The SADC mandated military intervention in Lesotho, just like that of the DRC, is replete with controversy. The main area of contention is the extent to which this process could have been regarded as legitimate under international law. It was said to have been done in conformity with the regulatory instruments for intervention.
The background to the problem in Lesotho emanated from elections that had been marred by controversies which led to political tensions rising to threaten constitutional authority. After the disintegration of the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in 1997, some of the political outfits that emerged integrated to form the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) which was to win elections a year later (Pherudi, 2003). Although the LCD won with a resounding victory; occupying seventy-nine out of eighty parliamentary seats, Southall and Fox (1999) contend that opposition parties disputed the validity of the results. Both the government and opposition parties courted neighbouring South Africa to mediate in the political crisis with
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the then South African Deputy-President, Thabo Mbeki, subsequently constituting an auditing team from Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe led by South African High Court Judge, Justice Pius Langa (Santo, 1999).
Likoti (2006) notes that although there was notable credibility and transparency in the way the inquiry was carried out, what could have triggered tensions between the disputing parties was the way the report was made public. Instead of it being unveiled to the public in Lesotho the report was presented to the SADC Summit in Mauritius (13-14 September 1998) as allegations of its manipulation emerged. The most controversial statement of the report was made by Mbeki when he indicated to the contending political parties that “95% of elections were not free and fair, due to serious discrepancies” thus making them highly compromised (Likoti, 2006). The handling of the report put to question the credibility of the intentions of the SADC Troika with allegations that it had connived with the LCD party to manipulate the findings of the Langa Report in a bid to assure the party remained in power (Matlosa, 1999).
According to Molomo (1999), the ‘disputed’ election results and the mishandling of the findings of the Langa Report, were all viewed as a deliberate attempt to side-line the concerns of opposition political parties. This cumulatively triggered political turmoil culminating in a mutiny within the rank and file of the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) to deepen the crisis. This prompted the Prime Minister of Lesotho to request some prominent Heads of State within SADC members, namely Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe, for military intervention in Lesotho to restore law and order in the country (Likoti, 2006:163).
Immediately thereafter, on 22 September 1998, barely a month after South Africa had declined to deploy an intervention force in the DRC at the request of Laurent Kabila’s government, a contingent of the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) was deployed into Lesotho as a response to a direct request made by Prime Minister Mosisili’s government to the SADC Chair, Nelson Mandela the then South African President (Likoti, 2006).
The above coincidence in the pattern of events leading to decisions for military intervention is striking as military intervention into the DRC was done at a time when President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe was Chair to the SADC Organ, which then had the responsibility to oversee issues of regional peace and security while that of Lesotho came at a time when President Mandela of South Africa was Chair of the SADC Summit (Likoti, 2007). Questions that arise are: could South Africa’s involvement have been a result of trying to spruce up her
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image after having been humiliated by the Organ’s decision to intervene in the DRC without seeking approval from SADC summit that South Africa chaired at that time? Was it a result of the preponderance of state-centric interests on the part of both chairs of the two SADC institutions? Was it an acknowledgement by South Africa and Botswana of the exigency for military intervention in support of a humanitarian cause? Could it have been some form of power projection by post-apartheid South Africa to register her pedigree though targeted at a weaker state she regarded as her proxy that she could willingly interfere in her internal affairs? These questions by analysts such as Likoti (2007), Molomo (1999) and de Coning (2003) seek to illustrate that there is lack of clarity on the extent to which collective security interests could be regarded as having been the main driving force for military intervention initiatives in the sub-region.
The other dimension taken by analysts was in seeking to test the legality of the South African led military intervention in Lesotho. Using the international norms on military interventions the argument raised is that the intervention was not made on humanitarian grounds. In the view of de Coning (2003), there were no people in danger prior to the intervention in as much as there were no intentions to prevent a catastrophe. To this end, the intervention in Lesotho could be regarded as consistent with the realist imperatives of state-centric interests. The highly preferred legal argument by Likoti (2006) points to the fact that the intervention was inconsistent with the principle of sovereign equality of all member states. As a result, such an intervention tended to portray lack of respect to articulated Article 4 (a) of the SADC Treaty.
