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and distant places. Thus, no motion or thought, considered as at different times, can be the same, each part therefore having a different beginning of existence.149
It is essential to note that the subject matter of Locke‘s inquiry is principium individuationis, that is, existence itself, which defines or determines a being of any kind to a definite place and inexpressible to two beings of the same kind. Here, ―the idea of existence and identity is applied to compounded substances or modes. Assuming that an atom determined to be at a certain time and place in any point of its existence the same with itself must continue in the same way as long as its existence, a group of atoms would be said to exist similarly and have an identity. Should an atom be removed or added the substance changes and so does its identity for the period of time it exists as such.‖150 Whereas concerning the identity of living things or organisms, their identity is determined differently as we shall see in the next section. In all, this section is explicitly summed up this way:
that existence is the principle of identity: as long as an atom exists, it is the same atom. (this is identity through time.) This principle can be enlarged to cover collections of atoms. Thus, a ―mass‖ is the same as long as it consists of exactly the same atoms (―let the parts be every so differently jumbled‖), but if it loses or gains even one, it is a different mass (even though the atoms themselves will not lose identity, they will remain the same atoms), however, different identity conditions must apply to living things, because an acorn becomes an oak tree while changing drastically the matter it is composed of.151
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continuous participation of the same life. Locke illustrated this point with an analogy with a watch or machines. For example, I am using the same rollex wrist watch I have had for a long time, though I may have changed the following— the battery, the face cover and the leather handle to new ones, it does not make it different from my old watch, because the function or end to which the watch is fitted or designed has not changed.
Concerning the identity of man, Locke renders it thus:
This also shows wherein the identity of the same MAN consists; viz. in nothing but a participation of the same continued life, by constantly fleeting particles of matter, in succession vitally united to the same organized body. He that shall place the identity of man in anything else, but like that of other animals, in one fitly organized body, taken in any one instant, and from thence continued, under one organization of life, in several successively fleeting particles of matter united to it, will find it hard to make an embryo, one of years, mad and sober, the SAME man, by any supposition, that will make it possible for Seth, Ismael, Socrates, Pilate, St. Augustine, and Caesar Borgia, to be the same man. For if the identity of SOUL ALONE makes the same MAN; and there be nothing in the nature of matter why the same individual spirit may not be united to different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must not be united to different bodies, it will be possible that those men, living in distant ages, and of different tempers, may have been the same man: which way of speaking must be from a very strange use of the word man, applied to an idea out of which body and shape are excluded. And that way of speaking would agree yet worse with the notions of those philosophers who allow of transmigration, and are of opinion that the souls of habitations, with organs suited to the satisfaction of their brutal inclinations. But yet I hogs, would yet say that hog were a MAN or Heliogabalus.152
It is important to point out that the very idea of identity is suited to the idea it is applied to. This is the reason why we should not assume or think that the same identity conditions will work for varying or different things. It is glaring that it is not possible to locate identity on the unity of substance, the reason being simply that it is possible to have different entities— say X, Y and Z
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to exist in one substance, though at different time. This unity of substance does not in any way make X, Y, and Z the same.
On the identity of man, Locke thought it imperative to debunk the idea that the meaning or definition of man is that it is a rational animal or a thinking being. He gave an example of a rational parrot or cat that could talk, rationalize and more so philosophize. Though the parrot is capable of these qualities or hallmarks of rationality, it does not make it a man. What go into making a man are his shape, size, body and spirit. We see that concentration is made on both material and immaterial aspects of the substance called man. Some scholars think that the popular definition of man as a rational animal or thinking being in Locke‘s view is too broad.
That even if a parrot or cat was capable of rationality or thinking does not make it a man. It may be inferred that Aristotle‘s definition of man as a ‗rational animal‘ precludes or ignores certain facts about the nature of man. Hence, in Locke‘s view to make reference to a man, we must make reference to his material body; shape and size, and then the immaterial component-spirit.
What guarantees same man is simply sameness of body or soul. Locke used his argument here to illustrate that what is important at the resurrection is not just the body or soul but the person. He went on to distinguish between these three, stressing that the idea of man, person and spirit (soul) imply distinct entities with each having their relevance. He put his argument thus:
And thus may we be able, without any difficulty, to conceive the same person at the resurrection, though in a body not exactly in make or parts the same which he had here,—the same consciousness going along with the soul that inhabits it. But yet the soul alone, in the change of bodies, would scarce to anyone but to him that makes the soul the man, be enough to make the same man. For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince‘s past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler, as soon as deserted by his own soul, everyone sees he would be
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the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince‘s actions:
but who would say it was the same man? The body too goes to the making the man, and would, I guess, to everybody determine the man in this case, wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the same cobbler to everyone besides himself. I know that, in the ordinary way of speaking, the same person, and the same man, stands for one and the same thing. And indeed everyone will always have a liberty to speak as he pleases, and to apply what articulate sounds to what ideas he thinks fit, and change them as often as he pleases. But yet, when we will inquire what makes the same spirit, man, or person, we must fix the ideas of spirit, man, or person in our minds; and having resolved with ourselves what we mean by them, it will not be hard to determine, in either of them, or the like, when it is the same, and when not.153