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the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince‘s actions:
but who would say it was the same man? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guess, to everybody determine the man in this case, wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the same cobbler to everyone besides himself. I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the same person, and the same man, stands for one and the same thing. And indeed everyone will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet, when we will inquire what makes the same spirit, man, or person, we must fix the ideas of spirit, man, or person in our minds; and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the same, and when not.153
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definitive attributes which he considers make the idea of a person. These are ‗thinking‘,
‗intelligent‘, ‗reason‘ and ‗reflection‘. In addition, a person is a metaphysical being that is capable of considering himself as himself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places.
Locke therefore establishes ―consciousness‖ as the identity condition through time as the basis of personal identity. Once a person at t1 extends his consciousness to his past action at t2, he is therefore on that ground the same person, i.e. t1 and t2 are the same by virtue of sharing or participating in the same consciousness. Therefore, it is not unity of substance that makes the same person but unity of consciousness.
Essentially, consciousness is the underlying and definitive feature of personal identity. As pointed out above, same consciousness means same persons and not same substance. But however, Locke himself seems to be aware of a palpable problem‒the interruption of our consciousness due to forgetfulness or sleep. As he puts it:
But it is further inquired, whether it be the same identical substance. This few would think they had reason to doubt of, if these perceptions, with their consciousness, always remained present in the mind, whereby the same thinking thing would be always consciously present, and, as would be thought, evidently the same to itself. But that which seems to make the difficulty is this, that this consciousness being interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives wherein we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view, but even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst they are viewing another; and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past selves, being intent on our present thoughts, and in sound sleep having no thoughts at all, or at least none with that consciousness which makes our waking thoughts,—I say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i.e.
the same substance or no. which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not personal identity at all. The question being what makes the same person; and not whether it be the same identical substance, which always thinks in the same person, which, in this case, matters not at all:
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different substances, by the same consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one person, as well as different bodies by the same life are united into one animal, whose identity is preserved in that change of substances by the unity of one continued life. For, it being the same consciousness that makes a man be himself to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether it be annexed solely to one individual substance, or can be continued in a succession of several substances. For as far any intelligent being can repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is self to self now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come; and would be by distance of time, or change of substance, no more two persons, than a man be two men by wearing other clothes today than he did yesterday, with a long or a short sleep between the same consciousness uniting those distant actions into the same person, whatever substances contributed to their production.155 It is seen that the apparent problem is the interruption of consciousness, for example in sleep.
Does this suggest a person ceases to exist? Does this mean that when a person‘s consciousness is interrupted, the person stops existing and a new person or self emerges? The answer according to Locke is that when this happens, we do not cease to exist as a substance or as a human being but as a person. In so far a person‘s consciousness asleep is different from when he is awake; he is no longer the same person. The probable truth is that the same person can exist within different substances.
Locke explains the possibility of having a change or alteration in the substance that accommodates consciousness without and at the same time altering or causing change in memory or consciousness. It is clear; according to Locke that consciousness is the defining feature of a person and by extension personal identity. The physical body is conceived to be a substance that is capable of change. In other words, Locke is here stating that it is possible for the body of a person or the physical component of a person to experience change but in any way
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does not imply change of consciousness and therefore person. In consequence, it is only consciousness or person that is capable of surviving change, not the material body.
Though the possibility of change is certain, yet it only affects the human physical body. To buttress this change further, it is argued that in humans all the cells in their body are replaced every seven years. This implies that a complete or whole substance and not person coming into being once these cells replace the old ones. Book V of Aristotle’s Metaphysics P1, explicates this type of change thus: ―change within the same kind from a lesser to a greater or from a greater to a lesser degree is alteration: for it is motion either from a contrary or to a contrary, whether in an unqualified or in a qualified sense.‖156
More so, as Locke rightly pointed out and also to illustrate the inconsequential nature of the physical body in the determination of personal identity, he affirms that although my hand is part of me, cut it off, so that I am no longer conscious of it, and it is then no longer part of that which is [my] self, any more than the remotest part of matter. Thus consciousness is just the criterion of identity through time, but also in space-what I am right now includes all that I can feel.157 However, if all I can feel are parts of me [myself], what of some certain vital organs of our body that we cannot feel for example such as the liver; does this mean it is not part of me? This raises serious objections to Locke‘s thinking that all that I can feel are parts of myself.158
With regard to the question raised by Locke, whether if the same substance which thinks be changed, it can be the same person or remaining the same or be different persons? The answer provided by Locke is instructive:
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And to this I answer: first, this can be no question at all to those who place thought in a purely material animal constitution, void of an immaterial substance. For, whether their supposition be true or no, it is plain they conceive personal identity preserved in something else than identity of substance; as animal identity is preserved in identity of life, and not of substance. And therefore those who place thinking in an immaterial substance only, before they can come to deal with these men, must show why personal identity cannot be preserved in the change of immaterial substances, or variety of particular immaterial substances, or variety of particular bodies unless they will say, it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same life in brutes, as it is one immaterial spirit that makes the same person in men, which the Cartesians at least will not admit for fear of making brutes thinking things too.159
The emphasis by Locke is strictly that personal identity in change of substance is preserved by consciousness which alters not. As a result, there is a difference between the idea of a person and the idea of substance. We cannot presuppose that the idea of substance and person are identical.