Another legal argument used by just war theorists assumes that the legality of South Africa’s intervention was doubtful since it was at the invitation of the Prime Minister as the Head of Government and not the King as the Head of State who, in line with the country’s Constitution, had the jurisdiction to request such action. Further to this argument is that the intervention was carried out at a time when the business of SADC’s Organ for Politics Defence and Security was regarded in some quarters as under suspension due to the differences between its Chair (Zimbabwe) and that of SADC (South Africa). As such, SADC was regarded as lacking an official document that regulated interventions apart from the 28 June 1996 Gaborone Communiqué relating to the OPDS protocol that was yet to be approved by the Summit (Likoti, 2007). The intervening force was predominantly South African with 3000 troops compared to Botswana’s 130 troops, thus not reflective of a multinational force (Likoti, 2006).
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Another argument used is that the interveners failed to synchronise the processes for intervention with the AU and UN as stipulated by the SADC Treaty and Chapter VIII of the UN Charter (de Coning, 1998). There are similarities based on this argument with the one raised in the case of the military intervention in the DRC. The result was perceived negatively on why South Africa intervened with Likoti (2006) raising arguments that this was mainly in pursuit of its self-interests.
In trying to identify the motives for intervention, Likoti (2007) argues that South Africa’s intervention was intended to secure the Lesotho Highlands Dam Project which to them was of strategic importance to South Africa’s economy and national security. The other flaw to the intervention was that the interveners should have directed their efforts against mutinous soldiers in Maseru to prevent the unrest from spiralling and to save the seat of government rather than heading first to Katse Dam, where South Africa had significant strategic economic interests. Katse Dam is a joint Lesotho/South African Highlands Water Project (HWP) where South Africa is the major share holder and that provides the country with water resources in the industrial hub of Gauteng province (Matlosa, 1999). This is quite clear that state-centric interests usually take precedence over collective interests.
Coplan (2001) and Likoti (2007) argue that, the South African government envisaged boosting its diminishing image in the sub-region by projecting themselves as contending decision makers through the invasion of Lesotho. In addition, as Likoti (2006) argues, South Africa felt that the country’s security could have fallen under threat if the resource was withdrawn for the livelihood of her citizens. Coplan (2001) argues that for South Africa to wait for a marathon of roundtable meetings in seeking regional, continental and international approval for intervening in Lesotho would seem irrational given the political discontent that was happening in a state found within its borders. It is in this context that South Africa perceived the conflict in Lesotho as a major threat to its security. Still in this context, Molomo (1999) adds that what was more worrying is that the mutineers within the Lesotho Defence Forces (LDF) had arrested their commander and with the absence of an authoritative government to enforce law and order, there were fears, especially from the South African side, that the scenario was bound to explode into anarchy.
The above situation can be translated to mean that there was a void of authoritative power compelling people to perform their constitutional obligations, hence South Africa saw the need to initiate military force to compel the warring parties to come back to the negotiating
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table which they had deserted, leading to the Prime Minister to appeal for military aid from SADC (Coplan, 2001). In relation to regional and collective security, Waltz (2004) has observed that states tend to be more concerned about national security than regional security interests. Hence, South Africa responded through military intervention following fears that the levels of insecurity for her neighbour would eventually spiral out of control to affect its own internal security situation, in addition to the fear that its economic interests were also under threat (Molomo, 1999). Therefore, it had to engage in some form of immediate remedial action of a military expedition into Lesotho (Likoti, 2007).
Another perspective is that South Africa did not feel obliged to seek approval from the SADC Summit or AU in intervening in the Lesotho intra-state crisis on the pretext that she regarded herself as the ‘legal guardian’ when it came to Lesotho’s internal affairs (Likoti, 2006).
