the All-Union Party occupied themselves with this task from early July on, but there is no precise information on this point. Much more concrete evidence is available with respect to the organization of the partisan movement at the level of oblasts in the RSFSR and at the union republic level elsewhere.

[Since there was no separate Party organization for the RSFSR, its oblasts, krais, and

autonomous republics constituted the level immediately below the AU-Union Party, nominally on a par with the Party organizations of the union republics. During 1941 partisan activity in the Karelo-Finnish, Moldavian, and the three Baltic republics was small, and little information is available concerning it. In the Belorus-sian republic, available material suggests that the oblast

Party organization, which was much smaller and less important than the Ukrainian oblast organization, played a comparatively minor role during the first months of the war.

The discussion in this section is centered on the territorial organization of the Party, consisting of the levels described above. More important cities had their own Party organizations, which in most respects were equivalent to the rayon, and in some cases even to the oblast territorial organizations. The larger cities were divided into urban rayons, or wards. The city Party

organizations formed underground centers; and in some cities destruction battalions, which later furnished most of the manpower for partisan units, were formed either for the city as a whole, or in each ward. The major level at which partisan organization was carried out in most larger cities (both those which were occupied, and those like Leningrad which remained in Soviet hands) was the primary Party organization in individual enterprises. This was quite logical since the average factory, commercial enterprise, or transportation facility usually had as many Party members as an entire rural rayon. Apparently destruction battalions were not formed in the enterprises, but very similar home defense units known as civil air defense" or "home guards" were formed, and provided many of the recruits for the partisan detachments.

The Party organizations of certain major enterprises, such as sections of the railroad network, which extend across several rayons and connect various cities, were not subordinate to the usual territorial Party organization below the oblast level. In the development of the partisan

movement, such Party organizations appear to have acted In a fashion similar to that of the urban enterprises, but under the direction of the oblast Party committee rather than the city Party committee.]

In the Ukraine, the secretaries of the Central Committee, Nikita Khrushchev, M. A.

Burmistenko, and D. S. Korotchenko, directed the preparations, apparently without the assistance of an apparatus especially created for this purpose. For a time, as indicated above, their work was carried on in Kiev, which was not captured by the Germans until September 1941. Here Khrushchev and his assistants formed special organizations to direct the creation of partisan units in the oblasts of the Ukrainian SSR. In each oblast which was to have a partisan movement, a secretary of the oblast committee (obkom) was assigned this task.

[Fyodorov, p. 13. A list of the oblasts in which partisan secretaries were chosen may be found in a German intelligence report which is based on extensive partisan interrogations. (GFP Gr. 725,

"Partisanen-Erfahrungsbericht," 22 January 1942, GMDS, HGeb 30910/37.) In practice, not all of the secretaries chosen could fulfill their assigned tasks; in the Ukraine west of the Dnepr and in most of Belorussia no oblast-wide organization could be formed during 1941.]

At the same time, another official was secretly appointed to the post of "underground secretary,"

and was ordered to remain behind to direct Party activities, including partisan organization, after the Germans arrived.

[In addition to the partisans and the NKVD diversionist network described below, a considerable underground organization of Party agents existed in some areas. They were under the direction of the underground secretary and apparently carried on sabotage and forays, in addition to propaganda activities.]

In many instances, it seems, this appointee was not one of the prominent Party officials, although there is one significant case in which the man so designated was the first secretary of the oblast.

The person in question was Fyodorov, the Chernigov Oblast official mentioned above.

[Fyodorov, p. 13.]

Fyodorov maintains that he was given this appointment after urgently requesting it from Khrushchev; his record as a trouble shooter in the Communist organization of the Ukraine suggests, however, that there may have been other reasons. Several bits of evidence support the assumption that persons like Fyodorov, who had been in close contact with the NKVD while performing certain disciplinary tasks within the Party, were considered particularly well suited for the job of organizing the partisans.

[According to his own account Fyodorov had fought in the Red Army during the Civil War, but had not entered the Party until 1927, after which he gradually rose in the trade union apparatus.

He later became a member of the control commission in Chernigov Oblast, then second secretary of the oblast Party committee, and in 1938 —shortly after the major purges—first secretary.

During the war he and his band were sent to re-establish Soviet authority in the Rovno and Volhynia Oblasts, an especially difficult assignment in view of the hostility of the population to the Soviet system. After the war he acted as first secretary in several oblasts. As noted below, the director of the underground in the Crimean ASSR (where organizational arrangements were somewhat different) had been chief of the cadre section of the Party, i.e., in charge of personnel problems which involved disciplinary-matters.]

2. The Role of the NKVD

Several features of the Party underground organization made it especially necessary that those in charge be capable of working in harmony with the NKVD. One major component of the

underground was a network of diversionist groups. This network, which was to cover the entire occupied territory, but was especially important in urban areas, was organized by the territorial NKVD, usually from NKVD informants or agents. It remained under direct control of NKVD officials who stayed behind in the occupied regions. Apparently its connection with the Party underground was maintained only at the oblast level.

[ See Kozlov, p. 17; see also this book,-Chap. V, Sect. I.]

The network consisted of groups of three to seven persons each (including many women). It was designed primarily for sabotage and other disruptive tasks ordered by the Soviet authorities. The members continued their usual occupations as covers for their clandestine activities. For further protection, eacn group member waspermitted to know only the leader of his group, who, in turn, knew only his group members and hischief at the next higher level.

