In the previous section I chose the path dependent approach as an adequate theoretical framework to conceptualise democratic divergence. This is because it helps to track the performance of different regimes throughout the period studied which in turn, will be used to explain in a comparative fashion the different democratic trajectories that Colombia and Venezuela followed during the ‘divergence period.’ However, Schedler’s conceptualisation is still too broad to be applied to the Latin American context. The aim of this section is to re-construct this framework so it can be used to explain the heterogeneous democratic performance that characterises this region since
the end of the 1990s. 80
Such heterogeneity can be evidenced when in some countries, for instance, civil society became aware and involved on political matters. These practices can be regarded as new set of values people have implemented in order to strength democracy. On this regard, Isbester (2010a) argues that ‘civil society is becoming more robust and organised, [most of the] elected governments are reforming their states to improve the calibre of state institutions and democratic governance, and also their ‘Human Rights violations have diminished substantially’ (ibid.: xii). However, there is also evidence stressing that democracy is still fragile in other set of countries in the region and although some countries have not fallen, many have been shaken;
and some are even regressing.81 There is a rather broad consensus among Latin
Americanists: Buxton (2001, 2005), Ellner (2008), and Hausmann, et. al., (2014), among others, in identifying that the problems of poverty, social exclusion, and
80 As an example of such heterogeneity, it can be said that in 1977, only Colombia, Venezuela, and
Costa Rica had democratically elected governments. In 1978, after the withdrawal of its military, Ecuador wrote a democratic constitution and a year later held presidential elections. In the same year, the Peruvian military held elections for a legislative assembly and, in 1980, a democratic elected president took power. In 1983, Argentina elected a civilian assembly and president. In 1984, after a negotiated transition, Uruguay elected a president. In 1985, Brazil elected civilian presidents. In 1989, Chile and Paraguay both elected civilians presidents. In 1990, a civilian government took over in Panama. In 2000, Mexico elected its first president in 70 years who was not from the long-ruling Institutional Revolutionary party (PRI). And, in 2001, Peru’s backsliding into authoritarianism was halted and a civilian president was elected again (Isbester 2010c, 55).
81 The cases showing some levels of regression during the last decade are Ecuador, Bolivia, Venezuela,
inequality are the causes explaining the democratic reversions on the latter set of cases, and they claim that these issues should be addressed in order to avoid further democratic regressions. In sum, as Isbester (2010a) stresses, ‘inequality and poorly structured relations of power have produced a weak state and a minimal electoral democracy in some Latin American countries’ (ibid.: xiii).
Apart from this evidence, which has shown the heterogeneous levels of democratic performance that countries in the region have achieved, it is important to study the same issue from a conceptual perspective. Previously I introduced, both in the introduction and in chapter three, the definition of democracy as liberal democracy that this research will follow, which corresponds to the definition put forward by
Robert Dahl.82 Relating this definition to Schedler’s (1998b) path-dependence
framework, then, it is possible to claim that today most Latin American countries are located around the middle segments of Schedler´s democracy line classification (see figure 4.1). However, the time it took for each one of these countries to reach its classification was not the same. Some countries reached higher levels of democratisation than others as they met most of Dahl’s criteria; whereas others only met these criteria partially. Hence, the difference in achieving different democratic performances can be attributed to the type of elite pacts celebrated among the Latin
American regimes.83
Paradoxically, reaching the transition towards democracy by settlements among elites brought problems of different magnitude and intensity. This did not allow the process of consolidation to be complete. Three issues can be enumerated as the causes of this phenomenon. First, most of the countries in the region completely ignored the role civil society could have played when these settlements were signed, because they
82 As was previously outlined, according to Dahl a polyarchy can be considered as fully democratic
when it meets the following seven criteria: 1) elected officials; 2) free and fair elections; 3) inclusive suffrage; 4) the right to run for office; 5) freedom of expression; 6) alternative information; and 7) associational autonomy (Dahl 1989, 221). That is why this project argues that inasmuch as a regime fulfil most or all of these criteria, it will be closer to the definition of liberal democracy proposed by Schedler (1998a); whilst if it does not fulfil neither or just a few set of these criteria the regime will be closer to Schedler´s notions of electoral and/or authoritarian regimes.
83 Although all the countries in the region reached their transition towards democracy by elite
settlements, except for Argentina and Ecuador, only three countries in the region could both made their transitions and, at the same time, maintain their democracies alive (without regressions) and in good shape until mid-1990s thanks to settlements made by political elites. Those countries were: Colombia in 1957-58, Venezuela in 1958, and Costa Rica in 1948. However, Venezuela during the last decade has shown, as will be discussed in the next section, some signs of democratic regression.
denied them the opportunity to participate in the process of establishing the new democratic regimes. Consequently, Silva (2004) stresses, ‘under the elite pact, civil society organisations become weakened, marginalised, fragmented, disillusioned, exhausted and ultimately depoliticised’ (ibid.: 145). This lack of civil participation became a challenge for the consolidation of democracy because it led to the rise of hegemonic political parties, which, in turn, neglected minorities’ legitimate right to participate in the electoral process during the ‘transitional period.’
Second, the amnesty granted to the military during the transition process left the public with a taste of inconformity against democracy as citizens weren´t treated as equals before the law which essentially led to a generalised dissatisfaction with this type of
regime.84 Thus, civil society’s inability to bring the military to justice was a deep
disappointment which resulted in the difficulty in implementing a comprehensive process of democratisation in the region. As a result, the nations that enacted constitutional laws to grant military forgiveness –i.e. Chile, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, among others- required that those authoritarian legacies were removed from their constitutions as a necessary step to improve their democratic performance. A third problem that elite pacts brought during the transition process was to engage in economics for the benefit of special interest groups, that is, clientelistic relations, deep bureaucracy, and patronage (Buxton 2005). These were transmitted into the democratic structures as non-democratic practices. Isbester argues that these practices, ‘operate with and through democracy’s procedures, institutionalising themselves and weakening democracy in the process’ (Isbester 2010c, 60). Furthermore, a problem caused by the institutionalisation of bad practices is that elites may use the conventional democratic procedures in conjunction with these informal practices in order to perpetuate their own bases in power.
