Características de las PYMES en el Ecuador

Properly conceived, the doctrine of locus standi operates as a practical limitation on the availability of judicial review of administrative actions since it requires that in order to be able to challenge an action, a person must have an interest which is sufficiently affected by the action being challenged. It is not enough to show that one falls within the class affected, he must go further to show that he has some personal interest that have been or is certain to be affected by the action complained of.

In the case of Adeshina v. Lemonu (1965) 1 All NLR 233, the defendant argued inter alia, that it was not competent to the plaintiff to sue (as the crown was the real owner, he could not have an injunction without joining the Attorney General. The court held that the plaintiff had proved the existence of that right and its violation, and that he made money from fishing, as a result, he suffers special damages, peculiar to himself from the interference with the public right. And was entitled to sue and obtain injunction without joining the Attorney General.

In the case of Olawoyin v. Attorney General (1961) All NLR 269, the court held that the appellant failed to show that he had sufficient interest to sustain a claim. “It seems to me that to hold that there was an interest here would amount to saying that a private individual obtained an interest by mere

enactment of a law with which he may, in the future, come in conflict, and I would not support such a proposition.”

See also the cases of Kamiova & ors. V. Ezezi (1961) All NLR 548.

If the quantum of interest demonstrated is held to be legally insufficient, a party might not be able to obtain judicial relief. The principle is aimed at preventing vexatious and professional litigants including busybodies from overlabouring the judicial system with frivolous actions.

Generally, action may be public or private in nature. By private action, it is meant that a person has suffered damages in conjunction with the public at large. Generally, the courts have tended to apply the doctrine in the same manner to both instances without necessarily recognizing whether the injury is private or public. While the courts have strictly applied this doctrine to private actions, they insist that only the Attorney General has locus standi to challenge any public wrong or through a process known as relator action. Lord Wilberforce strongly supported this relator action in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers (1977) 1 All E.R. 696 when he said that ‘it is a fundamental principle of English law that private right can be asserted by the individual but that a public right can only be asserted by the Attorney General as representing the public”

It is the strict application of the doctrine of public law that has tasked the intellect of writers, legal writers, judges and civil right activists. Judges have unwillingly tied their hands in the face of stark illegalities on the basis of lack of locus standi on the part of the litigants.

In the case of Missisipi & Missouri Railway Co. v. Ward (1813) 67 U.S. 485, the court held that the plaintiff in that case would not be heard unless he shows that he sustained, and is still sustaining individual damages. Furthermore, in Massachussets v. Mellon (1923) 262 U.S 447, the court held that a party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute (been ……) because he has sustained or he is immediately in the direct injury as a result of of its enforcement and not merely that he suffers in an indefinite way in common with people generally.

In the Nigerian case of Onyia v. Gov in Council (1962) WNLR 89, it was argued that the claim was not properly before the court in that the right alleged to be infringed was a public right and that the plaintiff had no locus standi. The court held that the plaintiff cannot sue in his private capacity to

enforce a public right or restrain interference with a public right in which he has no particular or special interest or where he has suffered no special damage without joining the Attorney General.

The cases of Dada v. University of Lagos (1961) I U.I.L.R. 344; Olawoyin v. A.G. , Northern Nigeria; Mohammed v. Governor of Kaduna State (1981( 1 NCLR 117 all followed the same opinion that in public law matters, it is not enough for someone to claim that he belonged to a society against which the action is directed. He must also show that his interest have been, or is been, or is likely to be affected in a significant way.

The Supreme Court of Nigeria had a unique opportunity to reverse this situation in the case of Senator Abraham Adesanya v. The President (supra) but unfortunately it shirked that duty by engaging in a judicial somersault. In that case, the court held that the plaintiff had no locus standi to bring an action challenging the appointment of the Chairman of FEDECO since he participated in the deliberations of the senate.

Recently, there has been a tremendous relaxation of a locus standi doctrine in England with Lord Denning been in the vanguard of that crusade. Standing has now been given to complainants who merely show that they are members of the society. This cases are known as Blackburn cases –

1. R. v. COP of the Metropolis ex parte Blackburn (1968) 2 QB 118; Blackburn v. A.G.

(1971) 1 WLR 103; R v. Police Commissioner ex parte Blackburn (1973) QB 241; R. v.

Greater London County Council exparte Blackburn (1976) 1 WLR 550

In the case of Gani Fawehinmi v. Col. Akilu (1987) 4 NWLR Pt. 57 the Nigerian Supreme Court gave locus standi to the applicant to compel the Attorney General to prosecute some state officials for murder because according to the court “the peace of the society is the responsibility of all persons in

the country. And as far as protection against crime is concerned every person in the society is “each other’s keeper”.

The relaxation of the doctrine in England which is based on the common law has limitations in Nigeria where every right and liability to sue derives from the constitution and other statutes.