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ASPECTOS SOCIOECONÓMICOS DE EIVISSA Y FORMENTERA EN EL PRIMER TERCIO DEL SIGLO

2.2.5 ‘SOLIDARIDAD OBRERA’

4. ASPECTOS SOCIOECONÓMICOS DE EIVISSA Y FORMENTERA EN EL PRIMER TERCIO DEL SIGLO

This section explains and critically examines the challenges experienced in managing ME and the potential barriers to effective response. While it is possible that resources may

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abound in dealing with MEs (Mitroff et al., 1996), Dillon et al. (2009) argued that situation awareness is crucial in mobilising timely response, communication and mitigating the impacts of any emergency. Thus, the scale and speed in which extreme and complex events unfold are sufficient reasons for inferring that any ME will be challenging to manage due to barriers and other human-related factors that is examined in this section. The first subsection examines the challenges that may be experienced, while section 2.7.2 focuses on barriers.

2.7.1 Challenges in Managing Major Emergencies

The explanations of ME examined in this chapter have indicated that MEs are not easy to manage nor prepare for in a routine manner. Since they have characteristics that make them peculiar and escalate, it is important to examine the challenges that make ME more difficult to deal with as compared to routine or regular emergencies. Mitroff (2004) emphasised that three variables can make responding to extreme events or ME more challenging.These factors or variables (shown in Fig. 2-20), which are location in which ME occur, the time in which they occur and the nature or/and scope of their occurrence have strong ability to limit response arrangements.

Figure 2.20: Challenges to managing ME/extreme events (Mitroff, 2004) ME Location

Time

Nature

&

Scope

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As illustrated in Figure 2.20, all three factors have the potential to simultaneously influence and escalate any ME if contingency planning which specify procedures for mitigating the impacts of these factors is not in place and rehearsed. According to Mitroff (2004), location in which ME occur can pose a challenge or drive the response arrangements. It is the peculiar for emergency response to be rapid, however, the case studies reviewed shows that the events in Japan occurred quickly and so did other incidents, while the location they occurred also made it challenging to respond to. Perhaps this is because recent ME occur in unexpected magnitude and complex ways which place a demand on all existing resources at the disposal of those impacted (Mitroff et al., 1996). Furthermore, time is significant in preventing the stages of ME to escalate and the onset which Turner and Pidgeon (1997) explained. Even when the location in which ME occur is not remote or of close proximity to natural hazards as the Japan incident, the nature and scope of the incident as seen in the UK, U.S and UAE case studies often make response problematic and challenging. The UAE multiple collision saw the cars explore which made it impossible for any responding agencies to approach to save people.

Such conditions, nature and scope of incidents makes it challenging to deal with ME. While these three main challenges directly make dealing with ME challenging, they minimal effects on ability to conduct investigation which can translate into learns learned. Meyers (2011) argued that, the manner in which ME occur at times with limited level of prediction makes learning lessons difficult. This is because responders and emergency response agencies are so overwhelmed with the urgency of preserving lives and properties that it is almost impossible to identify and record major lessons which can be embedded in future plans to improve disaster response (Meyers, 2011).

2.7.2 Barriers to Managing Major Emergencies

The explanations of previous section indicate that challenges are external to the emergency management system, organisations and procedures. Therefore, procedures and planning for response are suitable when they are effective enough to reduce their impact on response arrangements and monitored to prevent them from escalating ME (Mitroff, 2004). Although mechanisms for lessons learned have been identified in literature and case studies of other countries as suitable for mitigating these challenges

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(Meyers, 2011). However, Perrow (2011) argued that the frequencies of ME or routine emergencies often hinder the ability to identify lessons, adapt them and transfer the knowledge before another incident occur. Thus, suggesting that the frequencies of ME can be barrier in itself to ability to learn lessons and use the lessons effectively for future planning and response.

Another barrier is explained by Boin et al. (2005) which states that learning from crisis or past disaster often contain a paradox in which “when the need for learning is at its peak, the institutional capacity of public leaders and their organisations may be disappointingly low” (Boin et al., 2005:120). Despite the attempts to apply lessons identified from one crisis or emergency to another, there are often ambiguous cause-and- effects relationships in emergency which allows contradictory, multiple and/or mistaken lessons to emerge from past incidents (Boin et al., 2005). Pidgeon (1997) explained that perception can serve as barriers to learning, thereby making it challenging to respond to future ME of such nature. The high consequence of incidents makes “trial and error” learning prohibitive (Moynihan, 2008).

Therefore, primary barriers to learning lessons directly from ME can be summarised as follows:

a. Frequencies of ME shorten the cycle of learning lessons (Meyers, 2011) b. Institutional capacity and leadership failure can serve as barriers for Learning

process (Boin et al., 2005)

c. Ambiguity of what to learn (Boin et al., 2005)

d. Multiple lessons or too much lessons to learn (Boin et al., 2005) e. Perception towards learning lessons (Pidgeon, 1997; Moynihan, 2008)

The frequencies of ME, institutional capacity, leadership failure, ambiguity of lessons learned, multiple lessons to learn from and perception about learning lessons are all issues that may be managed and which are independent of external factors like challenges discussed in section 2.7.1. Most of these primary barriers relate to organisational perception, management process and leadership issues that may be addressed and fixed with better understanding of ME and development of effective contingency planning. However, it is considered a higher risk to directly assume that the conditions which surrounded the occurrence of an incident in the past will repeat itself in similar manner in the future.

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In situations where a specific location is repeatedly subjected to the same annual incidents, the inconsistence of human nature can influence the application of learned lessons. This is because crisis, emergency and disaster management require inter or multi agency collaboration and learning rather than single organisational learning (Coombs, 2007). Thus, the ability to coordinate the same level of learning across all agencies and organisations involved in response can be challenging (Coombs, 2007). This can also make response interventions challenging as well as serves as barrier to learning lessons. While barriers to learning from the past often arise from lack of relevant experience, technologies and heuristics to draw on or learn from (Moynihan, 2008), this are considered as secondary barriers (Coombs, 2007).

Therefore, challenges of managing ME span from ability to identify applicable lessons to learn from and ability to apply these reasons in preparing for future ME (Coombs, 2007). This further relate to what is considered as secondary barriers to learning, lessons comprise of;

i. Lack of previous experience to learn from (Moynihan, 2008) ii. lack of proper documentation (Clarke, 1999; Birkland, 2006) iii. change of personnel (Moynihan, 2008)

iv. limited understanding and application of the context of lessons identified (Rosenthal et al., 2008)

As noticed, these factors or barriers are more operational in nature in that they relate more to human resource and lack of individual or group understanding of ME, and contingency planning in relation to lessons learned. According to Rosenthal et al (2008) barriers can lead to wrong lessons being identified and learned. Mitroff et al. (1996) also emphasised that lessons of past incidents can narrow focus and lead to limited information sharing among concerned emergency response agencies. This also means that old solutions are at times applied to new problems which might make lessons learned ineffective (Lagadec, 1997).

Therefore, the challenges associated with dealing with ME as well as barriers to learning lessons as examined by different authors in this section have emphasised the relevance and importance of this research area. It has also indicated the need to identify drivers which are likely to improve response arrangement as well as learning process based on

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the understanding of ME as both an event and a process. Therefore, the next section examines drivers and essential guidelines for contingency planning for dealing with extreme events that can serve as guidelines for the UAE.

Outline

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