. . . party cadres are often mean, wicked people who form their own cliques with secret connections to protect their own behinds and who with subtlety and cunning restrict or eliminate those cadres who are upright persons working effectively with good technical skills, because they are afraid of the competition of younger cadres with technical skills.50
Hence, the self-criticism and criticism campaign may have become a forum for the acting out of these conflicts as well as an opportunity to break down some of the resistance to new recruitment practices.
Opportunists take advantage of the campaign
Notwithstanding the Party leaders' motives for conducting the self-criticism and criticism campaign, once the campaign started, it became a vehicle for the advancement of all sorts of interests within the Party. There were growing claims of cadres using the campaign to settle old scores or victim ising people who had accused them o f wrongdoing. Conversely, cadres often avoided involvement in the campaign for fear that criticism of their superiors would damage their careers or even their personal safety. Senior General Chu Huy Man highlighted these problems at an army cadres' conference in Hanoi:
. . . some cadres and party members have become fearful, face-saving, easy-going and insincere in their struggle, fearing an ’adverse' impact on themselves. There have also been cases of people taking advantage of the occasion to vent malicious attacks. It is truly dangerous to use criticism to exalt and protect some while finding fault with and attacking others, 'flattering', and seeking 'self-advancement'51
In many cases, people were justifiably concerned about their safety. There were reports that people making criticisms were being threatened and subjected to physical abuse. The head o f a subward Party committee in Ho Chi Minh City was exposed to "severe" attack because of her frank criticism of other subward leaders.52 Such events must have raised doubts in the minds of many Party members about whether exposing corrupt cadres was worth the possible risk to themselves. They also highlight the inadequacy of a campaign of this kind in really bringing about concrete change. There were too many vested interests involved. More structural measures were needed to break down the barriers to change and to make officials accountable.
Rectification of shortcomings
The rectification of shortcomings exposed during the self-criticism and criticism campaign was handled within the normal Party structure. H igher echelons in the Party were
50 Pike, "Vietnam", pp. 251-2.
51 Tap Chi Cong San, May 1986 (BBC SWB FE/8308/B/10, 11.7.86).
52 Chau Ai, "A 'Cry' that must be answered early." Saigon Giai Phongt 25 April 1986, p. 4 (JPRS -SEA-114, 3.7.86), p. 54.
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responsible for oversighting the rectification efforts of lower levels and party members failing to take corrective action were to be subjected to Party disciplinary measures.53 The lack of an independent arbiter of the rectification process meant that there was no guarantee that Party members and cadres accused of shortcomings would receive a fair hearing. Cadres who lacked an extensive "protective umbrella" were likely to face the brunt of disciplinary measures while those who did enjoy such protection were able to escape punishment.
Reflecting its concern to regain public confidence, the Party gave most priority to rectifying mistakes occurring in Party units that dealt directly with matters affecting the public. Particular attention was also paid to resolving cases in which Party members or cadres had been accused unjustly of wrongdoing by other cadres. Party members and the public were encouraged to participate in the rectification process.54
Rectification took a number of forms, depending on the shortcoming. The most severe measure was prosecution on criminal charges. The chief accountant of a grain supply company in Hoang Lien Son Province, who had reportedly co-operated with seventeen other people to swindle state funds and assets, was sentenced to a total of twenty years in prison, eighteen years for "grafting socialist assets" and two years for giving bribes. Eight accomplices received prison terms of between six and fourteen years and nine others received suspended sentences of between one and three years.55 Perhaps the most prominent case of corruption dealt with in 1986, and one which went against the usual trend of targeting lower-ranking cadres, involved the Minister of Engineering and Metals, Nguyen Van Kha. He was indicted in September, together with eight other officials, on charges of graft associated with an automobile assembly plant in Ho Chi Minh City. This was apparently the first time a criminal charge had been laid against a standing Cabinet member.56
Another disciplinary measure was dismissal from the Party. Thach Ha district in Nghe Tinh province asked one Party committee member to resign because of his involvement in the illegal purchase and resale of motorcycles.57 The Party organisation in Ha Bac province either dismissed from their jobs or expelled from the Party some 681 Party members,58 and in Ha Nam Ninh Province, the Ly Nhan district Party organisation "released" eight co-operative chiefs from their positions.59
53 Hanoi Domestic Service , 2300 gmt, 14 April 1986 (FBIS 17.4.86), p. K 6. 54 Nhan Dan, 21 July 1986, pp. 3 and 4 (FBIS 22.8.86), p. K 2.
55 Hanoi Domestic Service, 1100 gmt, 22 September 1986 (FBIS 24.9.86), p. K 4. 56 Pike, "Vietnam", p. 251.
57 Hanoi Domestic Service, 1100 gmt, 14 May 1986 (FBIS 16.5.86), p. K 5. 58 Hanoi Domestic Service, 1100 gmt, 25 July 1986 (FBIS 29.7.86), p. K 8. 59 Hanoi Domestic Service, 2300 gmt, 24 May 1986 (FBIS 29.5.86), p. K 9-10.
In cases of nepotism, the beneficiaries were sometimes removed from their positions. For example, the son of the Thach Ha district people's committee chairman was dismissed and sent back to "agricultural production" after it was found out that he had been appointed to his job through family connections, but the only discipline imposed on the committee chairman was that he undertake self-criticism before the district Party organisation's executive committee. In the case of another leading Thach Ha district administrator who had appointed nine of his children or other relatives to government positions, local authorities dismissed only one of the official's nine offspring.60 The punishments applied in these cases were far from severe and it is hard to believe that they could have had a deterrent effect on other Party cadres.
In cases of misappropriation of state funds or property, the offenders were usually required to reimburse the State. Commodities purchased by cadres at less than market price through their abuse of office had to be resold at market price, with the proceeds returning to the State coffers. As a result of the self-criticism and criticism drive in Phu Khanh province, many Party members returned property and goods that had been obtained illegally. The Chairman of Tuy Hoa district people's committee returned a plot of land that he had bought illegally.61 Only a warning was served on the Thach Hoa village people's committee chairman in Nghe Tinh Province who had "indulgently allocated 1,020 square metres to a person to build houses against the prescribed plan".62
The disciplinary steps taken against corrupt officials were inconsistent. The kind of offence that led to dismissal from the Party or prosecution in one case led to a mere slap on the wrist in another. It leads one to speculate that the extent of punishment depended on whether the offender had friends in high places or whether the relevant Party committee was actually committed to cleaning up corruption. Even the draft Political Report of the Central Committee commented on the inadequacy of the disciplinary measures. It said that although in previous years tens of thousands of members had been expelled from the Party, and some had been tried in court, this time punitive measures as a whole were not serious enough and many "disqualified members" still retained Party membership.63
The Party prescribed measures for dealing with another major problem highlighted by the campaign — that of an increasing alienation of cadres from the grass-roots of its membership and from the population as a whole. One of the preferred solutions was to lay down specific requirements for regular consultations between leading cadres and
60 Hanoi Domestic Service, 1100 gmt, 14 May 1986 (FBIS 16.5.86), p. K 6. 61 Hanoi Domestic Service, 2 July 1986 (FBIS 8.7.86), p. K 13.