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Rational decisions are not always reached by people as a result of their cognitive reasoning – partly due to the social construction of risk, and partly because cognitive processing utilises the information at hand, and often with deduction aimed not at reaching a rational outcome, but to reach the most agreeable outcome

(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Rudski, Osei, Jacobson, & Lynch, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). As such, individuals’ judgements are often biased by their attitudes, beliefs,

emotions, and feelings at the time of decision-making (I liked the shoes’ colour but forgot to try them on for size), leading to irrational choice (Kahneman, 2003; Loewenstein et al., 2001; Rudski et al., 2011)

2.6.1.1 Cognitive biases

The discrepancy that exists between residents’ estimates of their bushfire risk and level of preparedness and their fire agency counterparts’, can be explained to a large degree by the influence of cognitive biases and social processes. For example, the discrepancy between expert and citizen estimates of risk can reflect residents’ tendency to underestimate their relative risk to natural hazards because they overestimate their existing knowledge (Ballantyne, Paton, Johnston, Kozuch, &

Daly, 2000). In other words, if an individual believes they know how bushfires behave and believe they know what mitigation measures to adopt and have adopted these, they may feel they are adequately prepared for bushfire and not heed any new or subsequent information or warnings. As such, perceptions about hazard specific knowledge can actually act to reduce the likelihood of preparedness measures being undertaken because the individual may become overconfident about their ability to deal with a hazard and thus underestimate their vulnerability (Lindell & Whitney, 2000).

Furthermore, individuals rate their level of preparedness by comparing themselves to others in their community. Community members often rate their own preparedness as being higher than the average for their community. This statistical anomaly, referred to as unrealistic optimism bias, results in people accepting the need for greater preparedness in their community but perceive this information as being relevant only to other residents and not themselves (Gold, 2008; Paton, Smith, & Violanti, 2000; Weinstein & Klein, 1996). As a result, although people may attend local bushfire information evenings or forums, they may not perceived the

information that is given as being relevant to them, and merely attend to confirm what they perceive they have already done, as being adequate. As such, these individuals transfer risk to others within their community, and as a result, if all members are interpreting their relationship with the hazard in this way, with action being the responsibility of others, motivation to prepare will be diminished.

A further bias is the tendency for individuals to overestimate the capacity of hazard mitigation measures to remove the perceived threat. This interpretative bias, known as risk compensation (Adams, 1995; Paton, Smith, Daly, & Johnston, 2008), describes how people maintain a balance between the perceived risk of a particular

hazard and the perceived level of safety provided by their environment. An increase in perceived environmental safety (e.g., fire agencies conducting controlled burns, investing in new fire trucks, updating bushfire ratings scales) results in a reduction of the individual’s perception of the risk. As a result increasing people’s hazard

knowledge through information provision may in fact result in the perceived risk and motivation to prepare being reduced (Ballantyne et al., 2000). Furthermore, people may attribute responsibility for hazard mitigation to the provider of the information (e.g., government agency) since they are obviously aware of the risk.

2.6.1.2 Cost/benefit analysis

Another factor that can complicate volitional behaviour arises from the cost/benefit analyses individuals engage in when deciding whether to adopt certain behaviour. In regard to health behaviours (e.g., smoking, dieting, exercising), the costs and benefits associated with adopting these behaviours are usually apparent soon after their initiation. Such relatively immediate reinforcement of behaviour does not apply to decision making about infrequent natural hazards whose return periods can mean that people may not experience them for years or decades. This discrepancy affects preparedness decisions. For example, the ‘costs’ (as can often require significant monetary contributions) of preparing for bushfires (e.g., buying a fire fighting pump, installing sprinklers, and clearing vegetation around the

property), are immediate, but the benefits of such bushfire preparedness action may not be appreciated for years or even in the individual’s lifetime due to the infrequent nature of major bushfires.

Therefore, regardless of whether residents are aware of the bushfire risk and the recommended preparedness actions, their automatically adopting these

such, simply telling residents to prepare because it will reduce the negative

consequences attributed to bushfire risk is not enough to prompt their preparing. This therefore questions the assumptions upon which current practices of fire agency risk communication and education strategies are based (Lindell & Whitney, 2000).

Consequently, of all the recommended bushfire adjustments described in section 2.5, those that are engaged in as part of everyday property maintenance (see section 2.5.2), and coincidently also reduce bushfire risk, are the most commonly reported ‘preparedness measures’ adopted. These are usually low cost, low effort adoptions that fulfil multiple functions (e.g., mow lawn for aesthetic purposes, have a two-week supply of food because it is cheaper to buy in bulk). These adjustments appear to be more popular than vegetation modification (e.g., clearing and pruning trees) and structural changes to homes (e.g., retro-fitting window shutters,

Gutterguard) (Brenkert-Smith, 2006; McFarlane, McGee, & Faulkner, 2011; McGee, 2005). This reflects the interpretive influence of cost/benefit analyses that residents undertake in their everyday dealings when deciding whether to adopt certain behaviour.

It appears then that interpreting bushfire risk and deciding what to do about it is related to the way residents’ manage their everyday daily hassles.

In their mixed-method study of the bushfire awareness-action gap of residents living in bushfire-risk communities of New South Wales, Australia, Eriksen and Gill (2010) determined that dilemmas of everyday life influenced residents’ attitudes to adopting bushfire protective measures. Day-to-day hassles such as costs (in terms of monetary and time values), gender role disparity, and managing priorities were found to inhibit householders from transferring bushfire

risk awareness to bushfire preparedness. This suggests that in order to successfully communicate bushfire management issues to residents living in bushfire risk areas, community outreach programs must acknowledge that to individuals, bushfire risk is interpreted alongside and thus competes with, other aspects of the householders’ everyday life.

Unlike daily hassles however, bushfires are infrequently occurring events and thus constitute a degree of uncertainty for the resident. This is further emphasised by the fact that the bushfire hazard itself is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon (see section 2.3), which thus reflects the diversity of actions that are required to adequately prepare for them (see section 2.5). However, similar to daily hassles, if a resident is faced with uncertainty and is unsure of how to act, they turn to easily accessible information sources; those found within their social environment.

2.6.2 Why traditional means of promoting preparedness do not work