CAPÍTULO 3 HEURÍSTICAS
3.3 Backtracking (método de vuelta atrás)
In many ways Nixon appeared to have seen the need f o r decisive and imaginative action in the f i e l d of in te rn a tio n a l r e la tio n s in order to allow the US to reassert i t s e l f in a time o f s w i f t l y changing global re la tio n s h ip s a ft e r the debacle o f Vietnam under Johnson. His fo re ig n p o lic y lie u te n a n t, Henry K issin ge r, has come in f o r c r i t i c a l reassessment in recent years, but at the time his " s h u ttle diplomacy" in the Middle East and his secret negotia tions over Vietnam and over Sino-US re la tio n s brought p la u d its to an ad m in istra tio n otherwise p e rson ified by the grubby pu rsu its of p o l i t i c a l "bag-men" and faceless "plumbers".
Nixon recognized his goal, his "summons to greatness", but u ltim a te ly the paranoia in the p o l i t i c i a n overwhelmed the v is io n of the statesman. Nixon l e f t the White House a despised, almost t r a g ic , f ig u r e and US foreign p o lic ie s were not irre v o c a b ly changed depsite the pressures th a t were b u ild in g . The next elected Republican President was able to re v e rt to the Cold War clic h e s o f the 1950s. Perhaps the Presidency o f Richard Nixon w i l l be remembered as an era of missed o p p o rtu n itie s . I t was, c e r t a in ly , a f a i l e d search f o r greatness.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The l a t e 1960s, c o i n c i d i n g w i t h Vietnam , marked th e end o f th e
p e r io d when America was o v e rw h e lm in g ly more pow erful than any
o t h e r n a t i o n , when we c ould a s s a u lt problems alone and e n t i r e l y
w i t h our own re s o u rc e s , when American i n i t i a t i v e s were accepted
w i t h o u t s e r io u s de b a te , when we c o u ld b e l ie v e t h a t our own
dom estic e x p e rie n c e s , l i k e th e New D eal, were th e a u to m a tic
b l u e p r i n t f o r economic development and p o l i t i c a l p ro g re s s
abroad. I t marked above a l l th e end o f th e era when we c o u ld
im agine t h a t any problems c o u ld be r e s o lv e d once and f o r a l l and
t h a t s o l u t i o n s once achieved would p e rm it us t o end our
i n t e r n a t i o n a l e x e r t i o n s .
Henry K i s s in g e r
A r t h u r K. Salomon L e c tu re New York U n i v e r s i t y
19 September 1977
The p re c e d in g c h a p te rs have attem pted t o i l l u s t r a t e th e fundamental change t h a t o c c u rre d i n US f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s d u r in g th e P re s id e n c ie s o f Lyndon
Johnson and R ichard N ixon. For over t w e n t y - f i v e years p r i o r t o Johnson
t h e r e had been a c l e a r consensus i n th e US about th e b a s ic o r i e n t a t i o n o f
American f o r e i g n p o l i c i e s . The US moved o u t o f i t s t r a d i t i o n a l i s o l a t i o n i s m
d u r in g World War I I guided by P re s id e n t R o o s e v e lt, who had r e a l i z e d t h a t
A m e ric a 's i n t e r e s t i n d e f e a t in g fa s c is m i n Europe had t o equal her d e s i r e t o
subdue th e more immediate t h r e a t posed by Japan. R o o s e v e lt's death b e fo re
th e w a r 's c o n c lu s io n means t h a t th e l i k e l y n a tu re o f h is d e a lin g s w i t h the
S o v ie t Union a f t e r th e war can o n ly be c o n j e c t u r a l , a lth o u g h th e r e i s some
evidence t h a t he may have been, i n i t i a l l y a t l e a s t , more c o n c i l i a t o r y
tow ards i t than h i s successors proved t o b e J
R o o se ve lt was succeeded by th e r e l a t i v e l y in e x p e rie n c e d H a rry S. Truman, a
man p a r t i c u l a r l y u n s k i l l e d i n th e ways o f f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Truman e a g e r ly