Uso de la memoria

George F.

Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950 (Boston:

L ittle , Brown & Co.,

1967), p.358.

combined c o n f l i c t and co-operation was harder . . . to explain and understand 5

than the cold war had been . . . "

By Nixon's time the US " f i n a l l y explained i t s actions on the in te rn a tio n a l scene in the same terms as a ll great powers before i t - th a t i s , in terms of the lo g ic of the balance o f power". Despite his "search f o r greatness", Nixon was almost c e r t a in ly driven more by pragmatism than a ltru is m . He e s s e n tia lly sought to manage global a f f a i r s with the minimum cost and maximum b e n e fit to the US. A fte r Vietnam, America was c le a r ly weary with i t s global r o le . During the Cold War US p o lic ie s , although couched in noble terms to con trast with the a lle g e d ly wicked in te n tio n s o f i t s adversary, were defensive and r i g i d . The Nixon-Kissinger "grand design and grand stra teg y were more p o s itiv e and c a lle d f o r greater f l e x i b i l i t y and m a n e u v e ra b ility ".7 This f l e x b i l i t y included bringing the PRC in to the mainstream of in te rn a tio n a l r e la t io n s . The balance of power sought by Nixon and K issinger, as the means of managing the new global com plexities, was d i f f e r e n t from the simple b ip o la r balance sought by e a r l i e r generations of European statesmen. In the words o f one w r i t e r ,

[th ey sought] the acceptance of a t r i p o l a r c o n fig u ra tio n of power in the mi 1i t a r y - s e c u r i t y issue area and a m u ltip o la r in te rn a tio n a l economic system, the development o f a moderate in te rn a tio n a l system supported by the United States, the Soviet Union and China, and the h a ltin g of the spread of communism w ith in the Western sphere o f in flu e n ce while simultaneously avoiding a d ir e c t m i l i t a r y c o n fro n ta tio n w ith the Soviet Union.

I b i d . , p.217.

u I b i d ., p . 180.

Dan Caldwell, American-Soviet R elations: From 1947 to the

Nixon-Ford-Kissinger Grand Design (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, i y 8 l j , p . Z b Z .

8

I t has not been the purpose o f t h is paper to attempt to evaluate the success of the innovative Nixon-Kissinger fo re ig n p o lic ie s . Indeed, the weakening US commitment to detente a ft e r Nixon's re s ig n a tio n , the widespread perceptions of US ind ecision and weakness in fo re ig n a f f a i r s under C arter, and the re turn to the language and postures of the Cold War under Reagan, which were so re c e n tly endorsed by the American e le c to ra te , may suggest th a t the Nixon-Kissinger approach w i l l be seen as an h is t o r ic a l o d d ity . They f a i l e d to forge a new fo re ig n p o lic y consensus despite the d e stru ctio n of the old by the Vietnam im broglio .

Nevertheless, Nixon's achievement was to break the e x is tin g c o n fro n ta tio n i st b i p o l a r i t y , to move towards c o n s tru c tiv e dialogue with America's adversaries, to recognize the s t u p id it y o f ignoring the r e a l i t y o f 800 m ill i o n Chinese, and to recognize the necessity f o r America to come to terms with the p l u r a l i t y and complexity of competing forces and in te r e s ts in the l a t t e r pa rt of the tw e n tie th century. The present a s se rtive and uncompromisingly s e lf- c o n fid e n t nationalism dominant in Washington is y e t to convincingly prove i t s e l f as a v ia b le a lte r n a tiv e to the more so p histicate d global management techniques i m p l i c i t in Nixon's detente approach to in te rn a tio n a l r e la t io n s .

Nixon had to t r y a new approach as the old p o lic ie s , founded on the Truman Doctrine and the knowledge of Soviet s tr a te g ic i n f e r i o r i t y , were p a te n tly no longer achieving US p o lic y goals. By 1969 the American s tr a te g ic p o s itio n had weakened. Vietnam had demonstrated the f o l l y of the Pentagon's b e l ie f in the e ffic a c y of technology and defence expenditure as the means of achieving m i l i t a r y o b je c tiv e s . The US could no longer assume i t had the a b i l i t y to impose i t s w i l l , as a l a s t r e s o r t , by force over any adversary. Indeed i t may be argued th a t the Vietnam experience was e n t i r e l y counter-

productive in t h a t i t encouraged insurgency forces and anti-US i n t e r e s t s in