In the quest of understanding the impasse dogging the OPDS, Nathan (2004) suggests it is imperative to try to differentiate between the internal and external logic of a regional bloc as a separate constituent of correlations. Nathan (2004) further describes the external logic concept as encompassing a set of visions and mission statements that steer the organisation into a beneficial venture in the eyes of member states. Member states are thus supposed to be convinced that through regional institutions, their interests will be served and problems attended to via collective cooperation and coordination of goals which by nature differ with each organisation. Therefore, in relation to SADC, its external logic is driven by its transcendence objectives of regional cooperation and coordination in the context of economic and social development and peace and stability. It is, however, unfortunate that the objectives of SADC’s external logic have always been viewed, misinterpreted and thus, translated at individual, bilateral or tripartite levels by some Member States. This has resulted in the ineffective implementation of SADC’s logic of collectivism in attending to regional problems and pursuing regional goals, in particular conflict resolutions and peace-building initiatives.
In describing the internal logic of a regional entity, Nathan (2004) relates this to the uniformity expected to be embedded therein where member states’ domestic and foreign policies should not collide but rather consolidate SADC’s principles of collectivism. This should then motivate states in indulging in close political and security cooperation. The internal logic is, however, not absolute as it leaves members with an option not to religiously
82
adhere to common goals and values which appear to be usurping their sovereign decision-making. As can be related to SADC, and in particular understanding why the organisation has had a turbulent journey in its history of conflict resolution and peace-making, the internal logic concept therefore reflects member states as perennially encountering serious sentimental differences, which normally result in sharp policy shifts that are detrimental to effective coordination of sub-regional security issues. This, in most cases, has resulted in member states making unilateral decisions that are not in sync with the principles of the organisation (Cremona, 2001).
In comparison, Cremona (2001) argues that the European Union (EU) is a better illustration of the necesisty of the internal logic and the notion that uniform objectives and values are the hallmark and not a remnant of institutionalised political and security operations. Article 6 (i) of the Treaty of EU stipulates that “The Union is founded on the principle of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and rule of law, principles which are common to Member States”. Mathisen (2010) further adds that the EU Treaty is a legally binding instrument compelling its Member States to adhere to the provisions of its statutes which according to Cremona (2001) are binding rules with supranational authority on various issues. To be a member of the EU therefore, the
“….Treaty on the European Union states that any European country may apply for membership if it respects the democratic values of the EU and is committed to promoting them. The first step is for the country to meet the key criteria for accession” (https://europa.eu/european-union/topics/foreign-security-policy_en)
In contrast to the above assertion, the criteria by which the DRC satisfied the admission requirements into SADC in 1997 was questionable in that it was not clearly spelt out in the SADC Summit’s communiqué whether or not the DRC’s admission was in accordance with the principles of democracy which were a prerequisite for admittance to this institution (Moorcraft, 2011; Nathan, 2004; Nzongola; 2002; Rupiyah, 2002). Hence there are suggestions that there were inconsistencies relating to the failure to fulfil principles of democracy inherent to the SADC Treaty. As Rupiyah, (2002) contends, the fact that Laurent Kabila had declared himself head of state on 17 May 1997 without an electoral mandate and renaming the country from Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo laid sufficient grounds for such criticism. Initially, President Mugabe is reported to have been unwilling to accommodate Kabila due to his playboy background, which, as observed by Moorcraft
83
(2011) did not please the austere Zimbabwean leader. This observation disputes the view held by Rupiah (2002) and others that tends to portray President Mugabe as having vested personal interests in supporting Kabila’s admission into SADC. Moorcraft (2011) also asserts that Kabila had once been despised by one of the leading world revolutionary icons, Che Guevara, with whom he had spent time together in the early 1960s, at the height of the first Congo crisis. Che’s opposition to Kabila was that he did not match his Maoism revolutionary rhetoric as shown by his penchant for night clubs and brothels.
Intriguingly, South Africa was at the forefront in pushing for the DRC’s inclusion into SADC. The rationale behind this was that Pretoria anticipated having better influence and control over Kabila from inside SADC rather than from outside (Taylor and Williams, 2001;
Landsberg, 2002; Landber & Baregu (eds) 2002). As Landsberg (2002) observes, Pretoria even offered Kabila some post-conflict reconstruction aid in exchange for Kabila toeing the democratisation line. By this time, Pretoria had made the extension of democracy a central pivot to its foreign policy on Africa (Lanberg & Baregu (eds.), 2002). In a way, the DRC’s entry into the SADC was squarely in furtherance of South Africa’s economic interests (Landsberg, 2002; Nathan, 2004).
Accordingly, this portrayed a level of personal antagonism between the two, probably as Mandela who was coming in as the ‘new kid on the block’ and full of ‘Western oriented democratic zeal’, was on a mission to help democratise the region (Nkiwane, 1999; Rupiyah, 2002). This of course, would displace President Mugabe from the lead role of presiding over the SADC portfolio on defence and security due to his ‘anti-democratic’ and ‘radical’ stance on security issues. Using the principle of seniority this portfolio to lead the SADC OPDS had been handed over to President Mugabe by President Dos Santos of Angola, on citing pressing demands at handling the civil war in his country. Mandela who had assumed the chair of the SADC summit wanted both portfolios under his ambit (Landsberg, 2002).