In the Lockean sense, the former connotes or relates to the material or physical body as well as the soul and the latter consciousness. So, consciousness is not substance, rather it is the very essence and nature of the human person.
The expression that ―whether in change of thinking substances there can be one person‖, Locke here expresses the possibility of having same consciousness moves from one thinking substance to another, yet the same consciousness is preserved and by extension, personal identity is preserved. He puts it thus: ―… it must be allowed, that, if the same consciousness (which, as has been shown, is quite a different thing from the same numerical figure or motion in body) can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, it will be possible that two thinking substances may make but one person. For the same consciousness being preserved, whether in the same or different substances, the personal identity is preserved.‖160 What Locke seems to argue is that if there is a possibility of the same consciousness transferred from one man
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(thinking substance) to another man, though the thinking substances from which it moves from and to being two; consciousness in this process is not altered, but remains the same. In other words, Locke explicitly affirms that ―consciousness of the past, or ―a present representation of a past action‖ can be transferred from one thinking substance to another, and, therefore, he detached himself from Descartes‘ theory of personal identity by rejecting the sameness of immaterial substances as the criterion for personal identity.‖161
Therefore, it is apt to say that if it is the same consciousness that operates in Peter is transferred into James, though Peter and James are two men, it is actually one person that is involved here. It may seem that two thinking substances (Peter and James) are involved; they are actually the same person, because it is the same consciousness that is transferred from Peter to James, not two persons, though they be two thinking substances. More so, ―if a soul or mind is like a hard drive, which is blank when we‗re born but acquires information as we grow, then if the information on the hard drive (our memories) is transferred to another hard drive ( a different mind/soul) then the person goes with the memories, and you have a case of the same person having two different minds or souls at different times. Thus, same soul is not necessary for same person.‖162
In all, Locke maintains that it is consciousness alone that unites actions into the same person.
There is no doubt that man is a being that thinks and cogitates; therefore he is conscious of his environment. As a result, man is conceived as a rational being that acts and reacts in certain organized ways to things in his immediate or remote environment. The ability to reflect on his action; good or bad and the actions of others, makes him much better or are advanced and better still a higher animal in the animal kingdom. According to the existentialists, man is accountable
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for his actions, to this end, excuses are not allowed, except on the ground that those actions were done unconsciously or involuntarily. Consequently, ethicists and moralists divided human actions into two— act of man and human act. In the former, a person has little or no control over his or her actions and in the latter, he or she is responsible for his/her actions. Locke, perhaps aware of this (as well as the fact that same immaterial substance or soul does not make the same person but same consciousness) attributed or took consciousness to be that which is capable of uniting all actions—whether present or past into the same person. Locke explicates his view thus:
But though the same immaterial substance or soul does not alone, wherever it be, as in whatsoever state, make the same man; yet it is plain, consciousness, as far as ever it can be extended‒should it be to ages past‒unites existences and actions very remote in time into the same person, as well as it does the existences and actions of the immediately preceding moment: so that whatever has the consciousness of present and past-actions, is the same person to whom they both belong. Had I the same consciousness that I saw the ark and Noah‘s flood, as that I saw an overflowing of the Thames last winter, or as that I write now, I could no more doubt that I who write this now, that saw the Thames overflowed last winter and that viewed the flood at the general deluge, was the same self—place that self in what substance you please—than that I who write this am the same myself now whilst I write (whether I consist of all the same substance material or immaterial, or no) that I was yesterday. For as to this point of being the same self, it matters not whether this present self be made up of the same or other substances—being as much concerned, and as justly accountable for any action that was done a thousand years since, appropriated to me now by this self-consciousness, as I am for what I did the last moment.163
What Locke wants us to believe is that; substances are inconsequential or unnecessary for personal identity. For Locke to reason that my consciousness can be placed in any substance implies he logically permitted or allowed the biological or medical process of brain transfer or transplant. The serious implication this had on his theory will be considered in a subsequent
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chapter. It is pertinent to affirm that Locke holds as true the possibility of transferring consciousness from one substance to another. This means that if I was the same kid ten years ago that broke bottles in the store-room and led to the lost of one of my toes, and as an adult now am able to remember that incident or experience, then the kid ten years ago and the adult who is me now are the same person. But in the event where I am unable to remember or extend the incident as an adult now, though the lost of one of my toes is still very visible or seen in my body, Locke‘s analysis is that it is only consciousness that can unite all actions into the same person. If I cannot link or extend that action of breaking bottles in the store-room to my present self, then I am no longer the same person but a different person. The absence of one of my toes in my body does not in any way warrant bodily criterion as the determinant of personal identity. The question here is, is it not possible that though I could not remember the incident, the absence of the toe could cause me to know that I am still the same person or triggers my memory to remember it later?