Because of these problems, Latin American countries since the beginning of the ‘divergence period’ –in greater or lesser extent- have been experiencing cultural and institutional changes which led them to reach different levels of democratic
84 In fact, in countries such as El Salvador in 1993, Chile in 1978, and Argentina in 1987 the military,
through a high level negotiation process with political elites, were able to bargain the end of their authoritarian regimes by writing certain authoritarian rules into the new constitutional democracies. These ‘rules’ allowed them to avoid being brought to justice and be judged for human right abuses (Schedler 1997).
performance. In fact, some polities have experienced positive notions of democratic
progress,85 while other polities have experienced some kind of democratic regression
weakening their democratic performances, but without reaching levels of authoritarian regimes, that is, to the lower level of Schedler’s classification of democratic definitions (see figure 4.1).86
In short, it seems that the uneven implementation of fundamental political rights, civil
liberties, and democratic procedures during the ‘transitional period’resulted in some
form of divergent process in the region´s democratic performance. Based on these premises, the issue of whether a democracy has been consolidated in the region is unquestionably important. Therefore, I claim that it is important to identify the type of democracy a country has achieved by the end of the ‘transitional period’, because departing from this point it can be possible to identify and understand the various causes that explain the heterogeneous democratic performance experienced by the countries in the region.
To succeed in this endeavour and root it into the Latin American context, it is necessary, first, to re-construct Schedler´s model presented in figure 4.1. Unlike Schedler’s model which considers ‘advanced democracies’ as the highest and purest level of democratic performance, I will consider ‘liberal democracies’ as the highest level to which a Latin American country might aspire in order to achieve full consolidation (see Figure 4.5). In other words, in this project I claim that if a Latin American country reaches an ideal combination of civil liberties and democratic procedures for every citizen, then, such country can be considered a liberal democracy, and therefore consolidated.
The following two reasons support this methodological assumption. First, ‘liberal democracies’ is perfectly aligned with the definition of democracy this project has proposed, and second, the definition is a more realistic goal if compared that of
85 That is, they are located close to Schedler´s middle notions of democratic performance (i.e.: either as
‘minimal/electoral democracies’ or ‘liberal democracies’).
86 As instances of democratic regressions in the region it is possible to find cases such as those of Peru
that suffered a temporary reversal of democracy in 1992-2001. Venezuela that had two attempted coups: one led by Hugo Chávez in 1992, and the other one against him in 2002. Paraguay attempted two coups in 1996 and 2000. Between 1997 and 2006, Bolivia had four governments. Whereas Argentina went through five governments in two weeks in 2001 as it struggled with its economic crisis. And finally, Ecuador’s populace drove four presidents from power between 1997 and 2006 (Isbester 2010c, 61).
‘advanced democracies’ which is considered more idealistic and much more difficult to attain by developing countries (Doorenspleet 2001). Therefore, Schedler´s original model will be re–constructed into the three types of democratic regimes shown in figure 4.5.
Figure 10.5.
Reinterpretation of Schedler’s model used in this research to study the process of democratic divergence
This reformulated model will serve to answer the following questions. What type of democracies do Latin American countries have? Are they close or far away from full consolidation? The answer to these questions may be contradictory when it is studied from a conceptual perspective. For instance, it is possible to claim that most Latin American countries are very close to full consolidation, if we can agree with Peeler’s definition which stresses that, ‘once a democratised regime has had at least two changes of power from the ruling party to an opposition party without the threat of military intervention, foreign meddling, or generalised non-cooperation of the elite, it can be said that this democracy has been consolidated’ (Peeler 2004, 93).
However, if we agree with a more comprehensive and challenging definition such as that of Linz and Stepan which state that a country can be regarded as consolidated when ‘it is able to defend itself against threats, while deterring regimen breakdown, erosion of democratic principles and procedures, and ideally working toward an improved democracy’ (Linz, et. al, 1996, 15), then the answer to the previous questions may not be straightforward. Most Latin American countries have free, fair, contested, and regular elections with mass participation but at the same time they lack some of the fundamental civil liberties that only the rule of law can protect.
Under the latter definition, then, this project claims that the type of democracy most of these countries currently have achieved corresponds to the type of ‘electoral democracy’ according to the reformulated version of Schedler´s model offered in figure 4.5. This definition is closer to Wiarda and Kline’s perception as they stated that ‘75 per cent of the democracies in Latin America have consolidated illiberal, or
Authoritarian regime Liberal democracy Minimal/Elector al democracy
minimum, or electoral democracies.87[By 2006,] only Chile, Argentina, Brazil,
Uruguay, and Costa Rica have liberal democracies with both civil liberties and
political rights’ (Wiarda and Kline 2007, 85).88 This leftist trend shows that Latin
America itself is neither a coherent region nor a proper and comprehensive unit of political analysis when it concerns its democratic performance. The consequence of such heterogeneity makes the analysis and understanding of democratic performance a challenge. Hence, to study the process of democratic performance in the region it is necessary to examine each country individually in order to identify the determinants that explain how far, or close, these countries are from consolidating their democracies. The next section will deal with this task by focusing on the specific cases of Colombia and Venezuela.