Consequently, she had to transcend the stipulated procedural act in relation to AU, SADC and UN in making a unilateral decision in supporting a country that was besieged by disgruntled citizens (Matlosa, 1999; Molomo, 1999). Moreover, Lesotho was a special case for intervention for South Africa in that it housed the former’s interests which deserved its protection under any circumstance. However, Likoti (2007) suggests that, in contrast, South Africa had interests in Burundi and Ivory Coast, but it had intervened diplomatically in the conflicts resulting in them settling for peaceful resolutions. It never used force as it did in Lesotho, which a deontological ethical point of view would suggest that the righteousness of her actions for instituting military intervention in that country could be regarded as flawed.
It is also worth noting that the two interveners appear to have had different perceptions on the supposed SADC mission as they differed in the interpretation of their mission and its source of legitimacy (Africa and Molomo, 2013; Likoti, 2007; Matlosa, 1999; Molomo, 1999;
Pherudi, 2003). The use of white flag by Botswana which intervened well after South Africa had already done so was illustrative of the fact that the former had understood her task as that of peacekeeping more than peace enforcement (Likoti, 2007). The contradictions were further compounded by the absence of a civilian leadership role which is synonymous with peacekeeping operations. This bore heavily on the nature of the intervention as it ended up being seen purely as peace enforcement rather than a peace keeping exercise (Williams, 2001; Likoti, 2007).
Taylor and Williams (2001) are of the view that South Africa’s actions were cosmetic in that it tended to paint a picture of being a regional peacemaker within the continent rather than an
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‘errant’ ‘big-brother’. In addition, South Africa gave an impression that in conflict situations where she did not share borders with the affected country, she would be unwilling to engage in intra-state military interventions initiatives but to influence foreign policies of the SADC Member States and the continent at large. It is for this reason that Likoti (2007) would make an assumption that explains the differences between Luanda, Windhoek and Harare on one hand and Pretoria on the other hand. Pretoria was accused of being hypocritical in relation to seeking an immediate deployment of troops in Lesotho whose crisis was still in its infancy while turning a blind eye to a fully blown crisis in the DRC that was in dire need of external assistance. This was despite the fact that SADC had earlier on approved, through the Organ in 1996, for a similar undertaking to be implemented against UNITA to which South Africa did not respond (Mills, 2009). Thus, Ngoma (2004) observes that the failure of South Africa to undertake collective military action against UNITA after having reached consensus to do so, exposed SADC to being accused of hypocritical and having a total display of double standards which were ethically inimical to collective security interests.
According to Likoti (2006) South Africa’s intervention in Lesotho was also shrouded in controversy as it reflected a hypocritical attitude following her denial to intervene in the DRC barely a month earlier. These assertions are compounded by the fact that South Africa did not take a lead role as she had in the Lesotho crisis in persuading other SADC member states to come to the assistance of Angola when its government requested military assistance from the sub-region following the resumption of its civil war (Solomon and Mgqibisa, 1999). This came barely a few weeks after South Africa had led a military expedition in Lesotho (Likoti, 2007). The civil war only ended with the elimination of Jonas Savimbi in 2002, but it must be noted that this was done without any SADC assistance as had been applied in the DRC and Lesotho (Amupanda (2012; Mills, 2009).
Perhaps the above situation could be attributable to what this thesis may regard as diminished levels of self interest which relate to the consideration by a state of the probable cost benefits that are likely to arise through actions of intervention. This means the slimmer the chances of benefitting are, the lower becomes the interest in intervention (Hobbes, 2004). This view is usually presented in support of the assertion that apartheid South Africa’s decision to end her direct flirtation with the Angolan civil war was a result of having suffered heavy casualties at the Cuito Cuanavale in 1987-88 thus leading to public discontent (Malaquias, 2007; Mills, 2009; Solomon and Mgqibisa, 1999).
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