At this point, it would be interesting to outline the standpoints of the political elites in Vojvodina on the question of the province’s status during the early 2000s. Particular attention is paid to the two most popular parties back then, with an appeal all over Serbia (DSS and DS); and to the League and the Reformists from the pro-autonomists.
The DSS Committee in Vojvodina regards the province as the hearth of the modern Serbian national movement, whereas the Vojvodinian Serbs are viewed as the pioneers of modern Serbian nationalism. The short-lived Vojvodstvo Srpsko of 1848–9 as well as the struggles of Jaša Tomić and other Vojvodinian Serb political figures for the national unification of the prečani Serbs with Serbia proper, are regarded with particular respect.17 By contrast, the system of autonomies established within the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is viewed from a particularly negative angle. The DSS Vojvodinian representatives argue that this system merely signified the implementation of the Yugoslav Communists’ interwar ideological platform with the aim to weaken the political sovereignty of the Serbian nation within Yugoslavia. The 1974 Constitution especially is regarded as a document which ‘set up a model of autonomies incompatible with any European or universal precedents
17 Dejan Mikavica, ‘Vojvodina kao Politički Program’, Srpska Atina (the journal of the DSS
in the fields of legal theory and political practice’. It is further added that in accordance with the 1974 arrangements three constitutional areas were set up in Serbia, the two of which (Kosovo and Vojvodina) were granted more extensive competencies than the remaining one (Serbia proper).18 In this light, even the 1990 Serbian Constitution was viewed as an arrangement that maintained certain aspects of the Communist constitutional order.19
Therefore, in regard to the broader question of regionalization in Serbia, the DSS representatives in Vojvodina and in Serbia as a whole seem to be keen on a unitary solution. The main standpoints of the party on the regional question were outlined in DSS’s ‘Osnovna načela za novi
Ustav Republike Srbije’ (‘Basic Principles for the New Constitution of
the Republic of Serbia’). First of all, this document declared the territory of Serbia ‘united and inalienable’. The official language recognized was Serbian in the Cyrillic script. The respective languages and alphabets of the national minorities were to be officially used in those territories where a national minority forms the local majority. Furthermore, the rights (individual and collective) of national minorities were to be codified in the state’s legislation on civil rights and freedoms. The option of positive discrimination, in favour of individuals coming from a minority background was also endorsed.
This document proposed the establishment of six regions with their respective seats at the capital Belgrade, Kragujevac, Niš, Novi Sad, Užice and Priština – following the final settlement of Kosovo’s status. The Serbian Assembly was to be bicameral, comprising a Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber of Regions. The latter was given a right of veto over decisions of the former that might prove detrimental to the status of a region. The regional parliament was endorsed to enact the regional statute, whereas the main executive organs of the region were to be its government and president. In regard to financial autonomy,
18 Dejan Mikavica, ‘Kome Treba Vojvođanski KomunističkiUstav?’, 2002, http://www.
dssns.org.yu.
every region was entitled to arrange its budget and have a say over which taxes should remain local and which should be directed towards the republican coffers. Nevertheless, a republican mechanism should supervise the equal economic development of all regions. As far as legislative authority was concerned, the regional parliament was to enact certain regional laws in a variety of areas (e.g. agriculture, regional planning, natural resources). Nevertheless, in case the republican government considered that a proposed regional law was not in harmony with the republican legislation (e.g. in case it jeopardized civil rights within a region or it attributed that region a higher legal status in comparison to the rest) it would be enabled to test the law’s validity before the Republican Constitutional Court prior to its application. Finally, all regional courts of justice were to operate in full harmony with the republican judicial system.20
The proposal of the whole arrangement was theoretically entrenched in the necessity to safeguard the territorial integrity of Serbia and the national rights of Serbs in their homeland. Moreover, it was made clear that the DSS opposes the concession of any kind of ‘special status’ that might encourage ethnic segregation or separatist tendencies. Finally, in regard to the functional aspect, the asymmetric option was rejected on the grounds that ‘Serbia is a small and poor country and cannot afford to finance any “parallel” governmental entities.’ By contrast, the gradual strengthening of local self-government was proposed as a more pragmatic and effective solution.21 Even though the DSS proposal seemed quite unitary in its conceptualization, still it favoured decentralization in a number of areas. This was particularly the case with its allowance for vetoes at the republican parliament, the degree of regional financial autonomy, as well as the authorization of the regions to proclaim certain laws pertaining to their jurisdiction (not merely the issuing of sub-legal acts). Furthermore, the six regions proposed by the
20 Demokratska Stranka Srbije, ‘Osnovna načela za novi Ustav Republike Srbije’, 2001, 2–3,
10–14.