Locke grounded personal identity on consciousness. The example given below clearly underpins Locke‘s basis of personal identity hinged on consciousness: ―I think I am the same person as I was yesterday because I who am aware of myself now also remembers being me yesterday. For exactly the same reason, if I could remember Noah‘s flood, then that was me experiencing it, even if I had to get a new body to live this long. And if I remember being Cain killing Abel, then I am responsible for that, and can be held responsible.‖164 To this end, any action that one cannot be accountable for, though done by the same substance, it presupposes that a different consciousness is responsible—by extension a different person. Take for example; assuming I was not consciousness of the action of stabbing my neighbour who fought with me yesterday
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since both of us passed-out but only to wake up today to realize what we have done, presupposes that prior to the fight which I remembered vividly, I was a different person from the person who actually stabbed my neighbour.
Locke‘s main argument is that personal identity consists in identity of consciousness, no more, no less. He stated it thus:
This may show us wherein personal identity consists: not in the identity of substance, but, as I have said, in the identity of consciousness, wherein if Socrates and the present mayor of Queenborough agree, they are the same person: if the same Socrates waking and sleeping do not partake of the same consciousness, Socrates waking and sleeping is not the same person.
And to punish Socrates waking for what sleeping Socrates thought, and waking Socrates was never consciousness of, would be no more of right, than to punish one twin for what his brother-twin did, whereof he knew nothing, because their outsides were so like, that they could not be distinguished; for such twins have been seen.165
This demonstrated Locke‘s virile resolve and affirmation of consciousness as the basis of personal identity and by extension the definition of a person. Substance may be identical or different, like the example of the identical twins; and Socrates and Mayor of Queenborough respectively but Locke does not think it to be the basis of personal identity. But those who argued for substance-based personal identity see or take the body as the necessary and sufficient conditions for explicating the idea of a person. Though the body according to them may sometime undergo change or mutation, the change or mutation is only insignificant; as in any case there are abiding bodily attributes that survive change. Howbeit, Locke‘s departure from bodily criterion of personal identity may be that the idea of consciousness presupposes thought or reflection; and this is the basis of man‘s moral and ethical responsibility or consideration. The
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body is not capable of these actions; hence he rejected it. As shall be seen later in chapter five,
Butler raised a fundamental paradox which apparently discredited the argument of Locke.
Locke accentuated further that absolute oblivion separates what is thus forgotten from the person, but not from the man. Here, Locke made a clear distinction between the idea of a person and the idea of a man. Though in our ordinary supposition, we mistake these two terms as one but when we examine the possibility of amnesia and forgetfulness, we see that Locke is right to separate the meaning and understanding of the two terms. Suppose, James and John are two friends; James committed a crime stealing fish from the pot of soup and John was completely oblivious of this crime. Suppose further that the consciousness of James is transferred into John and that of John into James‘, James here is only taken or seen as the man who committed the crime of stealing but not the person. The person who committed the crime is John. Locke added forgetfulness; in this case, it is not that I completely forgot the crime I committed years back.
Though I am the same substance and the same man, since I could not recall or remember committing the crime then I am a different person. In fact, Locke explains it this way:
Suppose I wholly lose the memory of some parts of my life, beyond a possibility of retrieving them, so that perhaps I shall never be conscious of them again; yet am I not the same person that did those actions, had those thoughts that I once was conscious of, though I have now forgot them? To which I answer, that we must here take notice what the word I is applied to; which, in this case, is the man only. And the same man being presumed to be the same person, I is easily here supposed to stand also for the same person. But if it be possible for the same man to have distinct incommunicable consciousness at different times, it is past doubt the same man would at different times make different persons; which, we see, is the sense of mankind in the solemnest declaration of their opinions, human laws not punishing the mad man for the sober man‘s actions, nor the sober man for what the mad man did,— thereby making them two persons: what is somewhat explained by our way of speaking in English when we say such an one is ‗not himself‘, or is ‗beside himself‘; in which phrases it is