Professional ethics in the health, education and welfare sectors are commonly underpinned by ideas drawn from Western European philosophy (Hugman, 2014; Barnard, 2017). Reflecting this, social work ethicists broadly agree about the historical prominence of two perspectives: deontology and consequentialism (for example, Clark, 2006; Banks, 2012; Reamer, 2013b). Both are principle-based, rationalist approaches with late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, European roots. Deontologists emphasise the duty to act in accordance with what is intrinsically right, rather than in order to achieve particular outcomes (Reamer, 2013b). The most prominent deontological ethicist was Kant (Hugman, 2014), whose ‘categorical imperative’, articulated in 1785, expressed the obligation to adhere to universally applicable moral rules (Kant, 1964, cited in Houston, 2012, p.655). Kant also argued that each individual is inherently worthy of respect as a rational being, with his or her own preferences and desires (Banks, 2012). The corollary of this principle of respect is that people must never be regarded instrumentally, but always as self-determining moral agents. Conversely, consequentialists focus on the importance of establishing desirable ends, variously
construed in terms of happiness, ideals or utility (Hugman, 2014). The form of consequentialism that has found most purchase in social work is utilitarianism (Reamer, 2013). The utilitarian perspective, based on the reformist philosophies of Bentham and Mill, holds that right actions are those that produce, on balance, a greater sum of good than bad outcomes (Banks, 2012; Hugman, 2014). For Bentham (1789, p.65) the utility principle means that ‘every action whatsoever’, whether carried out by individuals or governments, should be judged in terms of the happiness it produced for those concerned. Mill (1861) broadens the concept, arguing that happiness includes not simply personal pleasure but also consequences based on considerations of what is fair and just. Both deontological and utilitarian approaches have been found relevant for social work, deontology because of its emphasis on respect (for example Clark, 2000; Congress, 2010) and consequentialism because of its attention to risk and outcomes for service users (Banks, 2012). The former has proved especially salient, with Banks summarising early statements of social work principles or values as sharing an emphasis on respect for service users as self-determining individuals (for example Biestek, 1961 and Butrym, 1976, cited in Banks). Critics argue that deontology lacks a political perspective (Webb and McBeath, 1989; Clifford and Burke, 2005) and that consequentialism can lead to moral relativism and the oppression of minority groups in society (Clark, 2000; Congress, 2010; Reamer, 2013b). Approaches to ethics derived from concepts of human rights, also with eighteenth century origins, offer other principle-based perspectives that go some way to balance these limitations. Reichert (2011) argues that human rights, derived in the modern era from revolutionary struggles in France and the US, are an essential basis for social work
practice. For Reichart, a focus on rights facilitates the dual attention to both individual circumstances and societal inequalities that distinguish social work from other human service professions. Ife (2012) concurs, and adds that attention to rights serves to balance the essentially individualistic nature of ethical reasoning, and as such serves to counter the dominance of neo-liberal discourse. Furthermore, he argues that being mindful of rights in the process of social work practice maintains a focus on the service user rather than the professional. Nevertheless, and across the health and care professions, principle-based ethics may have limitations in practice, where conflicting principles may apply (Reamer, 2013a; Barnard, 2017). Bioethicists Beauchamp and Childress (1979, cited in Ferber, 2013, p.27) propose a composite model of ethical reasoning for health practitioners, based on what they argue are commonly agreed moral principles of ‘justice, autonomy, beneficence and non- maleficence’. Banks (2012) suggests a similar model for social work but grounded instead in principles of dignity, welfare, and social justice. Hugman (2014) notes that such approaches represent ethical pluralism, advocated by its philosopher adherents as offering flexibility and adaptation to circumstances (Kekes, 1993 and Hinman, 2013, cited in Hugman). However, other approaches to social work ethics move away from principles altogether, focusing instead on instead on character and relationships, and I now turn to these.
The ethical significance of character is the hallmark of a virtue approach to ethics. McBeath and Webb (2002, p.1019) note that interest in the relevance of virtue ethics for social work was first voiced in the 1980s, offering a counter to the ‘persistent drone of Kantianism and utilitarianism’. This, they argue, echoed its
revival amongst academic philosophers, including MacIntyre. According to MacIntyre (2013), while virtue ethics can be traced to Plato, its principal architect in the ancient world was Aristotle. In the 4th century BCE, Aristotle asserted that the aim of human existence was ‘eudemonia’, variously translated as ‘blessedness, happiness, prosperity’ (MacIntyre, p.174). He described the virtues, including courage, good temper and truthfulness, as dispositions facilitating this. Crucially, virtues are not inborn but ‘cultivated by habit’ (Aristotle, 2009, p.23), and so a virtue approach prioritises the ethical commitment of the individual rather than application of universal precepts. Critics of virtue ethics for social work point out its ready compliance with dominant social structures in failing to ask who should define virtue, or why virtue should be a priority at all (Houston, 2003; Clifford, 2014). Others authors commend its attention to moral agency, and suggest virtues that social workers should cultivate (Clark, 2006; Banks and Gallagher, 2009). Virtue ethics’ compatibility with Western and other faith perspectives has also been noted (for example Adams, 2009; Øvrelid, 2008; Bibus, 2013; Schrieber, Groenhout and Brandsen, 2014). Webb (2010) concludes that virtue ethics’ focus on reflection and personal disposition is especially fitting for contemporary social work given the dynamic contexts for practice. In unpredictable circumstances, Webb argues, what is needed is not a set of unbending moral rules such as those advocated by deontologists and utilitarians, but the flexible moral agency of the individual social worker doing his or her best. Hence, virtue ethics has also been found compatible with a postmodern perspective that locates morality in the self rather than rules imposed by shifting external demands (Smith, 2011; Kendall and Hugman, 2013).