21 Milovan Mitrović, ‘Politika Demokratske Stranke Srbije u Vojvodini’, 22 April 2002,
DSS would follow at least some historical divisions, so therefore might potentially form the basis of future regionalist demands. However, the DSS officials tended to offset this probability in a rather dubious manner by arguing that in Serbia there do not exist historically established regions as it is the case in, say, Spain or Italy.22
Meanwhile, DS did not present an articulate platform on the question of regionalization in Serbia. In the party’s political programme it was mentioned that Vojvodina is a region with specificities of a historical, cultural, geographic and national character. It was further recommended that the Republic of Serbia should devolve part of its authority (e.g. in economy, education, exploitation of natural resources, minority rights, public information) to the province, as long as these functions did not resemble the attributes of a state. It was also suggested that Vojvodina should be granted the appropriate fiscal and executive authority.23
The party’s relaxed attitude towards the issue of Vojvodinian autonomy had gained some popularity for DS among the province’s pro-autonomist parties and groupings. On certain occasions, though, DS firmly rejected certain demands by the regionalist elites as detrimental to the state’s interest. The party’s policy of tactical adjustments over the Vojvodinian question had resulted from its intention to keep the ‘democratic forces’ in the province together. However, a question that remained unanswered is where, exactly, the DS’s lenience towards asymmetric alternatives ended and where those of the party’s consideration of the broader state’s interest began. DS’s manoeuvring between these two poles occasionally generated criticism over the party’s alleged inconsistency, from the League of Vojvodina’s Social Democrats all the way to DSS.24
22 Interview with DSS representative; Novi Sad, 15 March 2001.
23 See the political program of the DS at: http://www.demokrata.org.yu/srpski/program/
politicki.html.
24 DS had been also accused of displaying an equally ‘chameleonic’ attitude vis-à-vis the
management of interethnic relations in Vojvodina, thereby, frequently switching from lenient to more reserved outlooks on minority rights (Interview with sociologist at the University of Novi Sad; 14 November 2005).
The League’s greatest gain from the nomination of posts within DOS in autumn 2000 was the appointment of Nenad Čanak to the position of president of the Vojvodinian assembly. According to the League’s agenda, Vojvodina is characterized by such a degree of ethno-cultural diversity that is difficult to encounter anywhere else in Europe. As a result of these regional specifics, the provision of certain institutional guarantees was prescribed. These provisions were, namely, a bicameral parliament (consisting of a Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber of Nationalities) and a Vojvodinian Constitution arranged by the Vojvodinian assembly. The territorial autonomy of Vojvodina’s sub- regional units (Srem, Bačka, the Banat) was also endorsed.
In regard to Serbia’s constitutional rearrangement, federalization was proposed as the most appropriate option. According to LSDV, Serbia should be rearranged in terms of a democratic federal state whose units would enjoy a high degree of autonomy. The League proposed the establishment of six units drawn in accordance with their political interests, historical particularities, economic features and demographic factors. The units proposed were Vojvodina, Šumadija, Southeast Serbia, the greater Belgrade area, the Sandžak and Kosovo – following the settlement of its status. This ‘democratic federal Serbia’ was to be endowed with a bicameral parliament comprising a Chamber of Citizens and a Chamber of the Federal Units. The competencies assigned to the central government were to be national defence, foreign policy, monetary policy and other macro-economic issues. The primacy of the Chamber of Citizens was also endorsed.25
At this point, a similarity by default between the programmes of the League and DSS becomes apparent, namely the arrangement of an equal number of units in accordance with almost the same criteria. Especially in regard to functional and demographic catalysts, it seems that both parties found the drawing of units consisting of 2,000,000 residents on average as an efficient option. But this is where the similarities between
25 Liga Socijal-Demokrata Vojvodine, ‘Republika Vojvodina: Put mira razvoja i stabilnosti’,
the programmes of the two parties ended. In regard to the powers that the central government should retain, according to LSDV, the picture looked much closer to the very minimalist arrangement of the Serbia- Montenegro union – thus implying some sort of loose union of regions with extensive self-government.
