CÉLULAS ESTAMINALES HUMANAS: CONSIDERACIONES BIOÉTICAS SOBRE

Other theorists give accounts of what it is for N to be acting in doing things in which, seemingly, they accept the idea that things do things, since they often refer to what N’s body is doing, though they avoid mention of what N is doing. I don’t know whether the preference for body talk is thereason for the neglect of agent talk, or if, rather, some doubts about the permissibility or usefulness of speaking of N asdoing things in an account of what it is for N to beacting in doing them leaves these theorists with N’s body as the only eligible-seeming subject on which to pin the things that, after all, seem to happen when subjects act.11

This approach to action is not always explicitly stated, and some theorists seem to vacillate on the matter. But there are clear and prominent instances. One is Danto’s declaration that “an action [is] a movement of the body plus x,

11_{I can think of other rationales for this kind of proposal, but none is very complete or} very good. I offer some here: Perhaps the idea is that a focus on the activities of bodies makes room for a certain kind of conjunctive analysis, discussed by Ford (2011), which would otherwise seem impossible: Saying that N acts in Aing just in case N’s body moves plus p can seem more plausible than saying that N acts in Aing just in case N is Aing plus p, since there are some things a subject can’t help but act in doing (reading silently, or buying a house), so that there seems to be no room for a separately describable condition fit to make these into actions. By focusing on N’s body, we may hold out hope for such an analysis, since there’s quite certainly nothing a body can do which on its ownguaranteesthat someone is acting in doing anything. (See footnote 13 for hints on why this motivation is problematic.) Another possible motivation lies in the vague thought that an action mustbeginsomewhere, and that that somewhere must be in the agent’s body, which I don’t think is a good thought. (We’ll get back to issues about basic action in chapter 4.2.) Still another apparent reason for preferring bodies is a commitment to a form of “causalism” on which causation can only have effects that are bodily movements, and not, for example, instances of waiting. (But it is not clear why a form of causalism which requires that should itself command adoption.)

[...] and the problem [...] is to solve in some philosophically respectable way for x” (Danto, 1981, p. 5). Searle has offered the beginnings of an account of action on which a “successfully performed intentional action characteristically consists [in part in a] bodily movement or state of the agent” (Searle, 1980, p. 47), and does not say much to discourage the impression that he thinks every intentional action consists in a body’s movements. Finally, Michael Smith (2012, p. 387) is a proponent of what he thinks of as the popular thesis that for N to be acting in Aing is for N’s body to be doing something, and for further conditions to apply, as he endorses what he unquestioningly calls “[t]he standard story’s answer [to the question of what acting is]”, which “is that the difference lies in the causal etiology of what happens when a body moves” (Smith, 2012, p. 387). And though I take Smith to represent a larger movement, I will focus on his writings on the topic, as he is an especially clear and steadfast proponent of the present kind of account.

Interestingly, Smith does not only say that for N to be acting in Aing is a matter of N’s body doing something. He also restricts the bodily happenings fit to constitute N’s actions to movements. This restriction is, I think, a natural response to a difficulty which the present kind of theory faces. But it brings in difficulties of its own. After a theory like Smith’s is revised so as to avoid both kinds of difficulty, I think it will be fairly apparent what is really wrong with his kind of theory.

To see the temptation of introducing a restriction to movement, start by noting that if we tried to make up a theory saying “for N to be acting in Aing is a matter of N’s bodyAingand ...”, then we would have a theory which said that for N to be acting in doing N’s taxes is, among other things, for N’s body to be doing N’s taxes. The problem with saying this is not that it is linguistically alien and unpalatable to common sense. The problem is that as long as we

regard N’s body as a subject in its own right, separate from N, this claim does not seem capable of meaning something that might be true.12 _{(Obviously my}

objection does not go through if the opposing side identifies N’s body as just N — the subject acting in doing the taxes, in this case. But that would mean reverting to the different kind of theory which says that for N to be acting in Aing is a matter of N Aing.)

If we don’t want to end up with such disappointments again, we must note that there are only so many things it makes sense to say a body is doing. Bodies, considered as separate from acting subjects, can move, or be still, or sweat, or fall, or burn, and a number of other things, but not do taxes or try to take revenge. Taken on its own, this observation does not require a theorist like Smith to say that a body needs tomove in action, but such a restriction can seem natural, since (a) perhaps it it is thought to provide some informative contribution to an analysis of what acting is, and (b) movement seems to include very much of what a body can do, and because (c) bodies do seem to move quite often when subjects are acting in doing things.13

There is a straightforward objection to Smith’s restriction to bodily move- ment, but it seems possible to adjust Smith’s kind of theory to accommodate the restriction. The objection is that someone can act in playing dead, which doesn’t seem to involve movement, so that an account which tries to under- stand action through the notion of a bodily movement must fail.14 _Smith’s

12_{It does mean something that might be true to say that a body is falling or sliding — the} point is not intended to apply for all possible things a subject can be acting in doing.

13_{This kind of theory ignores the complaint that in trying to circumscribe agency, “it will} be a mistake to look forthefundamental description of what occurs — such as movements of muscles or molecules — and then think of intention as something, perhaps very complicated, which qualifies this” (Anscombe, 1963, p. 29). Though I am sympathetic to this conclusion, it is very difficult to make out Anscombe’s argument for it. Some of what I say below is, however, provoked by some of what Anscombe says in that argument.