Other approaches to social work ethics are more concerned with relationships. One is Habermas’ discourse ethics, which develops Kant’s principle of respect into a theory of inclusive communication (Gray and Lovat, 2008; Houston, 2012). Another is Levinas’ ethic of proximity, based on the premise that our instinctive responsibility to another person precedes reason (for example, Tascon, 2010, Rossiter, 2011). However, the ethic of care has gained more purchase in the literature than either of these. It originates in Gilligan’s assertion that care offers a moral perspective that values interdependence rather than rationality and autonomy (Gilligan, 1982, cited in Orme, 2002). Gilligan (1982) disputed assumptions that the most highly evolved morality was based on theoretical concepts such as rights and justice. Drawing on her own research, she argued that this was a male-oriented perspective and that women’s morality was based on care for others rather than abstract principles. Held (2006) notes that subsequent ethics of care theorists including Sevenhuijsen and Tronto have conceptualised care beyond gender, arguing that we are all carers or cared for during our lives and that care may also be reflected in social practices and values. In social work, the ethic of care has been commended in similar terms as virtue advocates, as challenging or complementing principle-based perspectives (Lloyd, 2006; Gray, 2010; Banks, 2012) and prioritising personal agency (Parton, 2003; Dybicz, 2011). Also like virtue ethics, it has been found congruent with non- Western approaches including Chinese Confucian ethics (Wada, 2014), which emphasises filial piety, the respect due to parents and elders, and ma’at, an Ancient Egyptian concept based on harmony and reciprocity (Graham, 2007). What the ethics of care offers too is a synergy between ethics and relationship-based practice, with the former not applied to the latter but arising inevitably within it. In addition,
Held points out that while rationalist approaches to ethics reject emotion, the care ethicist values it - not unconditionally, but as material for reflection. Thus like virtue ethics, an ethic of care chimes with social work’s emphasis on reflection as promoting the ethical use of professional power in the ‘swampy lowlands’ of the human services sector (Schon, 1991, p.42).
Other theoretical literature focuses not on philosophical ideas but particular topics. It is beyond the scope of the thesis to explore this in detail, but it is relevant to acknowledge as it indicates further the burgeoning interest in social work ethics noted in Chapter One. This body of work falls largely into three categories. The first, while it may include philosophical theory, emphasises the specific ethical considerations that arise in particular professional settings. UK examples include explorations of ethical practice in dementia care (Barnes and Brannelly, 2008), in work with travellers (Cemlyn, 2008), in mental health services (Dixon, 2010) and within the criminal justice system (Lynch, 2014). This literature conveys a sense of ethics as a situated activity, with particular circumstances generating particular challenges for the practitioner. As such, like the emergence of virtue and care approaches, it reflects a broadening conceptualisation of social work ethics beyond universal principles generically applied.
The second category focuses on clarifying ways of thinking about ethics. Banks (2012) differentiates ethical issues, problems and dilemmas. The first of these, she argues, characterises all social work practice. In an ethical problem, a decision may be difficult but the correct way forward is nonetheless evident. Ethical dilemmas are
the most troubling, presenting a number of equally distasteful options. Other authors propose models for structured ethical decision-making (for example Bryan, 2006; Dolgoff, Harrington and Loewenberg, 2012; Reamer, 2013). McAuliffe and Chenoweth (2008), having differentiated models of ethical decision-making as predominantly linear, reflective or cultural in their orientation, advocate an inclusive model. However, they acknowledge its limitations in that it cannot assist where personal and professional ethics collide, or where practitioners are at odds with social policy. Again, this reflects the tension between the consistent application of predetermined precepts and individual moral agency.
The final category of literature, and one especially significant for my own research, addresses the impact on social work practice of current political, policy and administrative contexts. Despite some optimism about the compatibility of these with social work values, and the opportunities they offer for practice that empowers service users (Duffy, 2010; Thyer, 2010), expressions of alarm dominate. In particular, neoliberalism, which emphasises individual responsibility and subjects ‘all areas of life … to the logic of the market’ (Stark, 2010, p.10), is widely construed as compromising social justice and attention to individuals (for example Webb, 2009; Ferguson, 2010; Stark; Weinberg, 2016). In addition, UK authors note the impact of the continuing austerity agenda on welfare spending and practice (for example Lymbery, 2012; Lee, 2014). The dominant sense from this literature is that prevailing circumstances may not be ethically benign, and that aspects of social work’s ethical purpose – and accordingly, its identity (see Chapter One) - are insufficiently attended to or under threat. This is a thread that recurs both in Chapters Three and Four,
which review the empirical literature, and in the results of my study itself. Especially important for my research are concerns that statutory placements may socialise students into practices at odds with social work’s traditional values. For Preston- Shoot (2012, p.31), this amounts to a ‘secret curriculum’ by which organisational culture may shift practitioners’ and students’ focus away from service users in favour of agency demands. A priority for educators, therefore, is the promotion of ‘ethical literacy…personal reasoning and responsibility’ (Preston-Shoot 2011, p.188). Fenton (2016) adds that younger social workers practitioners and students may accede to neoliberal principles especially uncritically, having been immersed in them throughout their lifetime. This suggests again the importance for social work education, noted in Chapter One, in developing students into practitioners who can recognise and embrace the ethical dimensions of their work, and both the challenges and opportunities that policy and procedure provide.
This outline of theoretical perspectives has suggested a thriving field of interest and scholarship, reflecting the wider ‘ethics boom’ (see Chapter One) and suggesting ample scope for engagement creative application. However, an overview of theory says nothing in itself about the reach of ideas beyond textbooks and journal articles, or their significance for practitioners and students. Nonetheless practitioners encounter ethics daily, in professional reference points expected to underpin their work. These are formalised professional codes, the focus of the next section of this chapter.