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There are several forms of social networks of mutual benefit and solidarity for persons with common interests in urban areas. Blaikie et al. (2003: 15) consider kinship net- works and larger collectivities as a vital constituent in well-being and one which can afford the ‘basis for action when vulnerability is made a reality’. These networks are thought to influence poverty in general although the ways such they are perceived vary considerably. Recently, poverty debates have come up with the idea of ‘Civil Society Organizations’ as an essential component in understanding the relationship of trust and social capital available to the urban poor. Although the concept of ‘Civil Society Organizations’ (CSOs) is loaded with vagueness, it is not the intention here to probe into the debate of what constitutes CSOs. The main issue to be considered here is the capacity of grassroots organizations to freely organize and empower the poor and to address their situation fundamentally. Therefore, the section will look into the factors that have shaped the dynamic nature of the grassroots in poor communities by exploring the inter- action between them and the state.

Among the poor, community networks can be based on kinship, ethnicity, culture, religion or workplace affinities. In several poor urban communities, social networks have been formed in response to de-industrialization, increased unemployment and struggles for modest living spaces in segregated cities. These goals have often been associated with pressing for citizenship rights, health and education, and sometimes accompanied increased rates of political and ethnic violence. The networks can provide access to information about jobs, facilitate access to employment and press for an improvement in services in poor communities. Their roles can go beyond effecting change in the country as a whole. For example, Mitlin (2001: 154-155) notes that some religious organizations have played a significant role in the struggle for political independence. In addition, some traditional organizations have been able to provide communal infrastructure and services in African cities but there is relatively little evidence to show that these conclusions can be generalized. Mitlin (2001: 163) argues that although some grassroots organizations are able to press for improvements in service provision and effect some changes in their neighbourhoods, they have not yet been able to fundamentally address the situation of the urban poor because all their

actions have remained controlled by the state. The interface between the state and CSOs is central in addressing group interests.

For grassroots organizations to exercise their civil rights, there needs to be a political environment that respects the fundamental freedoms of its people as citizens. This is also the goal of many grassroots organizations in urban areas. The relationship between the state and CSOs has a certain history in Africa which is relevant to their role today. Mamdani (1996: 15) highlights the need for understanding such a relationship and the power applied by the state to achieve control. Historically, this relationship has been shaped by different modes of state control, although the state attempts to subdue grass- roots organizations by bringing them under its control. This does not necessarily imply complete control for either. The bifurcation of power during colonial rule in Africa has had a far-reaching impact on causing disjunction between the state and society in post- colonial Africa. Mamdani (1996: 18) argues that colonial power established two systems of power under one authority: direct rule was applied in urban areas, with indirect rule in rural areas. In urban areas, direct rule was devised to exclude Africans from ‘civil freedoms guaranteed to citizens in civil society’. The nature of this rule set the stage for different forms of CSOs in urban areas. Although there was little or no space for civil society activism then, throughout African cities there was an extraordi- nary level of popular mobilizations and the formation of various popular organizations around the struggles for basic rights. The nationalist leadership was able to unite these groups and ignite their ambitions in the promise that, through independence, all their aspirations would be achieved. At the dawn of independence, the post-colonial or ‘developmental’ state of the 1960s and 1970s allowed some role to popular discourse and practice and sought popular consent (Neocosmos 2002: 43). But having political power in its hands, the nationalist leadership was unwilling to hand over the same rights to others. The popular groups that enabled the nationalist leadership to come to power lost their ground and purpose to the extent that they were seen as blocking the new state. Many popular organizations were banned, constrained or incorporated into state struc- tures (Mamdani 1996: 15).

In the contemporary period, relations between the state and many sectors of civil society are characterized more by hostility than by cooperation or partnership (Neocos- mos 2002: 48). Such hostile relationships are fuelled by the hegemony of dictatorship in many African countries and the decline in urban resources. The drive of the state and the international financial institutions towards deepening privatization and the commer- cialization of urban services during the 1980s led to serious changes in the patterns of state-grassroots organizations. It laid the basis for the emergence of a new form of urban consciousness that questions the principle of state control. Many groups started to organize at community or neighbourhood level, struggling against privatization, service cutbacks and evictions in the main urban areas.