There was no organizational connection between the diversionist network and the partisan movement, because the former was specifically required to avoid risking discovery by contact with elements overtly hostile to the-Germans, such as the partisans. In practice, however, many diversionist group members did find it necessary to depend on the partisan bands for assistance and refuge. [See Chap. V, Sect. I.]

A second activity of the NKVD did have a direct bearing on the partisan movement. On 26 June 1941, Lavrentii Beria, People's Commissar of Internal Affairs (NKVD), ordered the NKVD rayon organizations to form home defense units known as "Destruction Battalions" (Istrebitelnye Bataliony). [See Chap. VII, Sect. I, B.] According to this order, the destruction battalions were to be of company size (100-200 men), and the rank and file largely comprised men too old, too young, or otherwise unfit for duty with the Red Army. At the same time, the officers and a large part of the enlisted men were NKVD officials or trusted Party members. The direction remained in the hands of the rayon or inter-rayon NKVD 'organization, though the Red Army cooperated by providing arms and possibly by furnishing training staffs in some instances.

It is probable that the destruction battalions had been planned considerably before the outbreak of war, at a time when the extent and rapidity of the German penetration of Soviet territory could not be foreseen. They were primarily defensive units, charged with guarding important

installations to prevent sabotage or attacks by German parachutists. However, at least as early as July 1941, NKVD orders provided that the destruction battalions in areas near the front should be transformed into partisan detachments. In this transformation, the NKVD officials were to cooperate with the territorial Party organization, which, as indicated above, was formally

assigned control over the partisan movement. Nevertheless, the NKVD was given the extremely important task of screening persons considered for membership in the partisan units. [See Chap.

VIII, Sect. II, B, 2, c] In practice, a rayon Party secretary was selected by the oblast Party committee to direct the organization of the partisan movement in his rayon. He was confirmed by the union republic central committee of the Party.

[For the RSFSR the confirming agency was the All-Union Central Committee.]

To assist in the work of organization and possibly to carry on other semi-military work, a

"military section" of the rayon Party apparatus, which had been organized down to the rayon level before the war, was available. Throughout the period of partisan organization and

development, however, it is readily apparent that the NKVD played a most significant role. The officers of the otryads ["Otryad" can mean either "detachment" in a general sense, or (as for example in the Red Army) specifically, "company."], as the newly formed partisan units were called, were, like those of the destruction battalions from which they were largely drawn, trusted adherents of the Soviet system. While a majority appear to have been Party or Government officials, about one-third were NKVD officers. The rank and file of the otryads were also reliable men; the less useful elements of the destruction battalions, including those either unwilling to face the dangers of partisan life or physically unfit for rigorous living conditions, were

dismissed. A high proportion of the remaining partisans consisted of Komsomol members too young for military service.

3. The Otryad in Operation

Not all partisan otryads were formed from destruction battalions; in some instances the territorial Party organization formed otryads by direct recruitment of men considered desirable, without drawing on the home defense formations of the NKVD. In a number of the larger cities no destruction battalions were formed; instead similar home defense units served as the basis for partisan recruitment. [See n. 5.] A number of special methods were also employed in forming partisan otryads, corresponding usually to exceptional branches of the Party structure. During the first months of the war, however, the destruction battalions were apparently the major source of manpower for partisan detachments in the nonurban rayons throughout the occupied Soviet Union.

Once formed, the otryad withdrew to an inaccessible spot and established a concealed and fortified camp. Apparently the original plans envisaged the operation of one or more such otryads in each rayon, or at least the concentration of a few otryads from neighboring rayons in one well-protected hide-out.

[Fyodorov, pp. 18, 19, 68; see also Sidor Artemovich Kovpak, Ot Putivlya do Karpat (Moscow:

Gosudarstvennoye Izdatelstvo Detskoi Literatury Narkomprosa RSFSR, 1945), pp. 5, 9.]

In one case, a special "oblast otryad" was formed to act as a nucleus for the partisan movement and as a guard for its oblast headquarters.

[Fyodorov, p. 22.]

It appears, however, that the initial plan provided for general direction of the partisan movement in oblasts not immediately adjacent to the army fronts by the underground Party secretary and his staff. This staff was not to join an otryad but was to remain in hiding.

Presumably the rayon otryad commander was to direct specific harassing operations, while the underground secretary was to receive and pass on general directives from the union republic committee on the Soviet side of the front. This is only speculation, however, for the general system of control over the territorial partisan movement never really operated. A considerable number of rayon otryads withdrew as planned to their hideouts and began operations against the German forces. In one case, at least, the underground oblast secretary visited the partisans in his region and issued directives, but he soon disappeared. In other cases, the contact with the

designated underground secretary was never established, for the secretary was captured

immediately by the Germans, or was swept out of his oblast in the general confused retreat of the Red Army. A lack of adequate radio equipment prevented most rayon otryads from establishing direct contact with the unoccupied areas of the Soviet Union. As a result, most otryads in areas distant from the battle fronts were unable to coordinate their operations with any over-all plan.

If the territorial system of organization had succeeded, the Germans would have been confronted with a network of small partisan detachments in every administrative subdivision of the occupied Soviet Union. Such bands, operating on their home territory, would have been extremely

important not only because of the material damage they could have inflicted, but also because they were foci for political resistance to the occupier. The potential political importance of such a system undoubtedly helps explain the major roles accorded the Party and the NKVD in efforts to develop it. In practice, however, such a pervasive network of partisan bands could not be established. It is necessary, therefore, in order to assess the real value of the initial movement, to examine the ways in which the territorial formations were adapted to a different basis of partisan organization.