It is clear from NKVD and Party directives that the territorial partisan organization was intended to operate in cooperation with the Red Army; such orders emphasized repeatedly that special attention should be given to the organization of partisans in areas near the fronts. At the same time, the Army authorities were ready to adapt the partisan bands organized by the Party territorial apparatus to their own military needs. The military council (soviet) of the Northwest Front [One of three Soviet Fronts (army groups) operating in the first weeks of the war. Probably the others issued similar directives] issued an order envisaging the formation of partisan units on a territorial basis: "It is desired that each administrative rayon should contain at least one partisan combat unit." At the same time, the order placed great emphasis on the military utilization of the partisans. It tended to regard the territorial system merely as a framework for the formation of units to be employed as army auxiliaries:
First and foremost, partisan detachments and diversionist groups must be established in the main operating areas, that is, the areas of greatest concentration of the enemy. . . . The operations must be carried out in areas in which forests furnish cover for the units. Such an area can consist of up to two or three administrative rayons; operations are to be carried out only against the main lines of communication of the enemy. . . .—Appendix, Document 2.
For a brief time in June and July 1941, the task of utilizing the partisan movement for military purposes was assigned to the NKVD "OO" section of the Red Army, but after mid-July the job was assumed by the Political Administration sections of the army staffs.
[ The Political Administration was charged with propaganda and indoctrination within the Red Army. The existence of a brief period of NKVD control is asserted by Zhigunov, NKVD officer with an army staff (interrogation of 24 April 1942). Zhigunov also reported the transfer to Political Administration supervision, a change which is confirmed by the fact that as early as 13 July 1941 the Administration of Political Propaganda of the Northwest Front submitted a report on the organization of partisan units to General Lev Mekhlis, head of the Main Administration of Political Propaganda of the Red Army. [See Appendix, Document 4.]]
In practice, the Political Administrations of different armies appear to have employed varying methods in utilizing the territorially formed partisan units. In one army on the West Front, a battalion commissar was assigned the task of liaison with partisan units in his area of military operations. The commissar admits in his memoirs that he had previously known nothing about partisan warfare, and that he was told by the chairman of the military council of the West Front that until shortly before his assignment no one in the Front command had taken partisan activity seriously. Now, however, the Army authorities felt that the partisans could assist militarily and were therefore prepared to furnish arms, advice, and cadres. The commissar held conferences with the rayon Party committee in the area in which his army was operating, presenting the army position to the Party secretary, the commander of the rayon military section, the representatives of the village soviets, and the plenipotentiary of the NKVD.
[V. Andreyev, Narodnaya voina (zapiski partizana) (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoye Izdatelstvo Khudozhestvennoi Literatury, 1952), p. 49.]
The army commissar was not impressed by the ability of his new associates, however, and practical cooperation appears to have been minimal. Even if the basis for joint action had been more promising, it is probable that the rapid retreat of the armies from this area would have rendered extensive cooperation with the territorial partisans impossible.
Farther to the north and to the south, however, the territorial units were utilized to a greater extent by the Red Army. The Political Administrations of army formations on the Northwest Front actively cooperated with the rayon Party apparatuses, and even sent officers to assist in organizing partisan detachments. Probably some of these detachments remained in the rayons in which they were formed, but others, after they had been recruited by the Party committees, were transferred to the Red Army for training and equipment. After completing their training, the units were placed under the operational control of the staff of the Northwest Front, which used them for scouting in the rear of the Germans.
A similar pattern evolved in the northern section of the West Front— but with some interesting variations. In Smolensk Oblast, the "Western Railways Administration" joined the oblast Party committee in the formation of a partisan detachment from among the railroad workers. [See n. 5, concerning the status of party organization in such transportation enterprises.] Apparently the
"OO" (NKVD) section of the railways administration was actually assigned the organizational task. After it was formed, the otryad was trained, presumably under army direction, and was turned over to the military command for operational purposes. As the commissar of the unit, a man chosen by the NKVD and the Party organization, stated shortly after the otryad had completed its training, an "army commissar and a high staff officer" gave the following instructions:
1. The detachment is to operate in the general direction of Gusin.
2. The tasks of the detachment are destruction and sabotage in the rear of the German forces.
3. Liaison is to be with the staff of the central [part of the ?] West Front.
a. The liaison point is to be in the village of Kovshi.
b. Contact is to take place on the 25th of each month.
c. The password is "Haven't you seen any horses here?"; the countersign is "The horses have left Kovshi."
This detachment was undoubtedly considered to be of special value to the Red Army in attacking German communications, since it was composed of technically experienced men. Its importance and the close control exercised by the army command are indicated by the fact that a Red Army officer was detailed to guide the unit through the front lines and that it was then placed under the supervision of an army commissar assigned to direct disruptive activities in the enemy occupied area. In a similar fashion, the South Front employed territorially formed partisan units to
establish a center for disruptive activities in the Nikopol area.
The partisan units just described, while trained and directed by the Red Army, were used in the administrative divisions from which they were recruited. A somewhat different system was followed in Leningrad, which was besieged, but never occupied. There units of up to regimental size were formed by the Party organizations in the factories and were provided with Party officials as commissars and with men of military background as leaders. They were turned over to the Northwest Front command for training, and when they were sufficiently prepared were sent through the enemy lines by the Front command. Once in occupied territory, the large formations were broken up into battalions of 100-200 men each (apparently this size, corresponding to that of the rayon otryad, was considered most efficient for operational purposes), and carried on activities under the control of the Front command.
[A very interesting personal account of the way in which a member of the Leningrad Factory Air Defense organization (apparently similar to the destruction battalion) was recruited for a partisan unit is contained in OKH/GenStdH/GenQu/Abt. K., Verw., "Tagebuch eines Partisanen," 31 October 1941 (GMDS, H 17/218).]
There were also a number of partisan detachments led by officers who had been selected by the Party organizations in large unoccupied urban centers such as Moscow; they were trained by the Red Army and were then used to carry out partisan-type missions of strategic significance. Party cadres from the unoccupied regions played a more important role in organizing local units in German-occupied territory; they will be discussed below.
Not all the men sent across the lines by the Red Army were ordered to act as partisans. Many parachutists were hastily recruited and trained, then dropped in an indiscriminate fashion, evidently with the hope that some would succeed in sabotaging German installations. Other parachute and infiltration units were composed of regular Red Army personnel, including many staff officers, and were sent on specific commando missions such as the destruction of enemy communications and the collection of information. These elements were of some importance in the partisan movement since they frequently found it necessary to join partisan bands when they
could not make their way back to the Soviet lines. During 1941, however, they were of little significance.