Matriz comparativa de sistemas y herramientas digitales

When an army is strong in numbers and its generals are intelligent, you cannot go to war against it. The situation demands that you temporarily yield to your enemy. There are many ways to yield to your enemy - but using a beautiful woman to wait upon him, weakening his will to fight, is the most brilliant.

This is a more difficult stratagem to apply to Go.

It seems we can explain it this way: when a situation develops in a game where it is clearly disadvant-ageous to fight to the bitter end, the situation demands that we give way a little. Among all types of profit, letting him capture some stones has the greatest ability to lure him. Let the opponent feel happy and carefree about capturing, and the opponent will not believe

it is a “trap”. Naturally in later fighting he will still be immersed in the rapture of capturing some stones and the strong awareness of an advan-tage. This will affect his normal judgment. Out of nowhere, he will have already fallen into the “trap”.

Basic Figure: Taken from a certain domestic invitational tournament. The current position is very confused. But one look around reveals that Black's shape is all broken up and isolated. It looks like he has dead stones everywhere. His disadvantage is almost obvious. But now it is Black's play. He can still make a big issue out of this situation.

First let's study the life-and-death situation for the big Black group on the right side.

Diagram l: When White ataris at 1, under normal conditions Black should play guzumi at 3. After White 2, Black connects at 5, fighting for his life in a seki shape. But that way, after White has 2 in place, there are six Black stones about to be captured, and that has too great an influence on the outside fight. Black cannot consider this sort of submissive life. Fortunately, White's opportune moment has not yet arrived, so Black can stubbornly play 2 first, starting a ko fight. Here, Black is very elastic. Even if Black plays tenuki with 6, after White connects at 7 Black is still not dead. With Black 8, he can sacrifice the big group above and use the ko threats at a and b. Just imagine that all of Black's stones on the upper side are captured. He still can get some use out of

c. Furthermore, when White tries to kill Black, Black can make quite a few consecutive moves on the outside. Due to this, White cannot yet throw out a move to attack Black.

Diagram 2: The situation in the center is critical. Black has to do something. Tsuke at Black 1 is the only way to save a few stones, but this is not a good way to play.

White plays de at 2 and extends to 4, letting Black connect back.

Then he cuts at 6. White is ex-tremely thick. All Black manages to do is save a few stones.

When White plays osae at 12, the outside becomes White's world.

This is clearly not good for Black.

This is the way for Black to lose.

For positions in which you are currently at a disadvantage, it is hard to turn around the situation with ordinary play.

Figure 1 - Actual Game Continuation: Black considered that Diagram 2 was the only way to save the stones in the center, but that way of playing was not satisfactory. So he had to think about some other route. With the kosumi of Black 1 he first killed his own stones, allowing the opponent to capture them. This sort of gift is what we mean by „the beauty trap“. White could not see any reason not to capture these stones. Since White did not see any secret plots hidden by the stones Black was giving him, he com-menced capturing them with hane at 4. If Black had played 5 at 6, the result would not have been good (see Diagram 3), so he chose to sacrifice the Black stones on the lower side completely, on a large scale. The sequence of Black 5 and so on really startled White. White could not understand how so many stones could be sacrificed. Actually the “large area” sacrifice here was a little too big of a loss.

Figure 2 - Actual Game Continuation: In truth, Black also has made some gains. Black a and b, reducing liberties from the outside, are sente. He is very thick on the outside.

Also, with c, out of nowhere he can make the big group unconditionally alive in sente. Maybe the current position is slightly in White's favor, but White cannot relax even a little.

He must establish a group inside of Black's big camp.

So White has the advantage

because in the final analysis it is easier to make life on the inside than to capture the stones. The key is what degree of life is being made.

Black 25 should have been played at 47 or somewhere around 33 to be safe. But considering playing that way, White did not have any room for choice. He could only play kakari at d. At the moment, Black did not know how to attack so he played a weak move to give his opponent many different choices, as a means of confusing him. At the same time, he instilled a kind of relaxed attitude in the opponent. This tactic also be-longs to “the beauty trap” stratagem.

Tsuke at White 26 was shinogi. Black answered everything in a very stan-dard way. White was completely under the spell of the idea of a superior position. When Black peeped at 33, White did not want to take any risks, so he sought to change direction. This was the first slack move in the game. If this move were changed to connect at 35, there was about a seventy per cent chance of making life. There was no serious danger.

White played sagari at 36 and keima into the corner with 38, and White still had the advantage. The second slack move was hane at 40 to make life in the corner. If this move were played as tsuke above 37 the probability of making life was likely high, but it was already not as high as it would have been if he had connected at 35 with his move 34. From

41 to 47 was probably inevitable. White made life in sente, and still had the advantage.

The last slack move was 48.

Playing this move as double atari at e was bigger. Even if he wanted to block this way, he should have haned at 49 first, a difference of two points. In the game, Black played sagari at 49 in sente and then protected his territory with 51. The position had become extremely close.

From the point where he cap-tured the Black stones on the lower side, White was caught up in a superior air. Because of this, he played softer and softer, until at the end he lost.

Diagram 3: If Black played atari from the outside, his loss would be much smaller. But Black would not be able to gain all the profit he gained after incurring the loss. Connecting at Black 7 fails. White contains him tightly with 8. In the variation from Black 9 to White 24, Black loses the semeai due to a shortage of liberties. He also cannot seal in White, so Black is defeated.

Diagram 4: When Black played kosumi at 1, White actually had a way to avoid Black's deployment of “the beauty trap”. White 2 is the urgent point for shape. Black 3 is the guzumi tesuji! White cannot rescue his two stones. But taking the move with 4 is resourceful. Black can only push out at 5, and White captures two stones with 6. Black cannot connect with

these two stones, as if he does, White will hane at 8 and Black will be in trouble. Therefore, Black had best play 7 and 9. After White wataris at 10, he is eyeing the cutting point at a. If we continue this way, the whole game favors White. This Diagram probably is a little more advantageous than the actual game continuation. But, when you are able to capture so many of your opponent's stones, the majority of Go players would find it hard to choose this diagram and give up the opportunity.

Conclusion: In a complicated, disadvantageous position, Black deployed

“the beauty trap”. He audaciously presented his entire lower side to his opponent. After the opponent captured this big piece, he developed un-realistic judgment, grossly overestimating his advantage. Under the sway of this sort of state of mind, he repeatedly played slack moves that bore no relation to the position. After a few campaign circuits, Black brilliantly won the victory.

In the situation in this game, if Black had not used "the beauty trap”

strategy to confuse his opponent's normal train of thought, it would have been very difficult for him to have won in the end.