14_{Hornsby (2004, p. 5) makes essentially this criticism, but in a way that saddles Smith-} esque theories with doctrines about “events” and “actions” which it seems to me these theories don’t need to subscribe to, or always do subscribe to. I might, like Hornsby, also have appealed to actions in the category of “omissions”: If, for example, I decide to not get out of bed today, not getting out of bed is my action, and nothing is illuminated about it by calling it a kind

own response to this objection is that the notion of bodily movement he has in mind is very broad, and includes things we would ordinarily say don’t involve movement. I find this manoeuvre unhelpful. It defends Smith’s thesis simply by making it unclear what he means by “movement”.15 _{But it does not seem}

necessary to engage in prolonged discussion over what Smith means, or over what “movement” can be allowed to mean, since someone proposing Smith’s kind of theory seems free to move beyond that notion. Bodies can’t do taxes, but can do more than move. For all I can see, Smith might just as well have claimed: “For N to be acting in Aing is a matter of N’s body moving, or being still”. This, further, seems equivalent to saying “For N to be acting in Aing is a matter of N’s body doing something”, if move or be still includes all a body can do. Perhaps Smith’s proposed stretched notion of movement is meant to coincide with these broader notions. In any case, this move obviously overcomes the simple objection from still action. But it leaves us with a theory like this:

Smith-inspired: For N to be acting in Aing is for N’s body to be Xing, and

for a further condition C to apply (where C is a condition concerning a causal relationship between N’s psychology and the Xing that N’s body is doing).

of “movement”. I do not choose this example because I do not want to engage with what I think of as the mistaken view that acting involves movement though omission is a kind of “non-action” , which still can be done intentionally (as briefly suggested by Sartorio, 2009, p. 513). Suffice it to say that by “action” I just mean this general category of “things that are done intentionally”. Once that category is properly elucidated, there will, I think, be no further need to give an “account” of the subclass of things that are done intentionally and also involve movement, just as there is no special need to give an account of the subclass that involves melting things with the body heat of one’s hands.

15_{Smith says such complaints rest on an “uncharitable interpretation of what the standard} story has in mind when it talks of bodily movements”, and suggests the interpretation that “any orientation of the body counts as a bodily movement, even the orientations involved in leaning motionless against a wall, or lying still on a bed, or relaxing on a couch” (Smith, 2012, p. 389). Davidson (2001a, p. 49) has similarly said that we need a “generous” conception of a bodily movement to make good the proposal that actions are bodily movements. But if in a spirit of generous charity, we try to stretch the idea of an “orientation of the body”, or of a “bodily movement” to include these passive actions, I do not think we will be left with anything but the notion that the bodies in question are doingsomething or other. Luckily for Smith and Davidson, this claim seems available to them for all they’ve said.

The resulting story is familiar, though we have left behind the usual restriction to movement: For N to be acting in typing is for N’s psychology to cause N’s body to do certain (typing) movements, whereas for N to be acting in resting is presumably for N’s psychology to make N’s body stay put (in the way characteristic of resting).16 _{The obvious and familiar problem for the view}

concerns which causal-psychological relationship an agent is supposed to have to what their body is doing just in case they are performing an action. In answering this question, proponents of Smith’s kind of theory must reckon with counterexamples involving deviant causal chains. In the next chapters I will return to questions about how the relation between an agent’s psychology and what happens needs to be construed to exclude such counterexamples.

My present objection is different from concerns about deviant causal chains, and similar to my objection in the last section. For it again presses on the claim that if N is acting in Aing, N must be Aing. How can facts of the rough shape that N’s body is caused by various psychological states on part of N to do something, entail such facts as that N is doing something? In general it seems that whatever claims we make about what one thing is doing have no bearing on what any other things are doing. If a tornado is passing through, nearby dominoes may or may not be falling over. That a tornado is passing through in such a way that one domino is falling over hardly entails of any other domino that it is falling over, or of any other thing that it is doing anything. So how are we suppose to extract from the fact that a desire makes a body do

16_{Since not just any bodily activity can contribute to just any action, such theories must} seemingly also introduce some restriction on which movements on part of a body can constitute which actions. To provide such a restriction, a theorist of the present type might try to adapt a suggestion from Davidson (2001a, p. 51) — who is not a theorist of this type — and say that N’s body’s Xing (moving an arm, say) can constitute N’s acting in Aing either by being identical to it (if someone is acting in moving their arm), or by causing it (for example, if someone is acting in communicating some message by moving their arm). It is not clear whether this suggestion can be adapted with much success. (For example, how can we identify a body’s activities with a distinct subject’s actions?) But here I am ignoring this elaboration and these resultant questions.

whatever movements seem typical of playing the piano that an agent, viewed as something distinct from the body, is playing the piano, or doing anything much at all?17 _{(Even unintentionally — since maybe it’s a case of desire-triggered}

sleepwalking.) If, as seems generally true, no fact about what one thing is doing entails any fact about what another thing is doing, an account with the shape of Smith’s must fail to provide for the idea that an agent does the things which this account calls the agent’s actions.