The very use of the term ‘federalization’ by LSDV implied the concession of more extensive competencies, even though not explicitly clarified in its programme. Perhaps it should be noted that the employment of the term ‘federalization’ in the party’s programme was not to be taken literally, but mainly as a means to emphasize deep decentralization. After all, the application of a genuine federal structure in a country as small and as poor as Serbia would not sound as a rational proposal, at the first place. Finally, even though at a first glance symmetric, the League’s programme mentioned that the six units would be granted ‘a higher or lower degree of autonomy in comparison to each other’.26 This, in combination with the institutional provisions proposed for Vojvodina, would leave much room, if only implicitly, for the attribution of a higher status to the province.
The Reformist Democratic Party of Vojvodina emphasized the historical and other particularities of Vojvodina in relation to the rest of Serbia. The Reformists also underlined, more emphatically than the League, the internal subdivision of Vojvodina into the, equally historical, sub-regions of Srem, Bačka and the Banat. In this sense, they argued that Vojvodina differentiated from other European regions.27 By contrast to LSDV, the Reformists openly stood for the asymmetric regionalization of Serbia. The party envisaged the establishment of ‘a state of autonomous provinces and regions’ in Serbia. It was underlined that the autonomy of these regions and provinces should be explicitly defined in the Serbian Constitution. The areas in which the autonomous provinces, by their acts, independently and thoroughly would regulate certain decisions should be clarified as well. Also, the
26 Ibid., 3.
constitutionality of the provincial legal acts should be assessed by the single Constitutional Court of the republic. The central competencies of the Serbian government would be national defence, foreign policy, state security, criminal law, monetary policy and other macro-economic issues.
In the specific case of Vojvodina certain institutional provisions were recommended. In accordance with the province’s internal subdivision, a power-sharing model of autonomy was proposed, in which the provincial government in Novi Sad would share its authority with sub-governments established in Srem, the Banat and the rest of Bačka. Finally, RDSV opted for the utilization of certain aspects of the 1974 arrangements that might still be applicable today.28
Nevertheless, none of the two pro-autonomy parties was particularly popular then. The League, in particular, would not succeed in augmenting its public appeal, in the years to come, despite its continuous participation in the provincial institutions and decision- making organs. There can be given quite a few explanations in regard to this occurrence. First of all, as a result of the wide diversity of popular views over what ‘autonomy’ means, the agendas of the pro-autonomy parties might not necessarily correspond to the way that many Vojvodinians perceived decentralization or regionalization. Second, both parties had often been accused of being too ‘region-centered’ and monopolized by their leaders (e.g. Nenad Čanak’s focal position within the League). In regard to the former allegation, Vojvodina’s status within the broader political context of Serbia and Montenegro was not adequately addressed in their programmes. To these might be added allegations regarding the inefficient staffing of LSDV and RDSV alike. Finally, the previous association of quite a few individuals among the pro-autonomist elites with the reformist branch of the old LCY (also, their frequently nostalgic allusions to the post-1974 era) might have
28 Ibid.; Radosavljević Duško, ‘Autonomy of Vojvodina: Challenges and Perspectives’,
in Open University Subotica, Essays on Regionalization (Subotica: Agency for Local Democracy, 2001), 151–6.
discouraged quite a few Vojvodinians who opted for a definitive break from whatever they perceived as remnants of Titoism.