72
The main task of the press is to help the nation understand and assimilate the ideas of restructuring, to mobilize the masses to struggle for successful implementation of party plans . . .We need . . .’glasnost’, criticism and self-criticism in order to implement major changes in all spheres of social life . . . but criticism should reflect the interests of the party.12
Similar objectives were apparent in Gorbachev's preparations for the 27th National Party Congress, due to be held in late February 1986. At a Central Committee Plenum in April 1985, Gorbachev stressed the need for new faces in the cadre ranks, and for frank discussion about such issues as the quality of Party leadership, the evaluation of Party work, and the record of implementation of Party policies.13 Around this time, Gorbachev revived efforts of his predecessors to return greater control over cadre policy to the Party centre. During the Brezhnev years, the power of patronage had gone to regional and local leaders, who had used it to build up their own following. To break down regional loyalties, Gorbachev introduced a requirement that potential regional leaders be rotated through the Central Committee for a fixed period.14 In addition, cadres were brought in from outside to take up leadership positions in particular regions.
At the same time, however, Gorbachev appointed many regional Party leaders to key positions in the central leadership. No doubt this was part of an effort to consolidate his own power base. It also reflected the increasing economic management expertise which was developing in the regions as a result of modernisation, for example, the growth of high technology industries in the Urals and the agricultural modernisation of the south.15 This managerial talent would be an asset to Gorbachev in his efforts to implement economic reforms. A similar trend emerged in Vietnam, as a greater number of provincial Party officials with proven managerial skills were elected to important leadership positions at the centre.
The Soviet Union exerted direct influence on Vietnamese leaders through frequent bilateral leadership summits. In June 1985, a Vietnamese delegation headed by Party General Secretary Le Duan visited the Soviet Union and attended talks with Gorbachev. A "Joint Soviet-Vietnamese declaration" issued after completion of the talks referred to an exchange of views between the delegations on their preparations for their upcoming Party congresses, and this was confirmed by Gorbachev in a later dinner speech:
12 Ibid., p. 73.
13 Moscow Home Service 1400 gmt 23 April 1985 (BBC SW B/SU/7934/C/17, 25.4.85).
14 Gustafson and Mann, "Gorbachev's First Year", p. 6. 15 Ibid., p. 9.
We have held thorough and intense talks. As before, they were marked by a cordial and truly comradely atmosphere. Both in the Soviet Union and in Vietnam, work has got under way on a large scale now to prepare for the 27th CPSU Congress and the Sixth CPV Congress. This lends special political significance to our exchange of opinions.16
It is likely that the Soviets used such opportunities to reiterate their concerns about Vietnamese misuse of Soviet aid funds (see Chapter Three) and to seek remedial measures.
At the 27th National Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Gorbachev sharply criticised the Brezhnev era, while not actually naming Brezhnev. He asserted that the growth of the Soviet economy had suffered badly during that period and that radical reform was needed to reverse the inertia, stagnation and conservatism of the 1970s and 1980s.17 He did not, however, specify the nature of the radical reforms nor did he question the systemic causes of the situation, such as the demand economy. The only speaker at the Congress to allude to such problems was the new Moscow Party chief, Boris Yeltsin. Instead of challenging the system which was the basis of their power, leaders engaged in introspective self-criticism and emphasised the need to improve the system by changing the people who managed it, by strengthening Party discipline and by reducing waste, corruption and fraud. This approach had the advantage of preserving the system by accusing individuals for the system's shortcomings.18 In other words, it was a strategy for regaining legitimacy. At the same time, Gorbachev used this vehicle to remove his political opponents under cover of allegations of corruption and inefficiency. This approach had parallels in the Vietnamese leadership's decision to use a self-criticism and criticism campaign to assess Party cadre performance.
The Soviet Party Congress agreed to change Party rules to require that future admissions to the Party membership take place in open meetings with non-Party members present. Primary Party organisations such as factory or office based Party cells were given a say in the development of cadre policy. They now had the right, for example, to nominate people for inclusion on the list of Nomenklatura candidates, that is, candidates for future leading Party and State positions. The Congress affirmed the right of individual Party members to criticise their officials, and it laid down a requirement that officials inform Party organisations regularly of their progress in responding to criticism and suggestions put to them.19 Another significant change was that Party members who committed crimes could now be subjected to both Party discipline and prosecution before
16 Moscow Home Service 1530 gmt 28 June 1985 (BBC SWB SU/7991/A3/3, 1.7.85).
17 Baruch Hazan, From Brezhnev to Gorbachev: Infighting in the Kremlin (Boulder and London: Westview Press,