IDENTIFICACIÓN DE PERFILES

8-22. Logistics during UW presents unique challenges for ARSOF units. Careful planning and coordination—both with normal supply channels and other available government agencies—help to diminish these challenges and sustain the force. The SB(SO)(A) serves as the primary logistics operator

and advisor to the USASOC commander and primarily focuses on operational to tactical logistical support.

When deployed, the SB(SO)(A) acts as the single logistics command element for a JSOTF.

8-23. As soon as practical, the Theater Sustainment Command (TSC) or Expeditionary Sustainment Command (ESC) will release the SB(SO)(A) making it available for redeployment to the continental United States or to another theater. An ARSOF support cell will remain in-theater and embed itself within the TSC or ESC Distribution Management Center and become the forward SB(SO)(A) logistical element for ARSOF, synchronizing logistic support for JSOTF operations. ARSOF liaison elements are assigned to the SB(SO)(A) in direct support of the TSOC, with duty at the ASCC, coordinating logistic plans for Army-provided common-user logistics support for deployed ARSOF and joint SOF where the Army is the executive agent. This coordination chain will typically not be collocated with ARSOF elements within the UWOA.

8-24. In UW, ARSOF and joint force commanders responsible for a designated UWOA cannot assume that logistical requirements will be met entirely through standard U.S. procedures. The SB(SO)(A) is required to anticipate, coordinate, facilitate, and execute unorthodox logistical procedures as needed through JIIM partners, both inside and outside of the UWOA. Such nonstandard logistical requirements must be identified early in the planning process, assume close interagency cooperation, and require flexibility and ingenuity.

T

A

8-25. The auxiliary is the clandestine support element of the guerrilla force. As with the underground, the auxiliary is often a cellular organization that can be either rural- or urban-based. Functions of the auxiliary include the following:

z Security and early warning.

z Intelligence collection.

z CI operations.

z Recruitment of new personnel.

z Air or maritime reception support.

z Communications.

z PSYOP.

z PRS.

z Support of evasion and escape mechanisms.

z Internal logistics and medical support.

z Fund-raising.

z Augmentation.

S

8-26. Supply requirements—whether for a resistance element or a surrogate force for UW against nonstate actors—should be established during initial planning. Regulatory requirements limit the types of supplies (specifically, lethal aid) that the DOD can provide to a resistance organization or a foreign surrogate force.

Coordination with other agencies of the USG is required to procure lethal aid supplies, which DOD can then transport and deliver.

8-27. Local procurement of supplies generally provides a more favorable OPSEC posture. Local procurement includes coordination through the auxiliary to leverage its internal logistic system of barter, purchase, levy, or seizure. All elements of the UW force can accomplish battlefield recovery. Aerial as well as other forms of resupply may be used, but each technique presents unique challenges during UW.

Maintaining the security of the DZ (from both the enemy and civilians) is paramount. During OEF, for example, there were several instances of civilians rushing into DZs to procure items contained in the resupply bundles.

C

M

S

S

8-28. Caches are hidden storage places for supplies and equipment. When properly planned and established, caches permit ARSOF and irregular forces considerable freedom to operate throughout the UWOA, independent of their base areas. Caches reduce the amount of supplies UW elements must carry, thus enhancing foot mobility. Caches are located to support projected operations.

8-29. An MSS is a temporary base used by personnel who are away from their base camp during an operation for periods in excess of two days. The MSS may provide food, shelter, medical support, ammunition, or demolitions. The use of an MSS eliminates unnecessary movement of supplies and allows the irregular force to move more rapidly to and from target sites.

H

M

O

8-30. Medical operations in support of UW conserve the fighting strength of guerrilla forces and help secure the support of the local population for U.S. and guerrilla forces operating within the UWOA.

Medical requirements within the UWOA differ from those posed by a conventional force in two key areas:

z Guerrilla forces typically suffer fewer battle casualties.

z Guerrilla forces typically have higher incidences of disease and malnutrition.

8-31. In UW, commanders must tailor the organization of medical elements to fit the particular situation.

Depending upon the required skills, organizers may be able to bring personnel from other medical units into the UWOA. The basic medical organization may also expand by using guerrilla force members and recruiting professional medical personnel to establish and operate guerrilla hospitals.

8-32. Clandestine facilities are, at first, confined to emergency and expedient care with minimum preventive medicine. Once the area command develops sufficiently, the clandestine facilities can expand and become part of the unit’s medical organization. Wounded guerrillas that fall into enemy hands may reveal critical intelligence that may compromise the mission. Patients with appropriate cover stories may infiltrate civilian or enemy military hospitals to receive care not otherwise available.

A

I

8-33. Generally, not every group requires every routine administrative procedure. The prior development of the organization, its requirements, and the requirements of the theater and USG dictate the administrative procedures employed.

F

8-34. Section 1208, Support of Military Operations to Combat Terrorism (1 November 2004), of Public Law 108-375, FY05 National Defense Authorization Act, authorizes the SecDef up to $25 million per year to provide support to foreign forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals engaged in supporting or facilitating ongoing military operations by U.S. SOF to combat terrorism. Security assistance or other uses not directly connected with ongoing or new SO cannot use Section 1208 funds. USSOCOM Policy Memorandum 05-10, (C) Policy and Procedure for the Use of Section 1208 Funding Authority (U), details the request and authorization procedures for these funds.

8-35. The U.S. military uses intelligence contingency funds (ICF) to support USSOCOM-funded intelligence operations. Title 10 of the USC for the SecDef provides the funds for use as emergency and extraordinary expenses (E&EE). Army Regulation (AR) 381-141, (C) Intelligence Contingency Funds (U), discusses the criteria for uses of ICF and intelligence property.

8-36. Confidential military purpose funds are available for E&EE in support of SO that are not provided for by other DOD procedures. Specific guidance for confidential funds is provided in USSOCOM Directive 37-4, (S/NF) Confidential Military Purpose Funds (U). FM 3-05.220, Volume I, Chapter 14 (Special Funding and Support), defines specific procedures for request and use of funds