Cambio en vidas útiles de activos incluidos en propiedad, plata y equipo del hotel

The MOA-AD is the result of eleven years of negotiation (from January 1997 to September 2008) between the government of the Philippines and the MILF. It is based on the Agreement on Peace signed by the two parties in Tripoli in 2001, which defined three clusters of issues to be negotiated: (1) security, (2) humanitarian aid and development, and (3) the “ancestral domain,” the territory to be included in the BJE. In order to reach the first goal the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) formed an IMT¹³⁶ in Mindanao “to facilitate and negotiate [the]

peace process between the GRP and the MILF, more importantly in monitoring both parties’

adherence to ceasefire agreements” (House Resolution (HR) No. 578, 12 May 2008). The IMT, headed 70% by Malaysians, was quite successful. Under its supervision from 2004 onwards, military clashes decreased considerably from “one thousand two hundred fifty-seven (1,257) in the span of two years alone (2002-2003) to only forty-six (46) from 2004 to 2008” (ibid.)¹³⁷ However, with stalled peace talks in December 2007 and the final breakdown of the talks in September 2008, the IMT left the Philippines in November 2008. Until then it continued to monitor those areas where there were no operations against the (according to the military)

“recalcitrant” MILF commanders Abdullah Macapaar (Commander Bravo), Ustadz Ameril Umbra Kato, and Alim Solaiman Pangalian (Arguillas 2008).

In order to put into practice the second goal, the MILF created the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA). Implementing the third goal of the Tripoli Agreement was the biggest challenge and the MOA-AD was to be the result. It contains five sections. In the first part (Terms of Reference) it lists the main documents it is referring to. In the second part (Concepts and Principles) it explains whom the BJE is designed to include, stating that this is not only Moros, but that it is the birthright of “all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros.” Furthermore it explains why the Bangsamoros have a right to self-governance and how the ancestral domain is to be defined. The third part (Territory) sets

136 With a membership of about 60 people, the IMT has its headquarters in Cotabato City while its five Team Sites are located in the cities of Cotabato, Davao, General Santos, Iligan, and Zamboanga. The IMT’s jurisdiction covers 14 of Mindanao’s 21 provinces. Members of the Malaysian Defense Forces have been in Mindanao since 2004 to lead the monitoring team, composed of 41 officers from the Malaysian Defense Forces, the Royal Malaysia Police, and the Prime Minister’s Department. It is also supported by ten military officers from Brunei Darussalam and five from Libya. Canada and Japan also have members on the IMT.

137 The head of the governmental CCCH reported that from a height of 698 incidents in 2002, the number went down to 569 in 2003 even as a war was being fought in the Buliok area and neighbouring towns. In 2004, the year the Malaysian-led IMT came, the number went down to 16; was down to 10 in 2005; up to 13 in 2006; down to eight in 2007; and then back up to 128 in 2008 (Arguillas 2008a).

limits to the territory, which covers parts of the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.

“[T]he core of the BJE shall constitute the present geographic area of the ARMM, including those municipalities¹³⁸ in the province of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite.” Beside this core area, 737 Muslim-majority villages, identified as Category A, had the chance to opt in through a plebiscite held within twelve months after the signing of the agreement. Category B included 1,459 “Special Intervention Areas” that would be “the subject of special socio-economic and cultural affirmative action implemented by the Central government”

for 25 years, after which another plebiscite would be conducted to “determine the question of their accession to the BJE.” The International Crisis Group adds that “[t]he category B areas included some of the most resource-rich land in Mindanao” (ICG 2008). The MILF reduced its main territorial claims to cover only the areas where the Bangsamoro are dominant, and all non-ARMM residents have the option to vote against their inclusion into the BJE.

The forth part of the MOA-AD discusses how resources and all “royalties, bonuses, taxes, charges, custom duties or imposts on natural resources and mineral resources” in the homeland should be split between the BJE and the central government “on a percentage ratio of 75:25 in favor of the BJE”. The last point, governance, settles the details of how the BJE was to be governed and is left to a final Comprehensive Compact. It is stated that the relationship between the BJE and the central government should be “associative.” This notion later on led the Supreme Court to judge the MOA-AD unconstitutional, because it could establish an independent state.

The International Contact Group (ICG) reports that a government negotiator explained that the MILF saw the BJE as “akin to a state in a federal system. For them, the use in the MOA of the term ‘central government’ was clear acknowledgment that the BJE was part of a larger whole, not a co-equal policy” (ibid. 2008).

138 Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan, and Tangkal.

Map 7: MOA-AD, Map of Annexes A and B

Handmade map by the author; proportions do not entirely correspond with reality.

On 14 October 2008, the Supreme Court, voting 8-7, declared that the MOA-AD was

“contrary to law and the Constitution.” Two main reasons were given: first, the “failure to consult the LGUs or communities constituted”; second, that the respondents “exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution” (Supreme Court, 14 October 2008). Regarding the first point, the Supreme Court concluded that “[t]he contents of the MOA-AD are matters of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order . . . at least three pertinent laws justify the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.” Concerning the second point, the Supreme Court explained that the MOA-AD was unconstitutional since it envisioned an associative relationship between the GRP and the BJE; “the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.” Thus, the MOA-AD would require changing the Constitution. The MOA-AD “virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress” (ibid.).