As the flow of support from the west became the major condition for state reproduc- tion, there was little concern for popular consent. The state’s relationship with its citizens has been confined to mainly ‘administrative and coercive relations’ (Neocos- mos 2002: 44). Clear forms of coercion are therefore employed by the state against these organizations’ activities. Grassroots organizations in urban areas are less able to effect positive chance in the lives of the poor and are increasingly less able to demand rights and social entitlements (Mitlin 2001: 158). They lack the capacity to ‘reduce the symptoms of urban poverty (such as exclusion from access to basic services) as well as to address some of the more structural causes that result in a lack of empowerment and

powerlessness’ (Mitlin 2001: 152-157). Their activities remain very much restricted due to government control over access to land and urban services. Local leaders may experi- ence pressure from external sources as well as encountering problems in running the organizations. In many situations, the strategy adopted by CSOs is to toe the line with state officials and politicians in order to secure better offers from the sate to the urban poor. Politicians and state officials usually expect an array of personal and political profits in exchange for the services they offer (Mitlin 2001: 161). Under such circum- stances, grassroots organizations tend to become part of the state or become apolitical in character.

Overall, grassroots organizations can conceal ambiguities and conflicts inherent in society. The problem of leadership of grassroots organizations is a key area. To an important degree, CSOs role is seen as being circumscribed by their leadership who have power over access to community resources or else control the organizations and thus create new patterns of exclusion and exploitation (Mitlin 2001: 156). In many poor neighbourhoods, the poor cannot actively participate in organizations that are assumed to represent them (Mitlin 2001: 157). Grassroots organization are, therefore, mostly not in a position to represent the interests of the urban poor, and their existence do not necessarily promote social integration or help in reducing the vulnerability of excluded populations living in large cities.

In summary, it is apparent that dissatisfaction with the social and economic effects of modernization and globalization has encouraged the emergence and informed the goals of many grassroots organizations. In Africa, due to the unfavourable political environ- ment, these organizations are less able to represent the interests of the urban poor and dense networks of civic involvement are not a sign or a source of definite support.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to identify the specific vulnerabilities of the urban poor by looking at the interrelationships between urban and rural livelihoods and the context- specific issues of particular importance to the urban poor. Urban and rural areas appear to be interlinked through various processes and relationships. Such interactions enable households to diversify their livelihood options but at the same time can present a source of vulnerability in both contexts. The urban context requires specific sets of livelihood resources for survival. Overall, the vulnerability of the urban poor is closely linked to their dependence on a cash income and their livelihoods, the type of livelihood activities they undertake and their exposure to the harsh effects of the market. This is particularly important in light of the commercialization of housing and urban services, constraints on land use and the lack of effective networks of support.

Wages and employment are important livelihood sources for the urban poor. How- ever, there are several constraints on them that prevent the poor from realizing their potentials. Housing and tenure security are also sources of vulnerability. Ownership of or secure access to housing is central to ensuring access to other resources such as income-generating activities, education and health, as well as political rights such as registering to vote. Overlapping land rights and the plurality of property systems and institutions create conditions for reduced access to these resources. Furthermore, access to urban services is subject to local and national political processes. The withdrawal of the state from service provision and the handing-over of them to various non-state providers have affected people’s access to these services. Informal provision is inade-

quate or expensive or both. A lack of security has various implications for livelihood activities, trust and well-being among communities and individuals.

The extent to which grassroots organizations, as a particular kind of social network, are able to penetrate and mobilize urban communities is dependant on various political actors with different vested interests, goals and ideals. Problems of plurality, polariza- tion and conflicts of interest are all part of the existence of various social networks. These organizations are therefore less able to represent the interests of the urban poor.

These conclusions imply that understanding the vulnerability of the urban poor requires a flexible and dynamic approach that focuses on resources that matter to people most and the constraints they face in accessing them. Chapter 6 will look at the liveli- hood approach as a suitable framework for enabling such understanding.

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