^ The T i m e s , 8/6/25, ’The Danger to Foreigners'. 57 F 2 2 2 6 / 1 9 4 / 10.
58
took knives and slashed his face and ribs. A dead dog would not have been so t r e a t e d. 59
T w i c e daily the army and camp followers were lectured by officers 'in order to create a spirit of unity against the i m p e r i a l i s t s ' , ^ and more lively propaganda was conducted in the form of plays re-enacting the Shanghai t r a g e d y . ^
As a Christian, Feng was d i smayed by the lack of response from other Christians throughout the world, and early in J ul y he wrote an open l etter c a l ling on Ch r i s ti an s to take a stand against imperialism and the b r u t alities of the British, arguing that the fate of organized C h r i st ia ni t y
62
h un g in the balance. ~ Shortly before this he had also issued an appeal to British workers, which was published in the organ of the British Communist Party, Workers' W e e k l y . Th e
strikers in Shanghai received more tangible a s sistance from him in the shape of a donation of $20,000 to the strike
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fund. So committed to the movement against i m p e rialism was Feng, in fact, that he did not shrink from p r o c l a i m i n g his
readiness to make war on Great B r i t a i n without delay. W hi l e the British were not inclined to take his words at face
65
value, numbers of students, as we have noted above, were
59 F3699/194/10. 60 61
63
64
V i s h n y a k o v a - A k i m o v a , o p .c i t ., p.8l. Sheridan, o p ,c i t ., pp.173~4. I b i d . , P.174. V i s h n y a k o v a - A k i m o v a , o p .c i t ., p.81. Sheridan, o p . c i t ., p . 174. / c^ F 3 6 9 0 / I 94/10. However, they were not absolutely certain that F e ng would not act, e.g. F3007/^/l0.
148
p re s si n g for just such 'practical' action, and to cater for these firebrands, F eng opened a special mili t a r y t r aining school in Kalgan, which enrolled between 600 and 1,000
, , .
66
student s .
Feng's a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m was limited, however, to the British, who ha d to bear the full brunt of his wrath. T h e y were the chief culprits and the m ain cause of Ch i n a ' s troubles, and China's ai m must be to 'break the economic b ackbone of England in China.' Japan, on the other hand, was not only let off lightly, but even benefitted from the affair, in those areas of China under Feng's control. T he G en e r a l ' s racial theories may have played some part in this, as he
argued that 'Chinese and Japa n e s e are descendents of the same a n c e s t o r s ' . In an interview given on July 20 F en g d eclared that he had originally intended throwing the North West open to all foreign capital, but that recent events had decided him in favour of extending the invitation to one n a t i o n al i ty
only:
I have decided to accept the offers of those who have the same colour and ideas as we Chinese, n a mely the Japanese.
He also announced that the N or t h West would soon send 10,000 students to J a p a n and that 180 Japa n e s e professors would be
68
invited to come to China. (Following the war with C h a n g
Sheridan, o p .c i t ., p.l68. 67 Hiid. , p. 174.
b 8
North China H e r a l d , 2 r5/7/^5> p . 4 (3; the page references to this newspaper given by S heridan do not tally with those of the issues held by the A u s t r a li a n Nati o n a l Library, alth o u g h the dates do; e.g. the reference given by Sheridan for this, o p .c i t ., p .1 5 4, p.337n., is to p.4l of this issue.
Tso-lin, who received Japa n e s e support against F en g and the other opposing forces, the J a panese connection was broken and these plans came to naught).
Accordingly, while not calling Feng's sincerity in question - he wrote in his diary a week after May 30 that foreigners looked on Chinese as worse than cattle or horses,
6 9
and he resolved to wipe out the h um il i a t i o n - we must agree with S h e r i d a n that:
F e n g Y u - h siang's most vehement anti-imperialism, like that of other warlords, was usually
directed only against those nations from which he could expect enmity in any event.70
On the other hand, equally important, perhaps more so, the same b i og r a p h e r also writes that 1 9 2 5:
... witnessed a shift in Feng's political orientation in the direction of a greatly increased emphasis on anti-imperialism. T h is shift may well have reflected Feng's
increased awareness and resentment of the dominant position of the We s te r n powers in C h i n a . 71
It was precisely this "increased awareness", as we shall note in more detail in a later chapter, that many observers felt to have been one of the major results of the May 30 movement, and Feng himself, by his proclamations and actions, certainly contributed to it.
W r i t i n g back to London on June 21, Palairet, the British Charge, noted that 'the obscure point in the present situation
^ Sheridan, o p ,c i t ., p.172. 7° I b i d . , p . 290.
is the question of the relations between Chang Tso-lin and 72
Feng Yu-hsiang1. While Feng's attitude was to have been expected, the British were both shocked and disturbed when Chang Tso-lin also issued a cable protesting against the Shanghai shootings, which while not so violently phrased as Feng's, was nevertheless definitely hostile to Great Britain. Subsequent events were to prove that this one cable was to be the sole extent of C h a n g ’s participation in the movement, but it is a credit and a testimony to the strength and
universality of the feelings aroused by the Shanghai incident that he felt himself obliged to take such a step. As he
explained to H.M. Consul-General at Tientsin, he could not stand aloof and leave national sentiment to be expressed by
73
others alone. And it was out of respect to such sentiments that the troops he despatched to Shanghai with his son to keep order in the Chinese city went with the explanation that
they were being posted there to protect their fellow Chinese. That Chang's cable created such a stir in British circles may
be better understood when we observe that this was the man of whom conservatives on the F.O. China desk (still unaware of his message) were writing that the Powers should intimate to him that failing resolute action from the Peking government
in suppressing the agitation, he should:
... see to it that a situation such as that of 1900 does not recur, and to prevent the government of China from disintegrating under the influence of Communism.
72 F3690/194/10.
73
Ibid.It was added that this would involve protec t i n g him against the U.S.S.R. and lifting the China Arms Embargo in his
favour. To his credit, the head of the department, Waterlow,
74
doubted the wisdom of such a plan, and the suggestion was not acted on.
Once h av i n g issued his cable, C h a n g immediately set about the task of persua d i n g the British that he had not really meant it, sending an emissary to the British L e gation to explain that in order to evade F eng Yu-hsiang's suggestion that they send a joint cable, he had been compelled to send a message on his own account. Palairet was not convinced, and
felt that C h a ng was undecided as to w h e ther or not he should occupy Peking, and thereby risk a collision with Feng, and hence felt himself obliged to avoid c o mmitting h im se l f to any firm stand:
T h e outcome of the present uncertain situation depends upon his action, and more competent observers than m yself hold that we shall not reach any satisfactory solution of the present crisis until the issue between C h a n g T s o - l i n and F eng Y ü- h s i a n g is settled.75
One F.O. official observed lugubriously, 'definite d e c i sions
76
are so rare in China that this might mean the Greek K a l e n d s . 'C h a n g continued his protestations of friendship throughout June, and in T i e nt s i n made personal overtures to an E ng l i s h m a n named Stewart, who cabled C hurchill warmly r e commending
F2009/194/10. 75 F 3 6 9 0 / 1 94/10. 76 F2420/194/10.
152