The other areas of contention between Presidents Mugabe and Mandela stemmed from South Africa’s foot–dragging in renewing the preferential trade agreement between itself and Zimbabwe shortly after Mandela had assumed power (Bagura, 1999). At some stage, the Zimbabwean business community went as far as to accuse South Africa of intentionally seeking to strangle Zimbabwe’s economy by de-industrialising it (Ngoma, 2004). In addition, Harare felt that it was pushed out of Mozambique by South Africa which immediately took advantage of the prevailing peace and stability in Mozambique (Bagura, 1999, Rupiyah,
84
2002; Amupanda, 2012). However, it was Zimbabwe that had immensely helped in bringing about that peace and stability in this former war-torn Portuguese colony. It is with this in mind that Landsberg (2002) comes to the conclusion that by continuing to support the interests of those who were in control of South Africa’s economy, mainly the white minority led multinational corporations, the post-apartheid South African leadership was seen by their Zimbabwean counterparts as mere ‘stooges’ bent on enhancing the economic interests of white minority ‘ruffians’ (Amupanda, 2012).
The economic tensions were also extended to beyond the SADC region as Kenya expressed its concerns over South African protectionist policies which denied the East African country access to the South African market despite having allowed it to penetrate her market (Landsberg, 2002). It is for these reasons that South Africa ended up being seen by some members in the sub-region and beyond as a ‘bully’ in economic, political, diplomatic and military terms ( Nathan, 2005; Adebajo & Landsberg 2003). Due to these underlying tensions between Zimbabwe and South Africa, whenever President Mugabe criticised President Mandela’s leadership the South Africans would counter such views by accusing President Mugabe’s rule as ‘dictatorial’ (Boshof, and Rupiya, (2003). The fact that when Mugabe expressed his dissatisfaction with South Africa’s intransigence, the response would be to earn himself the label of a dictator, in itself a sign where both sides appeared to be averse to criticism, thus worsening the relations between the two leaders. Thus, the presence of personality differences, ideological divergence, and dissimilar ontological perspectives arise, as raised in the sections above.
It is worth noting that South Africa’s interest in the DRC predated the ascendency of Kabila into power and for that reason Mandela’s interest was merely a continuation or furtherance of these apartheid era imperial interests (Landsberg, 2007). For instance, Anglo American/Debeers had historically had a major stake in that country during Mobutu’s rule.
Landsberg, (2002) further asserts that other South African conglomerates that had interests in Zaire included SASOL, Eskom, and Gencor. Due to these interests, the post-apartheid leadership in South Africa decided to launch a diplomatic initiative of ending the DRC war that ousted Mobutu from power (Amupanda, 2012). Mandela met Kabila and Mobutu on several occasions with a view to broker a cease fire through democratic means, some of which were held aboard a naval warship, Outeniqua, in the international waters off the Pointe Noire, Congo Brazzaville (Landsberg, 2002). Pretoria’s limited ‘democratic’ leverage began
85
to reveal itself with her strategy to offer Mobutu a face-saving exit which Kabila rejected (Amupanda, 2012). At the same time South Africa, through various democratic initiatives, tried to push Kabila to come to terms with other opposition groups, a position which Kabila vehemently rejected as he seemed determined to gain the Congolese presidency for himself by insisting that Mobutu resign unconditionally (Landsberg & Baregu, 2002). A second attempt by Mandela to mediate on board the warship failed to materialise as Kabila did not show up for the meeting (Phathela, Nov 2001; Amupanda, 2012). This episode was to set a harbinger of bad relations in future interactions by the two countries.
When Kabila finally came to power, the United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan and the US government gave cautious welcome to his abrupt ascendancy to power by encouraging him to oversee a transitional process to democracy. The OAU also welcomed his victory (Phathela, Nov 2001). Despite these contestations and inconsistencies inherent to the DRC’s eligibility for inclusion in the SADC, it was finally admitted through South Africa’s
‘blessings’ which was by then, chairing the summit. This indicated that Mandela (motivated by national interests of course) had reviewed developments in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), formerly Zaire, and had:
“expressed optimism that efforts of the Government to usher in a new era of political stability in the economic reconstruction would be successful. The Summit agreed that DRC has major strategic significance to the region because the country shares borders with several SADC countries and has great potential to cooperate with SADC in key sectors such as Energy, Water, Tourism, Transport and Communications”. (SADC communiqué, 1996:p.2 )
It is against this background in relation to the external logic, to which Nathan (2014) argues that Kinshasa was accorded SADC membership and subsequently plunged the regional entity into crisis. No sooner had Kabila been admitted into the club of Southern African nations than he began to accuse South Africa of arrogantly trying to promote democracy in his country through a “Pax-Pretorian’ axis (Natan, 2014; Turner, 2002). This was at a time when South Africa had made this issue its flagship (Turner, 2002; Landberg, 2002).