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The meaning of this stratagem is: intentionally expose a weakness, tempting the enemy to penetrate deeply into our territory. Then we choose an opportune time to cut off his line of supply, leaving him in a completely hopeless position.

Applied to Go, the main idea is: during a fight, you consciously lead the opponent into an area where you have an advantage; actually you are luring the opponent into a place where you have the advantage to do battle.

Basic Figure: Taken from a for-eign tournament. White first played tsuke-shita in the corner, leaving behind some aji, then turned to reducing territory in the center. The current position is unusually difficult to evaluate.

The key is, given White 3, what tactics exist in the corner after all?

This question defies estimation.

Diagram 1: Enclosing territory with Black 4 is most ordinary.

White hanes at 5 and extends to 7 to test Black's response. Rather than finishing out the variation in

the corner, White plays tobi with 9 in the center to limit Black's moyo.

Then he will wait for the right time to further develop tactics [in the corner]. Neither side has much confidence in this continuation, because the outcome will later depend on the way the corner is settled. Black doesn't have time to go back and patch it up, and at the moment White cannot see how much profit he might be able to extract from it. Looking at the course of the game, White should be satisfied he was able to get this far, as he cannot possibly have any more profitable variation.

Figure 1 - Actual Game Conti-nuation: Black's analysis was that White 3 in the Basic Figure was intended to coordinate with the development of tactics in the corner, so he decided to use the stratagem “remove the ladder when the enemy goes upstairs”.

The first step was to lure the op-ponent “upstairs”. After he went “upstairs”, then [Black]

would cut offhis retreat, which was the second step, “removing the ladder”. If he played dully as in Diagram 1, then White

would not possibly “go upstairs”. If we want the opponent to “go upstairs”, first we must build a “ladder”. Capping at Black 4 was the key move, building a ladder for White, luring him into “going upstairs”! With White 5 and so forth, he started climbing the ladder to “go upstairs”.

Black still followed the usual formula in the continuation. After thoroughly luring him to climb up, suddenly Black played atari with the magari of 12, pulling away the “ladder”! By now, White had climbed to the peak of the roof, and had no way to get back down. He certainly knew he had fallen for a trick, but it was too late. With 13 and the follow-ing White risked everythfollow-ing, but it was no use, as Black had a topo-graphical advantage. With Black's strong attack through a series of moves -16, 18, 22, 24, 26, 28 - White could not get out of danger. Finally White was forced into trying to turn to other things with 29, but his loss on the inside was just too great. Black cut at 30, gaining a clear advantage.

In this Figure, White's defeat was due to Black's magari-atari at 12. If he had followed customary procedure, as in Diagram 2 ....

Diagram 2: Extending with Black 12 is the usual way. In this case, White crawls out at 13, which makes a world of difference. Black can only reinforce the corner with 14. White plays atari at 15, then makes a one-space extension with 17. Having " above gives him a definite escape route. He also can utilize roll-up tactics at a. Next he has the means to make life with tsuke-shita at b. Although both sides are in danger this way, in comparison White has various possibilities such as furi-kawari,

sacrifice, etc. On the other hand, if Black cannot kill White, this becomes a losing position, so it is bad for Black.

This leads us to the primary reason White lost the game; White's corner activity was much too early. Starting this activity under the condition that the outside situation was unfavorable for White made it inevitable that Black would launch a fierce attack and destroy him. White's correct play could only be to first handle his capped stone [capped by Black 4 in Figure 1], waiting until after that is settled to look for an opportunity to start some activity in the corner.

Diagram 3: The tobi of White 5 is usual for making shape. Immediately sealing with keima at Black 6 is not steady. With the tsuke of 7 and there-after, White breaks through. The furi-kawari resulting from the cut at White 15 is inevitable. The connection of Black 16 cannot be helped. (If we change this to play at 18, White would cut with atari at 16, and Black is not good.) White destroys Black's right-side moyo on a large scale by capturing one stone with 17 and 19. Black then breaks into White's corner with de at 20. But White's shape here is very elastic. He forcefully blocks at 21. Black does not have any especially severe measures. Black can cut

at 22. Then White 23 and 25 are best. In the variation up to 33, al-though Black gains the corner, White naturally builds up a large territory on the side, as well as reducing Black's moyo. As a result, Black has clearly suffered a loss. (If Black changed 22 to cut at 28, White would play atari at 30. Black extends, White 25, Black 26, and White connects at 22. Black does not gain much, so this is also bad for Black.)

Diagram 4: When White plays tobi

at 5, a Black peep at 6 here is severe. Now on the move White cannot get the same shape as the previous diagram no matter what. If White connects with 7, sealing with Black 8 is severe.

Although we cannot say for certain whether White can make life on the inside, in the final analysis he is fighting in Black's sphere of in-fluence. This looks grim for White.

Diagram 5: The most correct way to play is to first hane at 5, then extend, leaving some aji in the corner, and finally play ogeima at 9. At this point, if Black crawls at 22, White plays kosumi at 11, and Black has no way to attack White.

White will get to play either 11 or 13, so if Black wants to separate White, he has to play tsuke at 10.

Playing this way, Black's aji on the inside is extremely bad. Both sides continue to 22. White can use a and b and other points to make life on the inside or start a

semeai with the three Black stones. We probably cannot calculate all the ensuing variations even given several hours. During the game, if both sides are not willing to give in, we just must rely on the actual play to resolve it. In this sort of situation, the player is hard pressed to judge which side has the advantage. In this game, with neither side having complete confidence, White is virtually forced to play this way. He has no other way out. Perhaps Black still has some room for choice when he plays 10, maybe to avoid this direct confrontation. No matter what, as far as White is concerned, he only has one way to go, gambling the outcome on finding some opportunity in the complications.

Conclusion: To turn a complicated position into a winning position, the cap at Black 4 was the key to success in using the stratagem “remove the ladder after the enemy goes upstairs”. This move lured the opponent to

“go upstairs” by stepping on the “ladder”. After the opponent “went up-stairs”, the “ladder” was taken away, and only then could the opponent be placed on “death row”.

If we play steadily like in Diagram 1, without first setting out the ladder, then the opponent will not, and also cannot “go upstairs”. Then we will not have a clear road to victory.