Los Axones Procedentes del VPMdm y Po como Elementos Presinápticos de la

7-27. Internal defense training is an umbrella concept that covers a broad range of activities. Its primary intent is to help address internal threats and their underlying causes. Commensurate with U.S. policy goals, the focus of all U.S. efforts is to support internal defense and development. Civil defense training is not restricted to times of conflict. It can also take place in the form of training exercises and other activities that show irregular-force resolve to and for the region.

7-28. Of primary importance to the irregular forces is the security and welfare of the population that supports the movement. Without this support, the insurgency is doomed to fail. CA forces support local security through local defense training. Local defense training protects the society from subversion, lawlessness, hostile government retaliation, and the effects of man-made and natural disasters.

7-29. The proper use of ARSOF CA assets in UW is essential during all phases of an insurgency to counter retaliation by the hostile government. When used to its full potential, CMO can be crucial to solidify the position of the transitional government and improve security conditions for the people. CAO vary with the capabilities of the new administration and with the level of hostile activity. The economic, social, and political situations are also major influences. CA elements supporting local security—

z Review U.S. security assistance program goals to support the insurgent security plan.

z Plan CMO based on the seven phases of insurgency.

z Train irregular forces to plan, train for, and conduct nation assistance, PRS, and other CAO appropriate to the needs of its region.

z Train on TTP required to protect the populace from lawlessness and retaliation and develop indigenous individual, leader, and organizational skills to isolate hostile personnel and protect the civil population.

z Establish and maintain contact with nonmilitary agencies and local authorities.

z Identify specific CMO missions the new leadership can and should conduct.

PHASE VII: TRANSITION

7-30. CMO planners, usually CA-trained personnel, play a major role in transition planning. Based on their expertise, these personnel may be the best group to perform this function. For these planners to accomplish this task, a clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation must be developed (JP 3-57 includes further information). Termination or transition occurs when either the mission has been accomplished or when the President or SecDef so directs. Planners may base criteria for termination or transition on events, measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and success, availability of resources, or a specific date. A successful harvest or restorations of critical facilities in the crisis area are examples of events that might trigger termination of the mission. An acceptable drop in mortality rates, a certain percentage of dislocated civilians returned to their homes, or a given decrease in threat activity against the operation are examples of MOEs that may prompt the end of ARSOF involvement.

7-31. The transition plan is vital if stability operations are to be a success. It prioritizes and plans for the successful handover of missions to a follow-on agency or force. It is either military or civil in nature or a blending of the two. Examples of these organizations are peacekeeping entities under a UN mandate, IGOs, NGOs, or IPI. CA forces and CMO planners are uniquely qualified to advise the commander on activities that reduce turmoil and stabilize the situation until international relief organizations or IPI assume control.

7-32. Transition may occur between U.S. military forces, another military force (for example, multinational or forces from the affected country), regional organizations, the UN, or indigenous civilian organizations. A detailed plan addressing the various civil functions and to whom they will transition greatly reduces the turmoil typically associated with transition. The CMO staff should periodically review the transition plan with all participating organizations. This review will ensure that planning assumptions are still valid and determine if changes in the situation require changes in the transition plan.

7-33. For CAO planners to accomplish this task, a clearly identifiable end state and transition or termination criteria for the operation must be developed (Figure 7-4). Transition planning must start during the initial phases of operation planning to ensure that planners pay adequate attention to this critical area.

ARSOF plan for transition when they plan for intervention.

z Has the end state been achieved?

z Can forces be safely withdrawn from the operational area?

z Has consideration been given as to when USAR forces will be released?

z Has coordination for redeployment of the force been conducted with appropriate commands, agencies, and other organizations?

z Has the commander identified postconflict requirements?

z Has transition planning been accomplished in the event that operations are transitioning to another military force, regional organization, UN, or civilian organization?

z Have stated operational objectives been accomplished?

z Have the underlying causes of the conflict been considered, and how do they influence termination planning?

z What additional support will be required for redeployment?

z What are the FP requirements?

z What arrangements have been made with other organizations to accomplish the postconflict activities? For example, will there be humanitarian, governmental, and infrastructure assistance requirements?

z What is the policy for evacuation of equipment used by the force?

z What is the policy for redeployment?

z How will postconflict requirements impact the timeline for redeployment of the force?

z Will the force be expected to support these types of activities?

Figure 7-4. Sample checklist for transition planning

7-34. Historically, the international community has undertaken stabilization and reconstruction operations in an ad hoc fashion, recreating the tools and relationships each time a crisis arises. If the United States is to ensure that countries are set on a sustainable path toward peace, democracy, and a market economy, it needs new, institutionalized foreign-policy tools—tools that can influence the choices countries and people make about the nature of their economies, their political systems, their security, and in some cases, the very social fabric of a nation. In July 2004, Congress created the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The mission of the S/CRS is to integrate military expertise and best practices into the civilian world, while preserving the flexibility and agility necessary to respond to the highly fluid environments of conflict transformation. There is a tremendous asymmetry in the resources that the military and civilian worlds bring to bear on planning. S/CRS considers it a priority to develop a cadre of civilian planners for reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation. C/SRS core objectives include—

z Monitor and plan. Develop clear policy options concerning states and regions of greatest risk and importance and lead U.S. planning focused on these priorities to avert crises, when possible, and to prepare for them when necessary.

z Mobilize and deploy. Coordinate the deployment of U.S. resources and implementation of programs in cooperation with international and local partners to accelerate transitions from conflict to peace.

z Prepare skills and resources. Establish and manage an interagency capability to deploy personnel and resources in an immediate surge response and the capacity to sustain assistance until traditional support mechanisms can operate effectively.

z Learn from experience. Incorporate best practices and lessons learned into functional changes in training, planning, exercises, and operational capabilities that support improved performance.

z Coordinate with international partners. Work with international and multilateral organizations, individual states, and NGOs to plan and accelerate deployment and increase interoperability of personnel and equipment in multilateral operations.

7-35. When ARSOF conduct UW, CA forces must coordinate CAO with this relatively new USG C/SRS asset from the earliest practical moment in the preparation phase through the UW operation to transition or the final ARSOF efforts in the UWOA.

Chapter 8